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RECENT LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
Honorgble Charles M. Leibson
Jefferson Circuit Court
Louisville, Kentucky
There were three different pressure groups that were involved in recent
Kentucky malpractice legislation.

The first

~as

the physicians.

Physicians

in the state of Kentucky were alarmed last year and the year before by the
availability and the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance. This was
I

a crisis brought down on the state of Kentucky, but not by the experi~nice
of the physicians in the state insofar as suits against them and pay-outs on those
suits are concerned.

The Governor's committee has statistics on this, so that I'm

not just expressing a personal opinion when I say that problems elsewhere have
caused carriers to increase the cost of insurance in Kentucky as well as to quit
writing policies.

Nevertheless, the problem is as real to the physicians that

are involved as if it were one of their own making.

Such problems have been dealt

with in the Act in a manner that should be most helpful to physicians.
To some physicians, however, the main problem is being sued ..

The problem of be-

ing sued subdivides into groundless suits and meritorious claims where someone
has been injured as the result of negligence by the physician or hospital or medical service provider, and is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for the
injury.

There were a great many different proposals offering solutions.

involved eliminating all claims, groundless or meritorious.

One

The legislature in

Kentucky did not succumb to the pressure in that respect, nor did the Governor,
who, as all of us know, had a very strong: hand in what took place .in the state
legislature this past January.
Attorneys were also a pressure group.

The attorneys had a responsibility,

or if you want to cnnsider it from an economic standpoint, a selfish interest in
maintaining the right for suits to be brought when there is a meritorious claim.
The attorneys have no more right to maintain groundless suits than you have to
object to meritorious ones.

Attorneys have considerable problems, however.

cost of malpractice litigation is very high.

The

The persons who are potential

claimants in many cases are sufering catastrophic injury, are totally unemployed,
or are deceased.

There's very little money available to finance the depositions,

expert witness fees, and extensive trial procedure.

There is also a great deal

of unnecessary and, I believe, undeserved and perhaps unavoidable hostility that
attorneys who take such cases experience which causes many attorneys to refuse to
take such cases altogether.

When I was practicing, they used to say, "Go see

Charles Leibsoni he'll take any kind of case.
him."

He doesn't care who gets mad at

That was why I got more of these cases than I ever really cared to have.
The unavailability of medical testimony forces

attorneys to go

o~tside

of

state to get experts who are legitimately subject to criticism as being professional witnesses.

This problem comes because

though physicians within this

state will talk to you confidentially about what has been negligently done, they

are not available to testify, because of the criticism and ostracism of their
colleagues when they do.
Another interest group is the pUblic. There are twa aspects of their
concern.
One aspect is that everyone has to see and pay for doctors and so
they are concerned with the cost of medical insurance.

The other aspect is

that everyone is potentially a victim of a doctor's negligent act.

Their rights

also had to be considered.
These statistics were presented to the Governor's Committee covering the 5
years before it met in 1975.

They showed that the five leading, and I believe

practically exclusive, writers of medical malpractice' insurance coverage earned
premiums of over $7,365,000 and incurred losses of $4,509,016.

The figures showed

that only about 57 percent of the earned premiums were ever paid out or reserved
for payment against claims that had been made, which is a pretty good loss ratio
in any business.

This didn't make any difference.

These carriers were still

refusing to write policies, or else they were tripling premiums or pulling out of
business altogether because of experience in other states.
In essence, then, what did the legislature do.
two principal elements.
ance.

They passed an act that had

The first element deals with the unavailability of insur-

It provides a procedure known as a joint underwriting association.

Through

it the Commissioner of Insurance can, if he determines that a crisis exists in the
availability of malpractice insurance coverage, cause all the various insurance
underwriters in the state who deal in the liability field and in the hospital and
physicians'medical payments field to form a pool.

This is reserve legislation.

The commissioner reserves the power to impose this underwriting responsibility on
this joint underwriting association when he determines that a substantial number
of doctors in the state may not be covered by malpractice insurance.
The other major aspect of the law that was passed is the patients' compensation fund.

It operates in this fashion.

Every doctor and hospital is required

to insure against his own personal liability in a certain basic amount.
to doctors and hospitals on a mandatory basis

It applies

and to other health care providers

on a voluntary basis if and when the Commissioner of Insurance should order it.
It says that physicians and hospitals have to provide a basic insurance coverage
for themselves of $100,000 per occurence, $300,000 per year.
no longer have to buy the umbrella policies.

It says that they

These were, we were advised, the

real problem in causing the enormous expense and unavailability of insurance,
particularly to the physicians in surgery and anesthesiology.

Under this plan,

every physician and hospital will be assessed an amount equal to 10 percent of his
premium on basic insurance, which will be paid into a fund known as the patients'
compensation fund.
any

It will accumulate and will be available to pay the excess of

judgment of over $100,000 against a physician or hospital.

Those judgments

in Kentucky have been few and far between.
I was a great believer in having this fund, but I did not want it to operate
in the manner in which it did.

Why collect money from physicians before a loss
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actually occurs?

One may never occur.

I suggested that the act should be written

in a manner whereby if a lawsuit was won and a loss becomes payable, it would be
paid out of the general fund of the state, and would then be recouped in the next
year.

For instance, if there was a million dollars that had 'to be paid out of

the fund for 1975, then on the 1976 income tax, every physician would have an
assessment against his gross income which would be under one percent--whatever is
necessary to pay the state so that the money paid by the state would then be
recouped.

If nothing had been paid out, then no assessment would,be made.

could well envision that for many years

there~ould

I

be no need for physicians to

pay anything into the fund.
The physicians on the committee, the hospital administrators, and various
representatives of the physicians' aides, however, preferred the advance payment
of a percentage of basic policy premiums. Since it was out of their pockets,
certainly they were entitled to have the fund constituted in a manner that they
preferred.
There are other features in the plan which are of consequence.
has to

do with

the

ad damnum clause in a complaint.

This is the demand clause

in the complaint, which states how much you are sued for.
has been a real bone
reason or another.
pUblicity.

The first

For a long time, this

of contention for people who are regularly sued for one
The suit is filed for box car figures, and that gets a lot of

Then later on, if the suit had no merit, it is dropped or settled

for an amount much smaller than the box car figure sued for.

The act simply

provides that the demand clause in the complaint shall not recite any alleged
damages sum and that it will just ask for such fair and reasonable compensation
as the trier or fact should determine is appropriate.
that box car figure.

You will not be faced with

The insurance carrier defending you can assess the potential

value of the claim, and set up their reserve accordingly.
They are obligated by this act, when they think that the claim has a
potential in excess of $lOO,OOO,to notify the patients' compensation fund so that
the fund can deal with its potential liability.

A good side aspect to the program

passed by the legislature is that because of the potential liability of the fund,
there has to be reporting of claims to a central agency and some kind of investigation where the type or the amount of claims is such as to indicate that we have
a physician that is really incapable of practicing medicine up to the standard
that the medical profession has a right to expect.
"Medical malpractice" is a misnomer which I wish we could get away from.
In essence, 99.9 percent of the time, all you are talking about when you use the term
medical malpractice is negligence, pure and simple.

You'll find pronouncement

after pronouncement by our Supreme Court specifying that we're not talking about
a mistake in judgment which is a reasonable decision in the circumstances.

We're

only talking about those situations where there's been a failure to exercise
ordinary care and someone is injured as a result of that negligent act or omission.
That's the only time when compensation should be available.
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I make that point

because that brings me to another point in the Act.
The Act provides for an objective standard for a claim against a physician in
cases concerning informed consent. Some physicians have
claim for failure to provide informed consent.

ov~rreacted

to the potential

The truth of the matter is that

the cases where there's been compensation awarded on that basis are very, very few
in Kentucky.

To alleviate any fears that doctors might have in this respect, this

Act provides an objective standard.

Informed consent doesn't just relate to what

the patient or his lawyer might think should have been told to the patient, but
what a reasonable physician should be expected to tell a patient in the circumstanceq.
Our Court of Appeals has already decided upon this standard:in a very recent case which specifies that informed·consent will be treated just
other negligence problem--reasonable conduct in the circumstances.

like every
As with other

types of malpractice, the plaintiff will have to prove by experts that there was
a failure to follow standard medical practice in the advice to the patient, unless,
of course, you have a situation so flagrant that the facts speak for themselves.
You don't have to worry about subjective standards for informed consent anymore.
That's a problem that's gone.
The next problem dealt with by the statutes is the problem of secrecy,
privileged communication, and confidentiality.

Specifically, the .. problem is

whether evidence developed in peer review procedures showing negligence on the
part of the physician should be discoverable as are all other types of evidence.
The Act as passed provides a privilege against discovery for this evidence.

It

states that the proceedings, records, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations
of any physicians' committee, or similar entity, shall not be subject to discovery,
subpoena, or introduction into evidence in any civil trial.

This, in effect,

overturns a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Nazareth Literary and
Benevolent Institution v. Stevenson, 503

S.W.2d,

77 (Ky. 1973), wherein the Court

ruled against privileges.
The committee and the legislature did something in passing this Act contrary
to my suggestion.

I suggested that they make participation in the patients", com-

pensation fund in this act voluntary.

However they wrote the Act,saying you

"shall" join the patients' compensation fund.

A suit was filed in the United

States District Court--it's Floyd v. Carroll--for declaratory relief.
attacks two elements of the Act.

This suit

The first element is the constitutionality of

that part of the Act that states that doctors must belong to this fund in order
to practice medicine and which provides that if they are reported to the state
licensure board for failure to belong to the fund, it will be grounds for suspending
their license.

The plaintiffs argue that the practice of medicine in which they

are engaged is a means of livelihood and thereby is property within the meaning
of the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the united States.

They argue that

the part of the Act that says that if they don't or can't. get into the fund, they
can't practice medicine, deprives them of their right to practice medicine without
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due process of law.

They may well have something, because the Supreme Court of

the united States has ruled that an act which took away a man's license to drive
without prior evidence that he was guilty of any negligence in
, the way he operated
fuis car or other misconduct, was unconstitutional.
I would think that a license
to practice medicine should have at least the stature of a license to drive an
automobile.
Very surprisingly to me, the doctor plaintiffs also attacked, in this suit,
that part of the Act relating to the confidentiality and immunity of such proceedreco~endations

ings, records, opinions, conclusions, and

as wholly incompatible with and contravening a

sectio~

of. peer review boards,

of the Social Security Act

wherein the professional standards review organizati9ns were created
congress of the United States.

~y

the

The suit claims that the Act should be ideclared

void because this is violative of the supremacy clause of article VI of the
constitution of the United States.

The supremacy clause, of course, provides

that the state cannot pass any law that interferes with the function of the federal
law.

The message is:

Don't cancel your umbrella policy.

Although the Act

specifies that it is effective July 1, the Act is not necessarily constitutional,
and you may very well need that

umbr~la

policy if it isn't.

I understand also

that there is a state action that's been filed that also attacks the constitutionality of the Act as passed.

can you answer whether the Indiana law is being attacked
LEIBSON:

There is a malpractice suit that has been filed in Indianapolis

a lawyer named Townsend.

I don't remember the name of the suit.

That will

the constitutionality of the Indiana law which will have to be thrown out
it doesn't go through the screening panel procedures provided in the
Act.
y

Also, it doesn't restrict itself to the limitations on amounts that
Those screening panel procedures that I'm talking about are proce-

s that say that before the suit can be filed it has to go by mandatory provito the three-man committee of physicians to render an opinion on the matter.
Judge Leibson, if a physician is being questioned or reviewed by the
fessional standards review organization, will he be able to obtain standards
are applied to other medical areas in Kentucky, and will the act that you
of affect the confidentiality of those records?
The act will positively affect the confidentiality of those records.
to write an opinion about a fellow physician or to give testiyourself in any peer review procedure, the information or evidence you
will be confidential under this Act.
r recognize a locality rule.

As to the other part, we in Kentucky

We say that everyone who is a board certified

dic surgeon should adhere to the basic standards of that profession.
ity doesn't come into consideration, except if there aren't facilities avail-
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able that he could use to practice his profession.

But from a standpoint of know-

ledge, a board certified orthopedic surgeon, regardless of where he practices, is
supposed to have the knowledge of a board certified
QUESTION:

That pleases me.

orthop~dic

I represent the physician.

surgeon.

My point is that I want

to be able to discover the standards applied, I think arbitrarily, by this
organization throughout other medical districts in Kentucky.

I'm curious to know

whether the Act will restrict me from even getting those standards.
JUDGE LEIBSON:

I think the Act will restrict you from getting'any infromation

that is provided before that peer review board; at least I can tell you positively
that this is the intention of the Act.
QUESTION:

If the patients' compensation fund should become exhausted, would there

be further assessment?
JUDGE LEIBSON:

No.

As I read it, all that it means is that any unpaid portion of

the claims simply goes over into the next year and the claimant waits until the
procedures of assessment have replenished the fund before he gets paid.

It is a

socialization, you understand, in the sense that a physician or a hospital no
longer has a personal liability for his negligence over and above the sum of
$100,000.

It's paid by an assessment against everyone in the entire profession.

As opposed as I am, being a rugged individualist, to any form of socialization, I
have to say as a practical matter that anything that relieves the medical profession from carrying the burden of paying huge premiums for uroorella policies that they
never use, has to be a progressive step of which I approve.
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ARBITRATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
John A. Krichbaum, J.D.
Assistant Director Legislative Department
American Medical Association
'
Chicago, Illinois
Before I start the presentation of my portion of this program, I would like
to comment briefly on something that the judge mentioned toward the end of his
presentation, mandatory pretrial screening laws.
two state court decisions on this matter.

To date, there have been only

A recent Illinois decision struck
- -,

down the mandatory pretrial screening law (as well as striking down the limitation
on liability).

The Florida Supreme Court, however, ha~ recently upheld the man-

datory pretrial screening panel statute in that state.
I'd like to talk with you this morning about two subjects.

The use of

arbitration in medical malpractice cases, and the possible use of a no-fault
system for medical malpractice.

First of all I'd like to examine the constitu-

tionality of arbitration as a substitute for the traditional judicial system for
resolution of medical malpractice cases.

Secondly, I'd like to discuss some of

the potential advantages and disadvantages of
jury system for medical malpractice cases.

arbitrat~on

as contrasted to the

Finally, I'd like to discuss very

briefly what some of the states are doing by way of legislation

in~~gard

to

arbitration of medical malpractice cases.
We might start off with a very simple definition of arbitration.

Arbitration

is a procedure whereby parties with a dispute submit their disagreements to an
impartial third party, other than the traditional judicial system, for resolution.
It might be useful to keep two questions and two possible answers in mind
during this discussi'on.

First of all, is arbitration, as a substitute for the jury

system, constitutionally and legally valid?
times no.

My answer is sometimes yes and some-

The second question to keep in mind is whether arbitration, as a

substi tute for the

jury system is desirable.

The answer, again, is maybe yes and

maybe no.
First let us consider the constitutionality and legal validity of arbitration
as a substitute for the jury system.
clear that I will not be talking about

In this examination I'd like to make it
nonbinding arbitration, since whether it

is entered into on a compulsory or a voluntary basis, if it is

nonbinding, that

is if either party has the right to a trial de novo following arbitration, then I
believe it's more appropriate to call that sort of mechanism a pretrial screening.
By binding arbitration, I mean that following arbitration there would be only a
limited right of judicial appeal.

There would be no right to a new jury trial,

but only the right of appeal to the court on questions of law or on an allegation
that the arbitration decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Let's look at compulsory binding arbitration.

Under this kind of arbitra-

tion, one or both parties are forced to enter into arbitration for resolution of
any disputes.

This compulsion could be either by operation of a statute or by
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action of one of the parties.

Is

compulsory binding arbitration constitutionally

or legally prohibited or restrained?

My answer would be that compulsory arbitra-

tion, in the sense of a statute mandating that

malpractic~

cases be submitted to

binding arbitration, is constitutionally prohibited, and that compulsory arbitration, in

the sense of a health care provided conditioning the rendition of services

upon execution of a binding arbitration agreement, is legally restricted but

not

necessarily legally prohibited.
Why would a statute that required submission of medical malpractice cases
to binding arbitration be unconstitutional?

I believe it would be because of the

constitutional right to a trial by jury in civil cases.

Let me make it clear that

I'm not referring here to this right as stated in the federal constitution.

The

federal constitution does not impose upon the state an obligation to afford trial
by jury in civil cases.

The provision in article III of the u.s. Constitution

stating that "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be
by jury ... " and the seventh amendment, which states "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved ... " relate to trial in federal court only.

The seventh amend-

ment to the U.S. Constitution has not been extended to apply to the states.
There area couple of citations on this.
Sauvinet, 92 u.S. 90 (1876).

One is quite an old case, Walker v.

The Supreme Court held therE?' that'trial by jury was

not considered essential to due process.

Since the fourteenth amendment guarantees

no particular form or method of procedure, states are 'free wi thin the boundaries
of their own constitutions to retain or abolish juries in civil cases.
position was reaffirmed in Williams v. Florida, 399 u.S. 78 (1970).

This

Consequently

then, the right to trial by jury in civil cases in state courts is not derived
from the U.S. Constitution.

However, the constitutions of every state have a

provision guaranteeing the right of trial by jury in civil cases.

Indeed, such

a clause was in many state constitutions prior to the adoption of the federal
constitution.

Thus, we reach the conclusion that a statute, either federal or

state which would make it compulsory that medical malpractice cases be submitted
to binding arbitration, would be constitutionally prohibited.
What about compulsory binding arbi tration in the sense of a health care
provider conditioning the rendition of services upon execution of a binding arbitration agreement?

I said before that I thought such a sitation was probably legally

restricted but not necessarily legally prohibited.

What I mean is that the more

the cLrcumstances surrounding the agreement to submit bo binding arbitration between the health care provider and the patient reflects a compulsory term of the
agreement on the part of the health care provider, the more +ikely such agreement
is to be struck down by the courts as being invalid because of undue influence or
duress.

On the other hand, the more the circumstances surrounding such an agree-

ment reflect a voluntary agreement to submit to binding arbitration, the more likely
such an agreement is to be upheld.

That's pretty general, but there are principles

that you have to keep in mind if you are drafting either legislation or private
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arbitration agreements between health care providers and their patients.
A voluntary agreement to submit to binding arbitration indicates a waiver
of the right to trial by jury and is valid in most states.

In eight states within

the past year and a half--Alabama, California, Louisiana, Michigan,

s

Ohio, South

Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia--such voluntary binding arbitration agreements and
their implementations will have to be in accordance with specific statutes enacted
in these states relating to binding arbitration in medical malpractice cases.
In some of the other states such voluntary binding

arbitr~tion

agreements

will probably be legally valid if executed and..J implemented in accordance with the
general statutory arbitration guidelines of the state.

There are about 33 states
I

which have enacted a general arbitration statute.

In other states such voluntary

binding arbitration agreements might not be upheld because of case or statutory
law in the state which might say, for example, that the application of the law is
a judicial function which cannot be done in a binding way by nonjudicial personnel.
Case law in some states might make it very difficult, as a practical matter, to
have voluntary binding arbitration agreements construed as actually being voluntary.
I would like to mention several of the factors which support voluntary binding arbitration agreements being construed as actuallY,being voluntary.

Some of

these factors are required in the specific medical malpractice statutes which I
referred to as having been

enacted within the last year and a haLf in eight
1,_ ..

s

states.

Foremost among these might be the right of the patient to reJect the bind-

ing arbitration agreement within a designated number of days
following provision
,
of the services or signing of the agreement.

This provision is in all but one of

the statutes that were enacted in the eight states I mentioned.
statutes apply only to past disputes.
only disputes which have arisen.
future disputes.

Two of the eight

You can in those states agree to arbitrate

In the other six states you can agree to arbitrate

In five of those six states a provision exists in the law which

requires that the law contain a provision for the patient to reject the arbitration argreement within a certain number of days following the provision of the
services.

This is put in to uphold the voluntary nature of the agreement.

If a

patient is coming in for provision of necessary services, he may be quite willing
to sign anything to obtain those services,

but a court looking at that type of

ra-

situation in retrospect might very well conclude that the agreement was really not

y

a voluntary undertaking on the part of the patient.

The solution, may be to draw the

agreement so as to allow the patient to reject the arbitration agreement within
so many days following either the entry of the arbitration agreement or the provision
of services.

The argument, frankly, doesn't hold up quite as much if the days are

numbered from the entry into the agreement as it does if the days are numbered from
the date of provision of the services.
A second factor which helps uphold the voluntary nature of the arbitration
:ely

agreement is when the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement as

_es

well as the language in the agreement make it clear to the patient that the provision of services is in fact not dependent upon execution of the agreement.
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It

should be noted at this point, however, that whether a condition for rendering
services is the execution of a binding arbitration agreement will obviously have
different

legal

consequences depending on the setting and , the parties who are
executing the agreement. For example, if the condition is part of a prepaid group
practice plan which the patient enters prior to any immediate need for services,
it is quite likely that the agreement will be upheld.
P.2d

See Doyle v. Guilucci, 401

1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965). Likewise, it would seem likely that an agreement

to submit to binding arbitration which was entered into between, a physician and a
patient prior to any immediate need for med.ical care woulq be upheld in most states.
Both of the situations mentioned above would,be considerably different than
a situation in which a hospital made entering the hospital conditional upon
execution of a binding arbitration agreement.
would probably be struck down by the court.

In such a setting the agreement
Another California case which you

might want to have on this is Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California,
60 Cal.2d

92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).

A very well written law

review article on this subject is by Fredrich Kessler, entitled "Contracts of
Adhesion--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract," 43 Columbia Law Review (1943).
What are the potential advantages and disadvantages of voluntary binding
arbitration as a substitute for the jury system in medical malpractice cases?
list some of the potential advantages first.
claims.

I'll

It's a speedier meth~d of handling

Proponents of arbitration say that because of the informal nature of

arbitration proceedings, claims can be handled in less time than in the traditional
litigation system.

The second potential advantage is that it provides a higher

degree of sophistication in the decision making process.

Proponents of arbitration

say that it permits the use of experienced and knowledgeable decision makers such
as physicians and lawyers, which will result in more informed and appropriate
decisions.

A third potential advantage is that it provides less emotional or

irrational decisions.

Proponents say that a panel of arbitrators is much less

likely to be swayed by irrational and emotional appeals than is a jury.
potential advantage is less publicity.

Since arbitration is a contractual remedy,

it provides a benefit, proponents say, of
setting.

A fourth

having disputes remain in a private

The sensational aspects of a jury trial are thereby avoided.

A fifth

potential advantage that's mentioned for arbitration over a jury system is that it
is a mechanism which provides for less judicial appeal.
more final than jury awards,

Arbitration awards are

since reasons for judicial appeal are fewer in

arbitration, and proponents say that this will lessen the number of unnecessary
appeals.
Now I'd like to mention a few of the potential disadvantages of arbitration.
One would be the loss of the procedural safeguards which judicial li"tigation provides.
The informality of arbitration proceedings is a two-edged sword.

The informality

may speed up proceedings, but it does, of course, sacrifice traditional procedural
and evidentiary safeguards.

Under most of the enacted medical malpractice binding

arbitration statutes, the formal rules of evidence do not apply.
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The absence of

evidentiary objections probably harms the defendant more than the plaintiff.
A second potential disadvantage of arbitration is the loss of jury sympathy
for the defendant.

A number of physicians will find this hard to believe, but

traditionally juries have been quite reluctant to find again'st the defendant

Ip

physician.

In fact, national statistics show that, depending on the state, from

66 2/3 to somewhat slightly over 80 percent of jury decisions in medical mal~nt

practice cases are decided in favor of the physician-defendant.
Another potential disadvantage is that pUblicity concerning the effect of
iml~rance

:es.

large malpractice awards on rising heal th

premiums may cause some jurors

in

to reconsider awarding inappropriately large sums of money.
I

that this is taking place, for example, in California.

There is some evidence

It is also possible that

the more sophisticated panel members who might have a better understanding of the
loss of income may actually place a larger value on it.
A third potential disadvantage of arbitration is the easy availability of
arbitration.

This factor may encourage some frivolous or nuisance suits.

A fourth potential disadvantage is that arbitration may more often result in
compromise dispositions rather than in a clear finding of liability or fault.

I.

Arbitrators, it is often said, feel that they are doing a good job if they come

'II

down equally on each side of the coin over a period of time. 'Therefore, there
might be some tendency for arbitrators to try to encourage

settlemen~~

rather than

to reach a clear resolution of the issues.
A fifth potential disadvantage is that the nonpublip nature of arbitration
proceedings may make them appear suspect to the public.

Some critics of arbitration

Lon

say that it may avoid the healthy pressure of "law suit pUblicity" as a device for

1

encouraging quality health care.
A sixth potential disadvantage of arbitration is that as a mechanism for
limiting the right of appeal, it may make it considerably more difficult to correct
erroneous or unjust decisions.
The problem with making a decision for or against arbitration, even after

1

having heard some of the potential advantages and disadvantages, is that there

{,

hasn't been a lot of experience with arbitration of medical malpractice yet.
have been, of course,
Lt

There

some voluntary arbitration programs that have been in

operation for a number of years, but there

has

been no widespread experience with

the use of arbitration for medical malpractice cases.
I'd like to make a few remarks about some of the specific medical malpractice
voluntary binding arbitration statutes which have been enacted in some states.

As

I mentioned before, all of these statutes were enacted within the past year and a
)n.

half.

Tides .J

might be of interest to you.

i

for what might be called post-claim

3.1

that it is only after a physician or other health care provider has rendered or

ng

failed to render services out of which a claim has arisen that the parties may

A few of the specifics in some of these malpractice arbitration statutes
I mentioned that statutes in two states provide only
arbitration.

agree to settle such disputes by arbitration.

I
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That is, the statutes provide

The two states are Vermont and

Alabama.

The California law, which permits agreements to cover arbitration of

future disputes, requires that the arbitration agreement, contain the following
language immediately before the signature line in at least 10 point bold red type:
"Note: By Signing This Contract You Are Agreeing To Have Any Issue
Of Medical Malpractice Decided By Neutral Arbitration And You Are
Giving Up Your Right To A Jury Or Court Trial. . . "
All of the specific medical malpractice binding arbitration statutes except
arbitr~t~on

one (South Dakota), which permit
malpractice agreements,

p~ovide

agreements to cover future medical

for a certain period of time, either following
I

execution of the contract or provision of the services, in which the patient may
reject the arbitration agreement.

I think this fact highlights the importance of

such a provision.
Now, I would like to make a few brief remarks regarding a no-fault approach
to medical malpractice.

I think there are severe constitutional questions about

a no-fault system for medical malpractice cases.

The issue of whether state

legislatures can modify or substitute or do away with rights that existed in
common law is one problem area.

In any number of state constitutions there are

provisions that rights that existed at common law shall not be changed or modified.
Of. course, someone might ask about workmen's compensation
rights at common law.

stat;,~tes

which modified

The legal decisions all the way from the~u.S. Supreme Court

down to the state supreme courts, relative to workmert';s compensation have indicated
that if there is sufficient quid pro quo, if something sufficent is given back
for that which was taken away, then the legislature can
or change rights which existed at common law.

constitutionally

modify

Therefore, while it may be theoret-

ically possible to structure a no-fault medical malpractice system which would be
upheld constitutionally, it would be subject to quite a bit of argument about
whether there was in fact a sufficient quid pro quo, a sufficient trade off.
For example, the New York panel which recently studied no-fault came up
with suggestions for a no-fault system.

Their suggestions are all very general.

They are very fuzzy about the question of how you define a compensable medical
injury.

They cite the recent judicial decision in New York upholding the New York

automobile no-fault statute, but even in their study they note that that statute
provides for no-fault only up to a point.

In other words, you can get a certain

amount of money under the statute, but beyond that you may sue in court for
"serious injuries."
Beyond that, the desirability and workability of a "no-fault" medical malpractice program would be subject to serious question.

Should physicians, for

example, support with their premiums a system which is qoinq to provide compensation
even where the physician is not negligent? Would this greatly expand the number
of incidents for which doctors are going to pay?

I think that it would.

How do you come up with a definition of what is going to be compensable
and what's not?

Is it going to be easy to say that the person's condition is the

result of a medical accident rather than the injury or the disease for which the
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the patient initially sought treatment?
difficult.
rpe:

I think that this would be extremely

One of the approaches being suggested is to try to come up with a

specific list of all the compensable types of incidents.

I, don't think that would

be very workable.

:ept

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:
QUESTION:

I have two very brief questions.

First of all, you were talking about

factors relating to the voluntariness of the agreement and the tight of the patient
to reject it wi thin a certain amount of days"
.y

Are there any provisions in the

statute that deal with the question of what happens i,f the patient dies or becomes

of

mentally incapacitated?

ach
t

Would the patient's personal representative have a right

to reject the agreement?
MR. KRICHBAUM:

Most of the statutes provide that it can either be the patient or

his authorized representative.
QUESTION:

My second question deals with the potential advantages of the more

sophisticated decision making process with attorneys and physicians on the panel.
ied.
ed
urt
ated

Is there any provision

for any sort of consumer input which would perhaps counter-

balance what might be an over-professionalism in hearing such a case?
MR. KRICHBAUM:

I think that's a good question.

I know that most of the medical

malpractice arbitration statutes indicate that there will be an attorney, a
physician, and a judge.

Several do provide for consumer or lay representation.

fy
:Je

nk

ltion

.e
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RISK CONTROL
Paul A. Van Pernis, M.D.
American Medical Association
Chicago, Illinois
In discussing professional liability, we are forced to talk about malpractice; I don't really know how we can separate the two terms.
means "bad" practice,

The word malpractice

and what we have to try to do is minimize the instances in

which bad practices occur.

Although not all professional liability action stems

from malpractice, where it's truly bad practice, there is insufficient attention
to risk control.
Considerable effort to minimize the sources of risk have been made by
various hospital associations and some of the insurance carriers who write policies
for institutions.

Some efforts at education in this area have been made by "medical

specialty" organizations whose membership is primarily based in institutions.

Most

notable are the educational efforts of the College of American Pathologists.
Although many other professional associations have begun similar efforts, little
has been done by most state or county

medical societies.

State and local building

codes, fire department regulations, and some national bureau regulations and
advisory statements have been promulgated, but follow-up and enforcement is
sporadic and all too often a catastrophe of some sort follows.

My purpose is to

attempt to point out the sources of the individual physician's risk with the hope
that more awareness of the problems will occur, that something will be done about
it on a personal basis, and that each one of you will involve his colleagues in
clearing up the problems.
The physician faces risk in the office environment, hospital environment,
and the community or other agencies in which he or she works.

I shall now ask a

series of questions concerning some of the sources of risk, hoping that you may
be stimulated to think of some others for yourself, hoping that you'll make comments,
and most of all hoping that you will resolve to do something about the uneasiness
such questions may engender.
The physician's office:--let's start with the patient's waiting room and
the building in which the doctor practices.

Does the building and its environment

make it easy and safe for patients to come to see you, particularly if they have
physical disabilities?

Is your offices patient waiting area quiet and reflective

of a professional atmosphere?
dures?

Have you oriented your office

help to your proce-

Do you set a pattern of concern for patients that the office

can follow?

Is the wiring safe for lamps between furniture?

Can patients move into and out of chairs without assistance?
dations for the elderly and the physically disabled?

personnel

Are the floors safe?
Are there accommo-

Are there provisions to

prevent waiting patients from overhearing conversations between office personnel
and telephone conversations?

Is there privacy between office

personnel and

patients who are discussing finances, consultation arrangements and hospitalization
or other institutional arrangements?

Is there another
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exit for treated

or

acutely ill patients other than the main entrance to your

o~fice?

Are office

patient's records kept in confidence from other patients or other persons not part
o~fice

of your

personnel?

These

are the things that havebroughtsuitsi

pat

these

ins
pro

Do you

tha

are things we have to think about.
What about the examining and treatment room?

Is privacy insured?

have a nurse present when you examine patie~~s of the opposite sex?
patient or physician or nurse quickly summon help when nece'ssary?
adequate?

Could the
Is the lighting

inc

Is sufficient help available to assist both the patient and yourself?

Are the examining tables and chairs safe?

und

Are the instruments, appliances, and

other equipment periodically checked for safety, reliability, and accuracy?
often are they checked and by what standard?

How

r01

Do office personnel

ha\i

understand the maintenance and purposes of the equipment and the checking against
known standards? Who instructs them? Do you or your personnel explain to patients

weI
mee

why you wish to use the equipment?

phj

Do you explain its possible hazards as well

as its benefits?
Now let's examine the patient.
history a thorough ,and complete one?

or
Is your record of

sign it?

th~

patient's medical

COl

How was it obtained--by Y9u, by your office

wi,

Did you verify what your 'personnel or the

ge'

personnel, or by electronic recorders?
black box recorded?

Who checks them?

the

Did you add, delete or correct the record?

Did you make certain of its confidentiality?

Did you date and

tr,

Did you do a thorough and

complete examination and record the findings in detail, whether positive or

wr

Did you request the necessary laboratory, X-ray, electrocardiographic or other

th
We

studies?

Can you justify the expense of doing them?

Did you personally obtain

the necessary specimens or supervise the obtaining of such specimens?
the procedures?

di
Di

Who does

Do you know that those doing them are reliable, accurate, prompt,

di

and have accepted standards against which the results are checked?

ne

Have you visited the laboratories personally so that you know the personnel,
their qualifications, their participation in outside quality control checks, the

di

result of such outside checks whether voluntary or legally required, with or with-

de

out licensure?

pc

Did you examine the data obtained, transfer it to the patient's

nE

records, date and sign such data and make the necessary interpretations or request
a repeat of the procedure or procedures?

pE

If you did not record the results, do you

nE

have a system that alerts you to abnormal findings so that appropriate treatment
can be instituted, or medications and dosages changed?
changes of specimens,

Did you relate temperature
p,

shipping time, and time of obtaining specimens, or

L

medications or dietary factors which might interfere with the data in its interpretation?

When necessary, did you explain to the patient why another specimen
f

is needed and at whose expense the procedure is to be repeated?
Do you know the individuals in the radiology laboratory?
individuals in the

occupational therapy department?

Do you know the

Do you know the people who

s

Do you

P

know the people who are directing the activities of these people? Did you allow
sufficient time to obtain the patient's medical history? Do you obtain the

u

are going to do other tests like an electroencephelograph, for instance?

t

necessary consultations, discuss
art

the diagnostic and treatment plans with the

patient as well as with the family, your office personnel,
institutional personnel as indicated?

the hospital or other

Did you discuss the hazards and the
I

prognosis?

Did you indicate this on your patient's record and inform the patient

that such a record was made?
Did you obtain the necessary signed consents from the patient or the family,

u

ing

including a statement that the patient agrees that he was informed, and that he

?

understood your plans, diagnosis and prognosis?
the relationship of residents and other

stude~~s

Did you inform the patient about
to the patient and what their

role would be in the situation, provided you're in a teaching situation?

w

I

have a witness to such discussions?

Did you

Did you note on the record who the witnesses

nst

were?

.ents

medication, consultations, hospitalization, etc?

Did you give the patient written directions concerning the treatment plan,
Did you confer .with other

physicians, therapists, technicians, pharmacists, and social agencies--in person
or in writing--and did you inform the patient or family
conferences?

memfuer about these

Did you ask any of these persons to confirm appointments directly

.ce

with the patient or with a family member?

:he

get home, to another office, or to the hospital, etc. and make arrangements for

md

transportatioQ when necessary?
Did you arrange for future appointments and verify such

md

rative

Did you consider how the patient would

writing for the patient or his family?

arrange~ents

in

Were all the surgical procedures or other

therapy performed in a proper setting with proper techniques and proper assistance?
Were dressings, casts, applications, or other treatments done by you or under your
direct supervision, and did you recheck such applications within proper intervals?
apt,

Did you record on the patient's record what was done?
did you attach them?

lnel,

necessary?
discus~

Do you have a mechanism to handle complaints about your fees?

fees in advance with patients?

do you let your office manager handle the complaint?

3

patients fill out claim forms?

::>

you

nt
ture

n

Do you refuse to provide information that patients

need in order to submit claim

form~~or

you have been paid for the service?

instance, workmen's compensation, or
If a patient

needs to have his or her records forwarded to another physician or another institution, do you resist by making the transfer of information contingent on the
payment of his or her account?

r-

Does your office staff help

personal injury

claim~~nless

Do you

If patients believe they are overcharged,

ithllest

If you took photographs,

Did you date and sign the record and record witnesses when

Do you allow enough time for appointments, and to

listen to the patient's concerns?
What about the physician himself?

Have you put aside or resolved personal

frustrations that might interfere with the care of patients?

Are you certain that

he

personal illness will not affect your care of the patient?

Have you provided

ho

sufficient time to provide high quality patient care for both office and hospitalized

ou

patients?

ow

to patients when unforseen interruptions occur?

Have you arranged for adequate explanation to your office personnel and
Have you provided time for contin-

uing education,the readingr·o:f journals, and drug experience ihformation for your-
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,

I

j
self and your office force?
review activities?

Have you provided time for participation in peer

Have you provided time for reflective review of patient's

records, your consultations, and did you initiate any necessary corrections?

How

I

much do you rely on detail

men

for your knowledge of drugs and their use?

about your relationship with the hospital or other institutions?

What

Do you really

know and understand the medical staff rules and administrative rules of the
institution in which you practice?

Do you understand the use of mechanisms provided

to make changes you believe need to be made?

Are you prepared to explain the use

of consultants, assistants, and ancillary services to' your patients?
certain that your discussions with and about

p~tients

not broadcast by corridor or public area discussion?

Are you

are kept confidential and
Are you courteous but firm

when discussing errors with hospital personnel, and do you inform your patient
as to the corrections being made?

Are your own personnel instructed about hospital

routine and procedures when they assist or accompany you to your hospital?

Have

you made certain that the hospital records on your patients are complete, accurate,
and detailed?
care team?

Did you check the accuracy of notations made by others of the health

Did you write a summary of the case?

Did you discuss with your patient

the hospital charges and fees when the patient is in the hospital?
What about the insurance relationship and the follow-up you expect to give
upon discharge from the hospital?

Did you put the necessary"qj.rections to the

patient in writing and inform a member of the family or the guardian as to your
plan?

Are you certain you were understood?

Are you available for further question

The questions I have raised relate to what we know as traditional medical
care of patients with manifest disease.
implications of modern comprehensive
right.

Other questions will arise with the

health care since health is now a basic

I would suggest that you consider similar questions as related to health

education of patients, health protection of patients, health maintenance for
patients, diagnosis and care of symptomatic disease, care of the dying, and
rehabilitation and custodial care, which are all now considered to comprise the
range of medical services the public needs.
I don't want to leave you with a feeling that I know all the questions and
answers.
rule.

What I've said is really common sense.

I'd like to leave you with this question:
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It's application of the golden
suppose you were the patient?

A PLAINTIFF'S LAWYER VIEWS MALPRACTICE
William C. Ball, J.D.
Ball and Nagel, P.C.
Waterloo, Iowa

How
at

I assume that anyone attending this conference has reached the point in

y

his reasoning where he recognizes there is such a thing as malpractice.

I

ovide

run into some physicians who will not recognize this, but I'm not going to spend

use

a great deal of time on that problem.

Instead I'll try to

about the three people that are involved in m~}practice.
d

rm

normally, about a patient who's been injured.

defin~

it and to talk

First, we're talking,

By an injury I mean some inordinate

or untold result from medical treatment which mayor may not have been caused
by the negligence of the doctor.

Second we're talking about a lawyer to whom

ital

the injured patient goes.

ve

I'd also include the care facilities, such as the hospital where that patient
was treated .

.rate,
ealth
tient

When injured patients corne to me, it's my duty to sort them out.
they corne from?
state of Iowa.

ve

And of course we're also talking about the physician.

Where do

Basically, they corne from referrals from other lawyers around the
On a few isolated occasions they corne from outside the state.

There are usually two reasons they are referred.

The first, in most instances,

the referring lawyer tells me, is because "It's against a local doc;t.or, and I
.r

can't handle the case.

stion

certain unrealistic relationship between the professions.

al

fiable.

I need his future cooperation."

This implies to me a
~he

second is more justi-

He'll call me and say, "Hey, Bill, I wouldn't know one if I saw one.

Will you please look this thing over and tell me what's there, if anything, and
I'll be happy to work with you on any basis that you want me to, or if you don't,
th

fine."
The main characteristic of the people that are sent to me in most instances
is that they are in the dark.

e

They have not been given an adequate explanation as

to the reason for their bad result.

Obviously, our hornbooks say that a bad re-

sult does not necessarily mean negligence, but there's usually been a breakdown in
and

communication between the physician and the patient.

.en

breakdown is totally unjustified because upon investigation of the case, after

In many instances this

consultation with a physician who's knowledgeable in the area in which the injury
occurred, we will often write the patient a letter--which quite frankly should
have been written by the attending physician--explaining to him the reason for
the result that was obtained.

In some 25 percent of the cases, the patient is

angry because there's been a complete breakdown of communications between him and
the physician.

In many instances, of course, this is a sign that the physician

is rather sensitive about the result obtained, whether justifiably or not.
he's trying to hide something.

This is a hallmark.

Perhaps

It's not a controlling factor,

but it is something that does happen.
In some cases there is genuine medical injury which you don't need to be
a doctor or lawyer to figure out

shouldn't have happened as when the clamp
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slipped off inside the patient.
ipsa loquitur.

These fall into that terrible doctrine of

The patient comes in and wants to know what to do.

those, and I told the lady to see a surgeon and get

i~

~

I had one of

removed because she was

sitting in my office with it in her.
Finally, there is one thing

that the patients recognize--as far as I'm

concerned, the medical profession is in real trouble with the public in this
particular area.

This is the extreme reluctance, which I consider to still be

in existence in this country, of physicians to testify in legitimate malpractice
I'd-i~ke

cases against another physician.
brought he.r

SOD,

in because of an undiagnosed wrist fracture.

look at the case for her.
opened

to relate the observation of a lady who
She wanted us to

When I explained this problem to her, she looked at me,

her eyes in surprise and said, "Did the doctors take an oath to protect

one another?"
an oath.

This was her reaction.

I told her no, they take a diffe.rent kind of

I think this is something the medical profession

should talk about.

But let's talk about the lawyer for a minute because this is a many-faceted
problem.

The fault, in terms of the crisis in this area--and there is a crisis--

is not only the fault of the medical profession.
on the lawyers.

We can lay part of the problem

First of all, what do I tell someone who comes in to see me when

they think they have a case, or when they want to know if they have a case?

I

tell them that we turn down at least 80 percent of the people who come in after
we've investigated their cases.

I was talking to a leading firm in the midwest,

which keeps statistics on medical malpractice

cases~

Of the 100 cases that they

screened in the last 2 or 3 year period, they took five.
other 95.

They turned down the

Doctors complain about the contingent fee system, but the contingent fee

system is the best thing

the doctors have going in terms of the proper screening

of medical malpractice cases.

There.are no fools taking lawsuits they can't

possibly win on a contingent fee basis.
I tell the people that if we accept the employmen4 it will be on contingent
fee basis, but that it is necessary and vital to the patient's interest, the
doctor's interest, society as a

whol~

and the attorney's that the matter be

thoroughly screened in order to determine as many facts as possible before filing
the claim.
We obtain copies of all records.

Many times I'll write doctors requesting

the records, and I'll send them a patient's authorization, but I won't hear from
them.

Many times the answer to whether or not there is in fact negligence lies

in the doctor's records.
do?

If he doesn't give them to me, what am I supposed to

If the records contain a crucial

and subpoena ,them.

poin~

I suppose we have to file the suit

So I would caution doctors at this stage that you should talk

to your lawyer candidly about this.

In certain instances you may want to furnish

the records where in the past you may not have.
I indicate further to the client that it's necessary in this screening process for the attorney to research the proposed action thoroughly before accepting
the case.

I would exphasize this.

The time to do your legal and medical research,
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inasmuch as it's humanly possible, is prior to making a claim.
~f

Don't write doctors

+etters and tell them you are going to sue them when you don't know in fact whether
there is a case or not.

It detracts from the dignity of our profession,

,

far as I'm concerned is harassment of the doctor.

and as

I'll go on the record as being

critical of the legal profession when this happens.
I also tell potential clients during the screening process that I always
talk to the physician, even in the obvious cases.
ce
who

Normally I will talk to board

certified physicians who specialize in the area of the injury that was involved.
tha~

Sometimes these are local physicians who have gonfidence

I handle these

claims honestly, and reject the ones that are spurious ,or not worthy of further
me,

action.

Sometimes they are physicians in distant places.

At all times we attempt

t

to obtain practicing physicians.

nd of

medical malpractice case may mean that he feels that the patient.is entitled to

The. fact that a physician testifies in the

this testimony in order to balance our society.
I also tell potential clients that there is going to be a contingent fee

3ted
s--

basis if the case is accepted.

There's hardly anyone in this society who can

afford an attorney on any other basis in these cases.
hen

If the doctors are suc-

cessful in their legislative efforts to abolish the contingent fee, they will
to a large extent abolish medical malpractice suits as well.

Obviously the doctor

r:

has a well-paid attorney who is hired by a multi-million dollar insura,.!lce company,

t,

and I quite frankly have to ask you whether it would be a fair fight.
patient has serious injuries, he is incapacitated.
or unemployment.

fee
ing

If the

He might be on social security

How can he be told that he should hire someone at $50, $75, or

$100 an hour to prosecute a malpractice claim against a doctor?

I submit that

it's inherently unfair and that it violates our very concepts of justice in this
country.
I also mention to the people that come in that the doctors win 75 percent

::rent

of the cases tried in this country.
the cases are not meritorious.

It isn't necessarily because 75 percent of

It's more because of the ability of the physician

to marshall medical evidence on the crucial issues in the law suit--the medical
ing

issues.

As you know, medical testimony in a medical malpractice case is

practically a necessity.
ing
~m

s

A plaintiff's lawyer who goes into a medical malpractice

case without medical testimony should re-examine his case rather carefully.
I also tell the interviewees that in the event we accept the case there
are going to be court costs and immense fees involved.
from $1500 to $20,000.

This will run anywhere

If you want a genuine medical expert to travel to Waterloo,

Iowa or Lexington, Kentucky, it's probably going to cost around $1000 a day and
3.lk

travel expenses.

These kinds of risks are necessary to enforce what amounts to

ish

a recognizable legal right in our country.

When you talk about limiting the right

of the patient's redress to the courts, I ask you, in terms of the concept of
;>roing
3.rch,

fair play in this country, whether this really makes sense.
I mention something else to these people--and I think this is something
that doctors and lawyers should consider very carefully.
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There's little likli-

2

hood that the case will be settled prior to suit.

I've

had several cases recentl'

where I literally pleaded with the insurance adjuster to settle the case.
were cases of obvious liability.
bladder operation.

They

One was a case where a duct was cut in a gall

Not only did the doctor cut the duct, but he also failed to

check to determine whether it was cut after he commenced his closure procedures.
We had two different board certified surgeons say that there was negligence.

I

had another case where a man went in for a gall bladder operation and came out
with a bad arm

which, as you well know, was probably caused by positioning during

the operation.

In both cases the insUrance companY' refused to settle the case.

It had to be filed, and they then settled the' case after discovery.
a sad commentary.
their clients.

It's kind of

It seems to me that the insurance industry's job is to protect

That's their first duty and that's what the courts have said.

When I see cases such as these that are not settled and I have to file them, I
get sick because it's not necessary that these cases be filed at all.

The surgeon:

that were involved were basically good doctors, but they made a mistake.

They

injured soneone, but that's why they carry insurance.
I tell all my doctor friends--you may not believe it, but I have a few-that one of the first things they should do when
a malpractice case is to get their own lawyer.

the~

are served

with notice of

In this way, they will be adequate:

advised and the insurance company can recognize the fact that the doctor is indepeJ
dently represented.

Quite frankly, if I have a case against me that I feel is an

obvious case of negligence, I'm going to call my insurance company and tell them
they'd better settle or I'm going to admit liability--as long as the settlement
demand is within a reasonable area.

In the one case I settled, my settlement

demand was less before I filed the suit than it was when we ultimately settled
the case.

Again, I don't think this is proper; I think that the insurance

industr~

needs to reexamine itself here.
Finally, the last thing I mention to these people is that it is an absolute
necessity that we obtain medical testimony to support their position.
indicate to them the extreme difficulty in obtaining this testimony.

I then
I think that

if I had to put my finger on one area that I consider to be a main problem with
the medical profession today in this country from a view as the plaintiff's
attorney, this is it.
In talks I've given to doctors and lawyers, they ask me if I would testify
in a legal malpractice case.
problem.

I always say certainly.

I don't understand the

It's not a personal thing; it's a matter of being professtonal.

Your

first duty is to the public and not to your fellow practitioners, whether you're
a doctor or a lawyer.

It's kind of pathetic when we have to go to New York,

California, or Chicago to get a medical expert on an issue.

I don't think that a

doctor or a lawyer should have to apologize to anyone, let alone his fellow
practicioner, for standing up and telling the truth.
I would like to

point out to you that a Health Education and Welfare

special commission studied the medical malpractice problem in 1973.
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They made

:ently

recommendations in this area.

:y

The commission recommends that organized medicine and osteopathy establish an

.1

They know that there has been a problem in the past.

official policy encouraging members of their profession to cooperate fully in
medical malpractice actions so that justice will be assured 'for all parties.

:s.

That obviously is not the situation today.
nonpartisan.

I

The makeup of the commission was very

It consisted of doctors, lawyers, insurance industry representatives,

and government representatives.
lring

I have never seen a problem solved yet by shoving it unde+ the rug, but
that's exactly what the present legislative

l of

;ect

e~actments

are doing.

Arbitration

can have a proper place in medical malpractice if the ,arbitration panel, the
rules, and discovery are structured to safeguard the rights of all parties adequately.

But if you force through unfairly structured arbitration panels, of

course you are going to end up with a loaded deck against the patient.
:geons

ask you, can our society survive with inherent unfairness in

its

Again I

judicial system?

I submit that it cannot.
Limitations on the amount of the awards against physicians for negligence
can be set.
of

But this,again, has little to do with the premiums that are paid for

medical malpractice insurance.

Doctors complain about the contingent fee basis,

but they use it when they sue the patient for their fees.

If a patient runs a

stop sign and hits the doctor and severs his hand so he can't operate./ of course
the patient owes the full amount of the award.
On the other side of the coin, we have the most

aff~uent

members of our

society telling us that they should have less responsibility than others.

I hear

a lot about the price of medical malpractice insurance premiums going up, but the
question I always ask, and quite frankly it's not answered very much, is whether
the premiums that are paid have any reasonable relationship to the dollar volume
of the practice of the doctor.

I appeared before a subcommittee of the Iowa

legislature on medical malpractice and one of the senators said to me, "Well I
have a friend who's an
that
1

year.

ear, nose and throat specialist and he's paying $12,000 a

Don't you think that's unreasonable?"

or not; what's his gross volume?"

I said "I don't know whether it is

He says about $350,000.

So you see that the

average premium paid by physicians in this country is still around 4 to 5 percent
of their gross, and it is a business deduction.
:ify

When the ratio starts getting out

of line, then I think we'll have a problem.
In the last 25 years medical costs have gone up 850 percent; food costs

~r

have gone up 350 percent.

Ire

represent less than 1 percent of total medical costs, is being blamed for these
rising costs.

And yet medical malpractice insurance dollars, which

I submit that this is a distortion of truth.

:it a

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION:

How do we resolve the problem of the physician'S peers retaliating

economically and socially for his having testified?
also.
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I am a plaintiff's lawyer,

MR. BALL:

I wish I had mentioned this.

My feeling is that the first positive step

that can be taken in the area of medical malpractice is to beef up peer review in
this country because medical malpractice cases are nothing
more than society's
,
objective methods of enforcing standards of care.

The only other review of a

doctor's work is by his fellow practitioners from the hospital staffs.

The

hospitals should adopt an independent view because quite frankly they are going
to be sued too.

This Nork case is a classic example of where the hospital failed

to enforce proper standards of review of the medical profession in their review
committees.

I think that it's going to..Jtake courage on the part of a few people

to stand up in medical peer review committee

me~tings

and express this idea.

I

think that it has to corne from within the profession and it had better corne fast.
If it doesn't, it will be hastening the day when we are going to have medicine
delivered more economically through huge health care units and the private practice
of medicine is going to pass by the boards.

With these huge organizations deliv-

ering medical care, you are going to have peer review, and it is going to be
effective, and we're going to have the availability of medical testimony.
QUESTION:

You are familiar with charts, obviously, as all lawyers are.

In a

long term hospitalization or even a short term hospitalization, there are pages
and pages of charts, and when a lawyer does not know whether he has a case, he
often looks for the dotting of the "i" and the crossing of 'the,,"t" in order to
get a general overall effect.
profession who fish.

There frankly are some members of the legal

It's very easy to fish from a,hospital chart, and that's

why insurance companies and doctors are reluctant to give that type of document
to everyone.
MR. BALL:

How should we settle that sort of situation?

I understand.

case basis.

You presented an insoluble problem except on a case by

The problem you run into is that if I write you a letter and I say

I'd like a copy of your records and you don't give them to me, if the circumstances
exist which indicate to me that there is at least a good strong likelihood of
negligence, I'll probably sue you and subpoena the record because I have a duty
to do so.

I recognize that you stand a substantial risk.

do, damned if you don't, so to speak.

You're damned if you

But the most important thing I mentioned

was to call your lawyer and say, "Hey, call this guy up and explain this thing."
Explain to him the backgound of the medical treatment given.
another man in your specialty.
He was a friend of mine.
guy called for my records.

Have him talk to

I had an orthopedic call me from another county.

He said, "I have a helluva problem."

He said, "This

What about him?" I said, "What about him? He's a good

lawyer.

Give him the records.

there."

I asked him, "Is there a case there, Earl?" He said no and he told me

why.

He won't take the case unless there is something

I said, "O.K. I'll call the guy up and explain to him.

a letter.

Or I'll write him

You write me a letter and set out for me what happened here and why

this result was obtained and I'll write this guy a letter and tell him the same
thing, but I won't use your letter."

We did this.

I called the lawyer later and

said, "Ed, do you have any question?" He said, "No, I'm not going to take the darn
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step
in

case.

I've checked into it and I verified what you fellows have told me."

other words, you have to open up that communication.
position.
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Put yourself in the lawyer's

A DEFENDANT'S LAWYER VIEWS MALPRACTICE
Galen J. White Jr. J.D.
Boehl,- Stopher, Graves and Deindoerfer
Louisville, Kentucky
I would like to begin my discussion by quarreling with the term "medical
malpractice."

I think some of our previous speakers have alluded to this term

with derision.

A couple of months ago a Lexington doctor suggested to me that of

all the professions, the medical profession is the only one that has to characterize its tort problems as medical malpnactice'cc_,All other pro:fessions speak of
professional liability.

Having just renamed the topic,of this seminar, I want to

talk to you about what I believe to be some particular problems, fully aware that
I can't rebut all that my learned colleague stated.
Judge Leibson talked this morning about the Stephenson case and the Nazareth
Benevolent Institution case.

He talked only about the fact that the decision

allowed him to get to the records of the hospital and to all the letters of the
doctors that had been written about the particular defendant doctor.
mention that he received a verdict of $2.4 million.
amount of any injury verdict this state had ever

He did not

That was about 5 times the

known~

If that verdict had come

in this year with the continency reserve fund measures contained in our legislation,
it would have wiped out the whole fund through 1980.

'_ .

I'm not talking about the merits of that particular case, but I think it
does tend to show that the insurance companies are reasona:Qle in their protestations against what they call the runaway verdict.

They can't rate their insureds

properly because they may be sued 20 or 25 years after the policy is written.
got a case the other day from a hospital in an eastern Kentucky county.
plaintiff claims recently discovered malpracti.ce from 3 years ago.

We

The

He sued for

$2 1/2 million.
If we deal with malpractice solely in terms of insurance costs, I think
that is treating the symptom rather than the disease itself.
practice is more deeply rooted than that.

The problem of mal-

I'd like to review some of those effects

and then tell you about some of the problems inherent in defending doctors in our
current legal climate.
First, malpractice litigation has indisputably increased the direct cost
of medical care.

I'm going to talk later about some procedures that doctors and

hospitals now feel they have to employ as a result, not of clinical judgment, but
because of. law suits and judicial decisions.

Second, malpractice litigation, for

good reasons or bad, intimidates capable and skilled physicians from performing
some high-risk procedures for which they have trained.

Increased malpractice

litigation also influences the availability of health care in particular locations.
Once it was a problem in eastern Kentucky to even find a doctor.

Now we have

doctors, but they are quite often reluctant to treat problems they may have handled
4 or 5 years ago.

One reason is because they feel they may be second-guessed by

some expert here at the university.

Or they may just find a litigious-looking
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fellow coming in the front door.

A doctor near Carrollton told me just the other

day that he simply will not treat an individual from out of town who walks into
his office unless it is a legitimate emergency.
to Louisville.

He

j~st

sends them packing down

That's the way a lot of doctors feel they are forced to handle it.

Maybe he's making the right decision; maybe he's making the wrong decision.
point of the matter is, that's the way he handles his problem.
tice

The

Finally, malprac-

litigation has inhibited, I think, the best utilization of manpower.

Many

doctors would like to use paramedical personnel to perform routine procedures,
but they are afraid to delegate that k£nd of responsibility.
magazine,~articularly

It's difficult to pick up any

without reading the suggested reasons for the 'growth of
The first obvious reason is that malpractice does exist.

professional journals,

medica~

malpractice cases.

We ali recognize that,

but I don't think that's the ultimate problem to be solved in dealing with a great
many of our cases.

Doctors and hospitals have always inflicted pain and injury

upon a certain number of patients.

Although malpractice does in fact exist, I

think that the frequency of malpractice cases bears little relationship to the
growth of malpractice litigation.

I've read nothing in any surveyor report

which has suggested that the growth of malpractice litigation is caused by a
deterioration in medical care.
One value of reviewing the reasons for the growth ofli±igation in the
malpractice area is that I think it tells us much about ourselves (lawyers) as
it does about the medical profession.
caused the increase in litigation.
skill in recent years.
tions.

There are two basic trends which have

One is the tremendous advance of medical

The other trend involves the growth of patient

expecta~

A doctor in California noted these trends 20 years ago when he stated

that he was not concerned about the future cost of malpractice insurance; he
was worried about whether it would be available at any cost.

Advances in

medical techniques and the increased availability of medical care to more people
have inevitably increased the chances of medical accidents or unfortunate results.
Revisionist writers of American history have talked about the politics of
rising expectations as a pathological

development in this country.

I think the

same could be said about the rising expectations of p6.tential patients.

My

experience teaches me that people tend to demand more and more until their demands
outstrip what can be delivered.

The growing number of informed consent cases, of

which we win most, is a good indication of that trend.
This is an age of consumerism.
assert their economic rights.

At every turn people are encouraged to

Public service announcements tell you where to go

to file your claim for wage and hour underpayment, where you can file your claim
for discrimination in employment, and what to do if you have a bad product.

I

think this carries over to the mentality of people in dealing with their physicianE
While perhaps 25 to 40 percent of our cases involve claims that would have been
filed 10 or 15 years ago, the majority of them involve claims that I do nat
believe would have been litigated 10 years ago.
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The reasons for this are both

ler

good and bad.
Much has also been written about how the changing nature of the medical

)

profession contributes to the growth of medical malpractice litigation.
it.

speak of the depersonalization and fragmentation of medical care.
is true.

Writers

Much of that

Researchers in Germany published a recent study which indicated that the

3.C-

average length of any patient visit was less than 3 minutes in that country.

ny

think that's probably also a fair statement in this country.

I

However, the patient

doesn't realize what a doctor can accomplish in 3 minutes--how much he sees, how
he hears.

Is,
ses.

t,
reat

I suggest to you that the medical profession is, being singled out as a
depersonalized profession when in fact that's what is happening to all of us.
tellers work side by side with money machines; the old friendly butcher has
replaced by an anonymous meat cutter.

Just recollect intimate Crosley field

you climb to your $7.50 seat out in right field at synthetic River-

y

Stadium.
Consider the changes in the legal profession.
now.

Lawyers have time on their hands.

There are fewer automobile

They are not intimidated by the

teries of the medical practice as they used to be.

Lawyers are becoming more

lIed in handling doctors as adversaries and as witnesses.
doctors willing to testify in malpractice cases.

'They have found

If they don't . know one

sonally, there are services allover this country that will provide a physician
will testify for either side on any subject.
Many lawyers are now filing their malpractice cases for the first time,
I'm glad that Mr. Ball talked about the obligation of a lawyer to investiSome of the cases that are brought into my office reflect an abysmal and
ignorance by the plaintiff's attorney of the physician's responsibilities
the patient.
)le
Ilts.
of
:he

Often that lawyer represents an unhappy client with bad

Because of the favorable climate for malpractice cases, he files a suit
anything in his file to establish liability.

We've gone back and docu-

these cases and have found that these are not cases where the lawyer has
tly sought medical records or tried to make contact with the doctor.

These

cases where the fellow just had a mad client who filed suit.
I've talked about the problems but I haven't suggested any solutions.
, of

are not part of a solution, you are part of the problem.
because I'm paid to defend doctors and hospitals.

They

I confess to

But I'd like to talk

the problem of defending doctors and hospitals within the context of
JO
3.im
[

it mentioned that an error in judgment is not a basis for
doctor is not judged by hindsight.

This is a nice, easily

rule of law, but as a matter of practice it doesn't always work that way.
find much uncertainty in anticipating what the courts expect of them.

I

problem with the sponge case or the severed nerve case; I'm talking about
h

s that essentially involve judgment, diagnosis, and questions of when to
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send the patient somewhere else, when to administer medicine, when to do a test.
Those are questions of judgment, and yet doctors are constantly being second-guessec
by an expert who looks back from the results to the beginning.

,

Doctors find it repugnant that a lay court, often supported by uncertain
medical testimony or no medical testimony at all, may create criteria for a finding
of malpractice.

I think that when you start to look at how malpractice develops,

you should look at these things:

(1) the quality of the professionals involved,

and (2) the types of cases they experience.
Teaching hospitals and universi,ty centers should always provide a higher
quality of care than do rural hospitals and physicians located away from ample
libraries and other medical facilities.
types of cases.

Yet often they must handle the same

The fact that variation in the performance of a rural hospital

and that of a university center may exist should not imply that the former is
guilty of malpractice.

Even though malpractice litigation is said to deter

negligent conduct, a physician is more often than not unclear about what standards
will be applied to him retrospectively, what standards will be perceived by a
court and a jury after the whole problem has tried before them.
Take a look sometime at Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).

In

that case a Washington court held that as a matter of' law a physician was negligent
in failing to administer a glaucoma test to a young patient.

~espite

uncontradicted

medical testimony that is was a universal practice of ophthalmologists not to
administer such tests to patients under 40 unless the test was judged clinically
appropriate.

In that case the doctor tested the patient at age 32 when her

symptoms suggested to him that glaucoma should be suspected.

She had glaucoma--

which he admitted may have been in existence for perhaps 10 years--but which had
gone undetected.

The court didn't let it go to the jury.

They held as a matter

of law the testing of underage persons should have been done.

That decision

reflects to me a good bit of hindsight in a case where a court was overwhelmed by
a bad result and unduly influenced by the fact that the test was admittedly simple
and inexpensive.

As I said, as a result of decisions like this, the physician

or hospital is compelled to require procedures or tests that no one on that
hospital staff believes is necessary.
Further, a defendant doctor faces not only a detached, retrospective
evaluation by the courts of his

judgmen~

but he is also often compelled to justify

his actions against a foreign expert whose scientific knowledge is admittedly
greater than his and who possesses a deeper understanding of the problem.

The

case of Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970) was applauded by the University
of Kentucky Law Journal back in 1971 as abandoning the locality rule.

What really

shakes me about that case--besides its holding--is that it followed a decision
coming from the same court that decided the Helling case.
The Blair case presents a very practical problem of defending many physicians and hospitals.

A respected university expert takes it upon himself not only

to describe the course of treatment the physician should have followed but also
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st.

to state, often on the basis of very little understanding or experience, his

guesse

opinion as to the standard of care that should have been expected of that physician
in the circumstances in which he found himself.

For instance,our office tried

,

in

a case not long ago where plaintiff brought in a fellow from Boston.

He said it

inding

was "the universal practice" to conduct a particular test before surgery in

ops,

particular circumstances.

ed,

in this entire state or in any surrounding state who performed this "universal"

On cross examination he could not name one physician

test, and yet that kind of testimony went to the jury.
er
e

The plight of the defendant doctor is
to wage against medical treatises.

£~ther

aggravated by the contest he has

Last year at the se,minar one of the decisions

talked about was Heilman v. Snyder, 520 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1975), which stated that
al

medical treatises authenticated by an expert or by notice by the court could be
admitted as substantive evidence.

That decision and other decisions I've seen do not

tell the courts how they are supposed to instruct the jury as to the weight to be
dards

given to that material.

The material cannot be cross-examined.

The material more

often than not does not state what standard the defendant should have been following;
usually it describes only the best possible course of treatment.
In
rligent
licted

This material is

used, I think, unfairly and without real guidelines for'the jury against the defendant.
The retrolental fibroplasia (RLF) cases are also a dramatic illustration
of the problems with medical litigation.

RLF is a condition which

described by a physician back in the early '40's.

wa~

first

It involves the loss of eyesight

.ly

in premature infants because of damage to retinal vessels., A lot of theories

la--

were advanced throughout the 40's as to why this condition existed. In about
1952 some physicians in Australia and England wrote about this condition and

had

opined that probably too much oxygen while the premature infant was in the

:ter

hospital shortly after birth could cause the condition.

It was not until about

1954 that the first literature in this country came up with the same theory.

Yet

!d by

in two cases in the past year doctors have defended themselves against young adults

;imple

in RLF cases.

m

One was born in 1952 and the other in 1954.

The juries found that

they were negligent because they over-oxygenated these children 20 years previously
only because it was known somewhere, somehow, at the time that there might be a
connection between over-oxygenation and the premature infant.

Those cases dra-

matically illustrate the haz:ards of trying to keep right up to date in the area in
Istify

which you work.

(

only in Australia.

le

One child was born in 1952 when the subject was written about

I'd like to talk now about some helpful hints to doctors.

Here are some

rsity

areas in which I think doctors can help themselves in their practices.

really

area of consultation.

:m

either the patient or a member of the patient's family has requested consultation.
The principal doctor says there's no need for consultation.

f si-

One is the

Some of the cases that trouble us most are cases where
This may be all right,

t only

but he makes no chart of the request or of his reasons for denial of it. It's
my humble opinion that when you have a case, particularly a serious case, and a

lso

relative or the patient asks about having another doctor take a look at him, that
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you should give that very serious thought, and if in your medical judgment it is
not required, you chart that.

ThE
g~ve

A second area concerns what choices you should
tests or procedures.

a patient in terms of

made right now, you should have it done right now or have a good reason for not
doing it.

frj

If, in your medical opinion, you believe a test should be

to
WhE

There's no better way to stick your neck out than to have that patient

fa:

never come back when you're on record as having stated that at some point in time
this should have been done.

Never say to the patient that the test should be

made now, but that you don't have to doi<t now.

You should keep quie.t rather

than do that.

hal
of
We

Conversely, if the patient suggests that he ought to have a test--an EKG
or whatever--and you don't think it's necessary, chart it.
setting you up, but more often they ask innocently.

to

Sometimes they're

If the person was con-

cerned enough to want this particular test, put it in your chart as to why you
didn't do it.

SUI

of

Informed consent cases present the same questions in terms of your charts.
If you are a surgeon, do not rely upon hospital consent forms.

be

It is my belief

de

that in questions of informed consent, you should have your own consent form or

wi

your own chart where you put down that you told the pati'ent the risks, the

of

possible consequences.

de

sion.

If anyone

Also include the time of day and the date of your discus-

besides you and your patient is present, make a note of that

person.

QU
Finally--and this should be obvious to you--beware of the telephone.

DR

Doctors probably practice more bad medicine over the telephone than at any other

Ii

time.

MB

I want to tell you about what happened to a fellow in Florida.

In that

situation an individual came into a drug rehabilitation center which had no

is

physician on duty at the time.

st

The defendant doctor was sick at home and he

wasn't even a member of the center's active staff; he was on the courtesy staff.

It

Someone from the emergency room called him and said they needed a physician's

tt

signature on their records in order to admit this patient.
and use my name, but I can't treat him."
later he died-- 1 day

He said, "Go ahead

The center admitted him and 4 days

after meningitis was diagnosed.

The survivor sued the

doctor, and the trial judge granted the doctor a summary judgment.

The Court of

Vi;

sf

pl

Appeals reversed and held the case should be tried before a jury on these issues.

gE

One, whether the physician had accepted the man as a patient.

Two, whether he

0:

And three, '-'lhether

i~

was negligent in admitting the patient without seeing him.

the doctor's failure to diagnose meningitis was the proximate cause of death.
That's a tough case.

I think the next time you practice over the telephone you

should keep that case in mind.
Just a few more points.
contingent fees.

I'm a defense lawyer but I have no problems with

I think people have to go this route.

If the lawyer is willing

p
p

to take the risk of losing, as they do in most cases, that's an appropriate way

s

to compensate as long as the percentage arrangement is not unconscionable.

i
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A lot of doctors, when they first get sued, want to file a countersuit.
The basis for the countersuit usually is, "I didn't do anything wrong and this is

of

IS

frivolous." Well, if it is a frivolous suit, the doctor has a legitimate right
I

l be

to complain.

Lot

When a lawyer signs a pleading and certifies that the complaint is filed in good

Ltient

faith, there are sanctions in any bar association, which to my knowledge have

I

time

But my question is, why should this be limited to malpractice suits?

never been enforced, against a complaint not filed in good faith.

On the other

hand, I can state to you that some of my colleagues are looking for a good set
of facts to establish a cause of action against the filing of a frivolous suit.
We'd like to do it in a malpractice case, but such an qction should not be limited
EKG

to malpractice cases.

~e

The last thing I want to touch on is the problem that often exists between
the defense lawyer and the doctor.

TOU

sued is one of being hurt.
often it never leaves.

The reaction of a lot of doctors when they get

This sometimes goes away after the first case, but

That's understandable.

However, the only way a case can

larts.

be defended is for there to be complete confidence and trust between the doctor

Lief

defendant and his lawyer.

n or

with his attorney.

It's unlike any other professional relationship that I know

of in the tort field.
Lscus-

The doctor must never hold back, the doctor must level

A doctor is personally and professional'wounded, and a

defense lawyer always has to take that into account.

>,

3.t
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
DR. LEMON:

Mr. Ball, I've seen you taking copious notes over there.

::>ther

like to destroy your adversary now in public?

:lat

MR. BALL:

Would you

One of. the things I did want to mention was the locality rule.

That

is the rule that has historically required a physician who is familiar with the

e
taff.
,s

standards of practice in the locality where the malpractice occured to testify.
It has been pretty well abrogated, and now it's more or less universally recognized
that there are national standards of practice of medicine.

This is particularly

ead

true, with today's ease of communication, when a doctor in Lexington, Ky. can call

s
he

various national health services or for that matter physicians who are highly

rt of

phone.

ssues.

get some insight.

he

specialized in the particular area of the problem and consult with them on the
He can call Mayo Clinic, which has that type of service, and hopefully
Or he can refer the patient somewhere else because of the ease

of transportation.

Therefore, it has been my observation that the locality rule

her

is more or less a legal fiction.

h.

to seminars allover the coun.try to learn the proper standards of medical practice

you

in given situations.

with

problem.

The fact of the matter is that physicians travel

As far as defensive medicine is concerned, I certainly admit that this is a
The question lies in the degree and the nature and the scope of the

'illingproblem. A Duke University study authorized by HEW indicates that it is not a
, way
sUbstantial factor in the increase of medical costs.
Several of my friends have
indicated to me that although they feel it can be a problem, particularly among the
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unsure physicians, that basically investigation is the name of the game.

The

proper tests and procedures make a differential diagnosis; therefore, their job
is to practice good medicine irrespective of the

~ear

of suit.

I think that

lawyers and doctors are professional people, and it takes courage to practice
any profession properly.
You brought up the matter of countersuits by doctors.
you got this from the plaintiff's lawyer.

The real problem in terms of medical

malpractice suits does not lie in the filing.
thing done from necessity, hope,

or~a

You can tell them

The filing often represents some-

possibility 'of success when the true facts

cannot be made known until the discovery process is made available to the plainti
If that information is obtained and if it appears there is no likelihood of SUcce
then for the attorney to continue to prosecute the suit up until trial raises
serious questions.

I think the attorney is much more vulnerable by doing that

than he ever will be by filing the suit.
DR. LEMON:

Would you like to respond to any of that, Mr. White?

MR. WHITE:

No thank you.

DR. LEMON:

Are there any questions from the audience?

Would you like to have

any of these points pursued a bit further?
QUESTION:

I have a question about some of the legislation that is being proposed

concerning expert witness of the locality, especially in the state of Illinois.
MR. BALL:

I alluded to this.

Basically this legislation is designed to make it

more difficult for the plaintiff to present his case.

It doesn't have anything

to do with the realities of the medical practice in this country.

There is, as I

mentioned, a reluctance of in-state physicians in the state; usually the plaintif
experts corne from without the state.

Consequently, if you limit expert testimony

to an Illinois expert, then, of course, you cut down the number of medical malpractice suits.

But I submit that this is no answer; eventually, this type of tactic

will fall by its
MR. WHITE:

own weight.

I'll make a comment about that.

bad piece of legislation.

I share the view that this is a very

We should not artificially construct limits on the

nature of testimony of people.
QUESTION:

I have a question which apparently no one wants to bring up.

Given an

injured patient and a truly legitimate malpractice act for which that patient is
eventually compensated, how much of the judgment can that patient reasonably
expect to receive?
MR. BALL:

What's the average?

I believe the HEW studies concluded that the average attorney fee in

these cases is a third.
percent.

I know there have been citations of fees going up to 50

I don't subscribe to that.

I don't do it.

I don't think it's right.

If the case is so bad that you have to take 50 percent of it, you probably shouldr
take it anyway.

My own experience in these matters indicates to me that any-

where from 25 percent to possibly, in an unusual case, 40 percent of the net
recovery is fair.

I might add, too, that I have not in my 20 years seen any

real abuse in this area.

I'm sure there have been some, but in my own personal
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e

experience I haven't seen it.

job

DR. DEI10N:

Is there a related question at issue?

It seems that I have read that

of all the money that is spent for malpractice purposes--coverage, insurance
premiums, cost of defending the actual awards, etc.--that the client who is injured

e

actually ends up with less than 10 or 15 percent.
.hem

MR. WHITE:

cal

sound right no matter how I said it.

I started to put that percentage in my talk, but I thought it wouldn't

ome-

percent.

acts

play with all these figures--the cost of defending every case that's filed.

I think it's substantially in excess of 10

It probably is around 20 or 25 percent.

But that includes--and you can
As

long as a file stays open in a claims office, it cost~ money. The figure of 20 or
25 percent represents payouts to people who won their cases, as compared with all
the other costs of maintaining the organization.
DR. LEMON:

,at

MR. BALL:

That might possibly raise some question about the system.
I was going to say I don't agree with the 25 percent figure.

By my

recollection it is 40 percent or so, but that is still a shocking figure when
you throw it out.

But again, you have to get under the surface to really analyze

the situation, and it does bring into play the question about the efficiency of

.ve

the system itself.

By the way, I agree wholeheartedly with Galen that we shouldn't

.posed

call these suits malpractice because the term connotates a bad doctor.

.is.

bunch of nonsense; it isn't true.

:e it

the right to refuse to settle and many times--I don't say always--the companies

ling

will play upon the doctor's emotioRal state and, in effect., waltz him into a

as I
lintiff

That's a

The problem you have is that the,dpctor has

defensive stance that on the day of the trial he doesn't want to be in.

Conse-

quently, they turn around on him and counsel settlement on the day of trial when

;imony

they should have counselled it before the suit was filed.

_prac-

practice and I think these people have expertise enough that we should be able

;actic

to analyze the cases quickly, and if the people are reasonable, get in and get
out.

l very

I tell people to be very reasonable in their settlement demands in this

area.

Ten an

lt is

in
~o

I think this is bad

50

Jht.

;houldn
T-

mal
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AGENCY REGULATION
Harry N. Peterson, J.D.
Director Legislative Department
American Medical Association
Chicago, Illinois
The subject of agency regulation, the law, and the professions can be
approached from a number of perspectives.

Certainly, one approach is from the

viewpoints of the professions which are represented here--.the
attorneys.

phy~icians

and

Another angle could be from the viewpoint of the economist, insofar

as regulation may be responsive to forces operating in our economy such as the
pressures which are exerted by strong inflationary trends.

Other approaches

could be from the viewpoint of the consumer who is concerned, or from the standpoint of government itself, with its increasing role as a main purchaser of health
services.

It would be impossible, however, to cover the subject fully from these

various vie,·Tpoints within the time frame of this presentation.

Likewise it would

be impossible to discuss in depth the reasons, whether real or merely alleged, for
the extensive regulations which have engulfed the health care field.

Rather, this

presentation will accept the existence of such regulatiQn for the purpose of
portraying the vast scope which it has developed over the last .10 years.
also talk about some regulatory proposals currently being

considered,,~n

I will
Congress.

These indicate very strongly that regulation in general will not diminish; it can
only increase.
It might be well to know for background that national health expenditures
are now at the annual rate of approximately $118 billion and that they have been
steadily increasing over the years.

The forecast is that this will continue.

Health care expenditures have also been consuming an increasing percentage of the
*,.<Jross national product.

This percentage is now pegged at about 8 percent.

The

heavy intrusion of government at federal, state,and local levels accounts for an
ever-increasing portion of health expenditures.

With the particularly increasing

role of the federal government in paying for health services--and with the resulting heavier demands for services--the overall costs of health care have risen
faster than have costs in the economy generally.
These factors along with others have introduced a degree of regulation in
the past decade which has not been experienced in the health field before.

It has

even been said that the health care field may be more regulated by government than
any other sector of the .7\merican economy.

Certainly when we consider the cumula-

tive effect of controls by government at all levels--federal, state, county, and
municipal--this assertion becomes less debatable.
Regulation of the health field in its early stages was probably aimed at
quality, but today it more and more directly or indirectly affects costs.

Because

of the nature of medical services, moreover, changes in either cost or quality
markedly affect the other.
As we all know, regulation of the professions has been based primarily at
the state level.

Under our system of government the states have residual authority
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with respect to professional licensing and discipline.
the professionals may be either direct or indirect.
obvious example of a direct control.

The controls exerted on

Licensing would be the most

A host of other controls are found in a

variety of laws and regulations affectinq_hospjtals, nursing facilities, clinical
laboratories, use of X-ray equipment, drugs, or even disease reporting.
other could be named.

Many

The practice of medicine is also affected by the many laws

regulating the practice of its allied professionals.
I think it is fair to say that the great proliferation of regulation has
occurred within the last decade or so.'

This is particularly true at the federal

level, but it is also so at the state level.

,It is often the case that the

enactment of a federal program has a direct effect on regulation at the state
level.
the

Sometimes the federal enactment specifically requires this.

federal law provides a financial carrot for inducement.

Sometimes

Sometimes when

federal controls fail to be enacted the same controls are enacted at the state
I said that the expansion could be marked within the last decade.

Another

way of saying this is that the acceleration of regulation in the health field
probably had its origin with the passage of the Great Society programs of the mid
1960's.

The most notable programs were Medicare and Medicaid.

While a great

many regulatory controls can be directly traced to those programs, a variety of
other laws provided the nucleus for more regulation.

LawscQvering medical

education, medical research, drugs, devices, alcohol treatment and abuse,
occupational saftey and health, neighborhood health centers,. health maintenance
organizations, comprehensive health planning, to name only a few, all introduce
new regulations into the health care field.
The medical professionals simply cannot escape the effects of these regulations and controls.

It might be well to look at a few of the federal programs

and agencies in order to appreciate the scope of regulations which. is being
by the federal government.

Certain agencies' regulatory activities are to be

expected and are indeed beneficial to the public interest.
agencies seek an

e~pansion

Sometimes, however,

of their regulatory activities beyond the authority

of the law and create requirements deemed to be either detrimental to the public
health or an improper infringement upon medical practice.

It is then, of course,

that the regulations are of special concern to the medical professionals.
The area of drug regulation is one example.

We have seen the reaction of

physicians and their professional associations to many recent proposals by the
FDA as well as to many recent legislative proposals in this area.

The FDA has a

longstanding role to insure the safety of drugs reaching the market.
to see that only effective drugs are marketed was added in 1962.

Its duty

Its function of

regulating drugs for these purposes is clear and established by the Congress as
being in the public interest.

However, is it the FDA's proper role to direct how

drugs should be used in medical procedures or to prescribe conditions

r~sulting

in the elimination of drugs from the market based on relative effectiveness?

The

FDA does indeed have a right to specify requirements with respect to the labeling
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d on

of drugs, but it has no authority to use a regulatory process to mandate how

most

physicians may practice medicine or to dictate the kinds of procedures to be

a

performed with respect to the usage of drugs or devices.

inical

This question must also be raised:

is legislation, now being considered

ny

in Congress, proper to introduce new and strong regulatory controls impinging on

y laws

medical practice?

For instance, legislation is now in Congressional committees

that would specify that drug usage should be limited solely to the purposes stated
has

on the drug labelling. This would contravene long-established medical practice

deral

which has enabled physicians to use drugs for :the purposes and in the dosages
which they in their medical judgment deem to be in the,best interest of their

te

patient.

mes

might feel compelled

n

strictly to such labelling.

~ate

Indeed patients could be denied beneficial treatment because physicians
by the added threat of malpractice liability to conform

Other portions of the proposed legislation would impose additional restricand conditions upon the use of drugs by the medical profession.

Id

drugs on the market upon a conditional basis.

he

of the drug.

at

It would

It would limit the extent of

Certain bills would even limit the avai;.ability of drugs to

certain classes of physicians.

.y of

You can readily see that the thrust of new drug legislatlon is toward more
more regulation.
to new regulations.

The corollary result is that professional judgme;nt yields
The science, art, and skill involved in true medical practice

.ance

could be reduced more and more to ministerial functions by regulation.

A number

,duce

have recently enacted modifications in their former antisubstitution laws.

The

prescribing physician is confronted daily with both state and federal regulation
regu-

controlling the use of psychotropic drugs, including depressants and stimulants.
Medical education is another area which will undoubtedly experience
increasing federal regulation.

Federal assistance to medical schools was originally

aimed at the production of manpower to meet the nation's health care delivery
demands.

Since the enactment of that legislation in 1963, there has been a steady

increase in the number of both medical schools and medical school graduates.
Approximately 13,500 students now graduate from medical schools annually.
The number of schools has risen to 114 from the 88 which existed only about 10
years ago.

The thrust of this legislation, now that the raw numbers have

.on of

increased, is shifting to other purposes.

the

be beneficial, the controls exerted to achieve them are not always desirable.

has a

For instance, the funding under some proposals, would be used in numerous ways

luty

to require that students upon graduation practice in medical shortage areas.
of

~ion

While the purposes in some cases may

A proposal which has already passed the u.S. House of Representatives would

:s as

require every student, after graduation, to repay to the government the money

~ct

which the school received in his behalf unless the student served in a shortage

how

.ting
The

At this point I might stress that this should be of particular interest to

lbeling

law profession inasmuch as there are many who hold the view that a mandate of

:?

,
service or forced payments would be invalid.
Consider also proposed legislation that would create federal standards for
licensure of physicians with the intent that those st,andards would become effective at the state level.

The standards would include the actual preparation by

the Secretary of HEW of the license examination and would also establish elements
as to continuing education requirements.

These provisions, while they are a

highly improper intrusion of the federal government into state activities, actually represent modified positions.

The earlier proposals would have provided for

the direct federal licensure of medical: professionals.
~he

Another proposal would give control to
residency training programs in the country.

federal government of all

This proposal would authorize the

Secretary of HEW to divide the country into 10 regions and create councils in the
various regions.

These councils would provide advice to the Secretary, but he

would have the ultimate authority to recognize the programs of residency training
throughou·t

the country.

He would decide where they should be located, and he

would determine the number of positions in the various specialties in each one of
these programs.
Aside from the extremely serious potential adverse effect upon the quality
of training programs throughout the country, the program is objectionable on its
face because of the intrusion of federal government into this 'educational field.
Moreover, these proposals are being advanced notwithstanding the fact that the
goals which are sought to be achieved through the legislation are in fact already
being accomplished today.

Recent figures show that approximately 60 percent of

all medical school graduates in this last year have entered the fields of primary
care--and of course this is the basic thrust of the residency control programs.
Other provisions would eliminate prerogatives which exist in the medical
staff.

One provision would prevent a hospital from denying privileges to any

member of the national health services corps.

Certainly, members of the corps

must have hospital facilities within which to practice, but at the same time the
staff should have the responsibility for maintaining the competency of the staff.
Another provision would enable the Secretary to determine what increases
in medical school tuition would be allowable for federal payment.

Of course, this

would be a new handle of control upon medical education.
National health insurance proposals are also before the Congress, as you
know.

Some of these would seek to establish programs which would be based upon

many existing private sector mechanisms.

While all can be expected to result in

new regulatllions, there are some proposals which would clearly impose what would
be onerous controls on the medical profession.

For instance, some wbuld establish

vast governmental bureaucracies to administer the program.

We are all familiar

with the amount of red tape and paper work that would be generated through such
administration.

One program would create a strict budgeting process which would

freeze the amount of funds that would be allocable in a particular area for a
specified number of individuals.

This proposal also calls for the setting of
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fees, the setting of prospective budgets for institutions, and the establishment

:is for

of regulatory bodies to oversee the programs with respect to cost, services, and

ffec-

quality.
Two years ago Congress enacted a law which many individuals now see as

[l

by

2!ments

being of equal or greater significance than national health insurance--the

3.

National Health Planning and Resources Development Act.

3.ctu-

challenged in court.

It is currently being

All the ramifications of that law are not fully known at

2!d for

~his

time, but

it takes no special insight to see that it hasjprofound implications in relation
~o

the practice of medicine and the future of our entire health care delivery
I

the

system.

in the

development of appropriate health care facilities throughout the country.

he
3.ining
he

its

",,'<

Essentially, it is a law intended to provide for the planning and
In

many-tiered structure, however, it has created a system of p;Lanning which

~~J:,l control all elements of the delivery system.

Billed

as a program of plan-

i}lng at the local level, the structure in fact gives extreme authority to the

one of

~~deral government and the Secretary of HEW. The planning will ultimately control
not only the development of facilities but also the distribution of physicians

uality

:and

nits

t~on

ield.

~?{ample

the

~l.lthority.

lready

~l9rvices

This particular law is an.example of extreme regula-

through action at the local, state, and national levels. ' We view it as an
of overreaching by the federal government in the exercise

o:l;.~ocal

The planning process contemplates review of institutional health

to determine their propriety.

It also provides fqr rate regulation, at

present time, in six states.

of

t

other medical manpower.

The Medicare and Medicaid programs have introduced a number of direct

rimary
ams.

~~Etulatory controls affecting the practice of medicine and delivery of care.

ical

''-7;f<:,',

~hey

encompass such important matters as patient benefits, medical procedures,

ny

~~~mbursement for services, office administration,

rps

.~ards for facilities.

;:;f~','

For instance,

review of services, and stan-

the Medicare program of reimbursement for

e the

~hysicians

was first set at the 83rd precentile of fees in any of the localities

staff.

J,,:Qvolved.

Then it was arbitrarily lowered to the 75th percentile.

ases

payment level was based upon data which was already 2 years old before it was put

e, this

·~.~to the formula for determining the fee.

")"

Moreover, this

Subsequent to this, additional

restrictions were placed on the prevailing charge level in the form of an economic
you

i.ndex which is established by the Secretary.

He determines the components of that

upon

index, and this acts as a further ceiling upon any allowable increases in physicians'

It in

fees.

ould

more arbitrarily.

The controls imposed under Medicaid in many states have been fashioned even
All these limitations have produced a discriminatory result by imposing on

tablish
liar

ghysicians controls which are not imposed upon other sectors of the economy.

such

:taw which created some of these controls, Public Law 92-603, was enacted 4 years

would

~~o.

a
of

A

Certain regulations which were issued pursuant to sections of that act were

so harsh and unfair that unprecedented litigation resulted.

These controls

~~cluded utilization review requirements which acted in a detrimental way to proper
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patient care.

These regulations are currently undergoing modification.

d

Other provisions of the law related directly to reimbursement for hospitals.
These have also been challenged in the court.

The law

~ould

permit, for instance,

the Secretary to determine certain costs to be unnecessary if he felt the services
were not needed in the efficient delivery of health care.

Under this provision

the secretary made arbitrary classifications of all the hospitals, classifying
them by size and location, and then determined that payment at the 9Qth percentile
level would be proper reimbursement.
80th percentile.

Subsequently, he reduced that figure to the

He thus in effect determined that payments ahove such amounts

automatically constituted services which were unneeded in the efficient delivery
of health care.
I have presented only the surface of a vast reservoir of real and potential
regulation.

Responsible individuals are now calling for relief and deregulation.

It is even becoming a campaign theme for the forthcoming election.

As a reaction

to the regulation imposed on the public and the profession, the federal government has recently enacted some laws whiah themselves recognize the pervasiveness
and the influence of these regulatory agencies.

Two of these laws--the Privacy

Act and the Freedom of Information Act--attempt to require that only certain
information pertaining to individuals be collected and that the information be
.... ~

subject to notification of the individual.

The Congress has also recognized the problems of a massive bureaucracy by
establishing a federal paperwork commission.

This commission is charged with

investigating the amounts of forms and paperwork which are required from the public
by regulatory agencies.

This commission is currently in the process of holding

hearings around the country in order to hear from the public with respect to this.
Other responses by the Congress are represented by pending bills which would in
effect wipe out certain regulatory agencies unless they could periodically justify
themselves and be approved by Congress within a certain period of time.
certainly is a novel approach.

This

It represents a reaction by the Congress.

I

understand that Colorado has enacted a law which would provide for this objective.
All of the latter may be encouraging, but it may perhaps be too late to
reverse trend of regulatory agencies to control our lives.

Indeed, when the at tern

to reform the agencies are compared with the number of bills presently pending
which in one form or another would increase that bureaucracy and would increase
the number of regulatory agencies and their power, one cannot help but believe
that Congress will continue in its enthusiasm for enacting more legislation
effectively expanding the agencies.
In closing I should say that I recognize that I have dealt almost exclusively with regulation at the federal level.
about state activities.

As much or even more could be said

Enactments are now proliferating in the fields of

continuing education, licensure, discipline, malpractice, drug usage, certificate
of need, HMO's, and comprehensive health insurance; all of them have the cumulative effect of further regulation of the profession.
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I recognize also that I have

s

dealt almost exclusively with the medical profession, but I'm sure that you can

?itals.
tance,

see

the potential applicability of regulatory measures to the legal profession.
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UNJUSTIFIED REGULATION:

WHAT RECOURSE?

WHAT RESPONSE?

B.J. Anderson, J.D.
Assistant General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
American Medical Association
Chicago, Illinois
I've been with the American Medical Association for almost 12 years now,
was with them in 1965 when Medicare was enacted.
adversary to the government.

Basically, at that time,

The position of the AMA in terms of

relationship with the federal government shifted from that of an ally to
adversary at approximately the same time as'the Truman administration
During the first few years following enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid
ams, government needed medicine and therefore government was willing to talk
They had to rely upon the expertise of the medical profession, the hospital
strators, the private health insurance carriers, the Blue Cross-Blue Shield
and others because they had a great deal of work to do if this gigantic
-which would be small in comparison to national health insurance--was to
and if the benefits were to be available to thope people for whom
After the program became entrenched as the law of the land, many of its
cted undesirable features became apparent.

Its fundamental design required

deral government to write a blank check at the beginning of the year withwhat the total costs wouldbe until after the close of any given fiscal
The programs were also imposed as we were coming out of some of the populaoom effects of the end of the Second World War, but no provision was made
increasing deficiencies in the supply of medical and health manpower
beds.

As a result Sf this limited supply and ttie tremendous increase

fantastic escalation in the cost of health care occurred in this
Government never takes responsibility for this kind of activity, of
be responsible.
primary scapegoats of the program.

Physicians and hospitals have thus
There seems to be little that the

profession alone can do to correct that kind of public preception.
regulatory processes continued and as HEW had to respond with increasing
the demand for some kind of cost containment, we began to be aware
become highly frustrated when you have to deal with Congress.

But

more frustrated when you are dealing with the regulatory
are responsible for the implementation of these programs both at the
state levels.

In the case of the federal agencies, this comes about

simple reason.

Secretaries of Health, Education, and Welfare

in the background in the regulatory agencies are those career
them are the Roosevelt era's young brain trusters, some of whom
ily responsible for part of the initial draftsmanship that brought
the Medicare program.

They can be highly selective in what they tell
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the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare or the top echelon in the administration of

the~r

agencies about our needs.

As the decade following the implementation of Medicare proceeded, we at
AMA were frequently faced with a hue and cry--sometimes from the ultra-conservative physicians and sometimes from the ultra-liberal physicians--that "they can't
do that to us.

That's directly in violation of section 1801 of the Medicare law."

Section 1801 is used by some attorneys to introduce a speech in order to be humorous because it says that nothing in this title shall be construed to permit the
federal government to control the

way

in which medicine is practiced or the way

in which hospitals or other health care

ins~itutions

are administered, or to intel

fere in the contracts that hospitals enter into to carry out their business
activities.

This, of course, is the kind of statutory language that is observed

only in the breach.
Many times it would have been tempting to file a section 1801 suit against
the Secretary.

Even if you work for the AMA, you still have certain responsibil-

ities to your client.

It is very rarely that you can succeed in challenging

regulations, whether at the federal or state level, because regulations can be
changed at any time.

You can be out of court

befor~

you really get a foot in the

door because the Secretary can issue a new set of regulations which make every
legal issue that you raised in your complaint moot.
In addition, most lawyers, and I think many physicians, are becoming
increasingly aware that lawsuits are not won on legal issues alone.

In order to

have a respectable chance of success in a courtroom, you must also be able to
raise certain social issues with which the public, and therefore the judge, can
relate.
At one point we felt that the ideal lawsuit had come along.

It was based

on a set of utilization review regulations under the 1972 amendments to the Socii
Security Act, promulgated by the Secretary in final form on November 29, 1974.
What coalesced to bring this about?
three sections of the law.

There were a number of factors--specificalll

One provided that each case of hospital admission of

greater than 60-day duration must be reviewed.

The penalty for failure to

implement this kind of review in a state Title XIX program was a loss of up to
one-third of the federal matching funds for the state's Medicaid program.
A second provision provided that Title XVIII and Title XIX utilization
reVlew plans must be the same.

In other words, if you have a hospital that is

certified to participate in Title XVIII and certified to participate in Title XI
only one style of utilization review plans should be required.

You shouldn't ha

two different systems for performing utilization review in the same hospital.
The third section dealt with Title XVIII.

It said in the event that the

Secretary found the utilization review plan imposed by the state for the Medicai
program superior in its effectiveness, he could require the state to also use tr
plan for its Title XVIII program.

Simultaneously, the Secretary issued Title X]

regulations and said that he found the Title XIX ones superior in their effecti\
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.dminThere are 7,000 hospitals in the united States.

Almost all of them are

: at

to participate on either Medicare or Medicaid, and the majority of them

.erva-

The figure runs at around 6,000 hospitals.

The total number of hospital

ssions per year in the United States is a phenomenal figure.

These sets of

lization review regulations would have required each admission which was
le for benefits under a federal program to be reviewed within 24 hours of
- the
way

The review would then have to be completed within 48 hours at the
that in effect you had a committee gecision as to.whether or not
was medically necessary.

:0

To the uninitiated, "medically necessary" is strictly a term of art; it
rved

medically appropriate or medically justified.

It means reasonably

sary in order to restore the patient as a productive member. of society.

It

somewhat artifical concept·when applied to the over-65 age group of the
are the primary beneficiaries of the program.
ng

We filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois.

n be

judge who once sat in a wheel chair outside an X-ray department
hours waiting to be X-rayed.

very

We were fortunate to

He decided that it was a physical impossibility

committee to decide whether or not hospitalization would be medically
hour period because they wouldn't even have,· the test back
t amount of time.

g

der
to
:, can

The government did not believe that there was any possibility that the
would issue a preliminary injunction to halt the enforcement of these
As a consequence, Judge Hoffman, who recognized that the Secretary
any moment remove the objectionable provisions in the regulations to
lawsuit moot, was amazed that Secretary Weinberger refused to talk to
decision was reached.

The government then appealed to the Court

This was a surprise because the issue on appeal was so narrow.

The

issues of the lawsuit aren't me.t when only a preliminary injunction
;ion

The burden is to show that injury has occurred, or that there is
of injury for which there would be no adequate recourse at law.

:0

lp to

difficult burden for us.
abused its

tion
at is
itle
dn't
tal.

discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction.

than use the attorney from the U.S. Attorney General's Office in Chicago,
Department sent up one of their big guns from Washington to argue.
however, upheld Judge Hoffman's granting of the preliminary injunction.
One of the noteworthy things in Judge Hoffman's opinion was that he said.
on 1801 does in fact place a limit on the exercise of the Secretary's
that the Secretary has been given.
~~"LLVHotrate

use
Litle

On appeal you only ask whether or

Regulations are unreasonable if you

to the satisfaction of the court that they do in fact constitute

control over the way in which medicine is practiced.
Judge Hoffman was particulary impressed with testimony by physicians that
the primary considerations in making a decision as to whether or not a
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patient needed hospitalization would have to be a consideration .of the patient's
fear of acommittee decision that the hospitalization was medically unnecessary.
The patient would then have to be out of the hospital
is when federal benefits are cut off.

w~thin

24 hours because that

That can be a very traumatic experience,

particularly to an older person who fights going to a hospital in the first place
and then is suddenly told he doesn't need to be there.
Judge Hoffman, I suppose, felt very strongly that when government sees a
problem, their solution is often geared wrongly to the masses.

When a physician

sits down with a patient, there is an individual with very unique problems and
his concerns should be directed to that.
he has to same kind of relationship.
inclined.

When a 'lawyer sits down with a client

Not all federal judges, of:course, are so

Some of them are products of the Great Society days and believe that

when government sees a problem and devises a mass solution; it does not
unnecessarily harm a class of individuals.
After the preliminary injunction was upheld, Secretary Weinberger left and
Secretary Matthews came in.

Judge Hoffman made it clear that if we didn't sit

down and talk to Matthews, we would go to trial on the merits within 2 weeks.
Matthews was going to be unable to arrange that but Hoffman said, "Very well,
I will schedule trial on Monday."

Matthews then met with us on Friday.

We were

able to establish communications with him.
That in itself was really our victory--we could now talk to HEW.

We may

not always be able to reach a common understanding, but at least we can talk to
one another.
The second victory came when, without our request, Congress revised one of
the sections of the 1972 amendments upon which the Secretary had relied in
promulgating the first of the utilization review regulations so that there would
be no mandate for review of each hospital admission.

The language now says

"review or screening" and it also includes language that permits this to be done
on a sample basis.

The language does go on to suggest that a sample could be 100

percent, but there is still room to breathe now.
There are other instances, however, in which litigation has not been as
successful.

When the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act were enacted,

some people thought that PSRO meant Please Stand up and Roll Over--it means
Professional Standards Review Organization.

One of the groups of conservative

physicians who felt very strongly about this instituted litigation in July 1974
to contest the constitutionality of this statute at a time when there had been
no implementation, when there were no regulations, and when there were no Professional Standard Review Organizations yet designated.

There was very little hope

of being able to demonstrate to a court that there was either injury or such
immediate threat of injury that there should be relief from the PSRO requirements.
A three-judge federal district panel found that the law was constitutional on its
face.

The United States Supreme Court affirmed without opinion the three-judge

decision.

Government attorneys now interpret that to mean that the Supreme Court
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t's

that the federal government has a constitutional right to require phyperform peer review.

This shows you the difference ,between the workings

man's mind inside the government and the workings of man's, mind outside the
_"L,~'~m,pnt,

ace

because I don't believe any self-respecting lawyer would come up with

kind of interpretation.
are involved in another lawsuit against the Secretary of HEW for much

a

reason that we became involved in the utilization review suit.

This is

ation contesting the validity of maximum allowable cost regulations, which
federal reimbursements for drugs

availabl~

from multiple sources to a

allowable cost established by a review board.
In order for physicians to rely upon this regulqtory system the

~ood

and

need a current capability to determine the th~rapeutic
any single drug which is made by more than one manufacturer.

This

are talking about drugs available under brand names and generic
, from large manufacturers

and small manufacturers.

I don't know any

he is employed by F.D.A.--who believes that the F.D.A. has
to the American public that it has such capability.
this kind of regulatory system requires physicians to keep in mind
than medical considerations and clinical experience when they prea drug for a patient.

To give a good example of how this coerces

about a pharmacy and therapeutics committee in a hospital
is dependent for 40 to 60 percent of its total cash flow on the Medicare
the Medicaid programs.

If the federal government reimburses for drugs at

allowable cost, the hospital will make certain that the shelves of
are stocked with those drugs.

This means that your pharmacy and

committee, which comes up with the formula which governs the drugs
may prescribe to your hospitalized patients, will not have the range of
that was available.
We don't anticipate being successful in this suit, I might add.

It's

pretty muddied up because the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Association
Pharmaceutical Company both filed separate suits in the District Court
Columbia to contest the regulations.

Because of the first-filed

in federal court, the government moved for either a motion to dismiss or a
to stay the Washington, D.C. suits
4

pending determination of the Chicago

filed by the American Medical Association, because we filed before they did.
until they clocked in the proposed regulations at the Federal
r and then had rushed over to the court house so we would have the right
We know about the first-filed rules, you see.
Consequently, after PMA got thrown out in Washington they came into the
suit, intervening a\ a co-plaintiff with the American Medical Association.
was followed by the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut inteLvening in
the federal government.

ur

It's been interesting because even though Massachusetts is a co-defendant

49

with the government, the director of the Title XIX Massachusetts Medicaid program
joined with nine other directors of state Medicaid programs in signing a petition
asking the Secretary to delay the effective date of the maximum allowable cost

,

regulations because they would be unable to implement them for another year.

It's

a case of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing.
The most recent litigation in which the AMA has filed

a

petition is a suit

initially filed by the state of North Carolina.

It concerned the National Health

Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.

From the very beginning, of

course, we've said that this is the most massive

pie~e

of bureaucratic control

that has ever corne on the American scene and tpat it deprives the states of
their 10th amendment rights.

The ideal plaintiff for this suit is North Carolina

because their Supreme Court said 4 years ago that a certificate-of-need law
violates the state constitution.

No attempt has been made to introduce subsequent

certificate-of-need legislation in North Carolina partially because their state
supreme court insists that to do so, they would have to amend the constitution.
Even if we don't win, I think that certain things will be accomplished.
One will be that the implementation and development of the programs under that
law will be undertaken with much greater care.

There is a strong possibility, if

North Carolina gets the three-judge court convened, that a number of other states
will have an interest in joining this litigation.

If even 5,?r 6 states contested

the constitutionality of this kind of law, you might see a very good reaction from
Congress.
I really don't have any particular conclusions in terms of how to challenge
new regulations.

There is an apparent push in the legislatures to get their

teeth into the kind of problems for which the public is crying for solutions.
The future will show to an even greater extent than the past that the construction
of health care delivery systems and medical programs will continue to lie with
the courts rather than the legislature or the regulatory agenci.es.

In Chicago you

see bumper stickers that say, "Help support the lawyer; send your son to medical
school." . If you can't get your son into medical school be sure to send him to
law school,because there's going to be an awful lot going on out there.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION:

It seems to me that every time an inspector or regulator opens his

mouth, it costs the government, the institution, and/or the patient more money.
Has a study ever been done regarding cost effectiveness of regulation?

Does it

accomplish its purpose and does this accomplishment of purposes justify the cost?
MS. ANDERSON:

There have been a number of studies done by hospitals on the cost

of the utilization review system.
per patient.

The figures run from $13 per patient to $7.10

These cost studies are based upon the supposed requirement under

both the Professional Standards Review Organization and the utilization review
regulations that you retain nurse coordinators to do the initial screening against
the criteria developed by the medical staff.
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The answer to your queston depends

~ogram

upon your audience.

~i tion

public, who never really understand that they are the ones who pay the added costs

)st

for their hospitalization, the regulations aren't unnecessary.'

To the government, it's mandatory that we have them.

It's advocate, we've failed utterly i they want more controls.

To the

To the consumer

You have to pick your

a,ud,ience if you want the right answer.
I'd like to add something to that.

suit

1

Iealth

qgrams were considered in the Congress that there was an extreme lack of reliable
9.Jections as to costs.

E

col

It was very notable when various

il~y

No one talked about what the overall cos,t would be.

talked in terms at that time of the need t3 do something, but the questions

:~/,to effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio that might be derived got lost in the
I

I think some of those

There were some very high costs for the program.

rolina
',":,i",,';,-";

~.i':9::ures

are now being borne out as the program is being implemented.

Just to use

3equent

PSRO as an example, while it is not even fully implemented at, this time, the

tate

requires the designation of PSRO areas around the country.
but that's only about one-fourth of the total.

ion.

About 200 have
Already the

:1.

',rlgress is beginning to ask questions concerning what they have created, the cost

hat

.f':,the program and its effectiveness.

Unfortunately this has been a typical

ty, if

the legislative process.

states

It seems to me that I have read that some of the council members in

n.teste

AMA were not too much opposed to PSRO because of some funds being filtered
the program.

:::m fro

ANDERSON:

The policy statement on PSRO by the AMA,

jus~

like all other

came about by majority vote of our House of Delegates.

llenge

The

se of Delegates initially said that PSRO is the law of the land; therefore,

r

is to work so tha't it does not interfere with the way in which

s.

practice medicine, then medicine should take a leadership role in
ith

~~~ng

ago

~llion was an HEW grant for the development of review criteria so that there

dical

o1.ild be adequate professional and medical specialty input so that physicians

to

to shape it.

Not all physicians necessarily agree with that.

work with the regulations.

The $1

The AMA did not derive any benefits from that

I,million, except the headache of having, to work wi th the committees.
I probably badly misunderstood something that Ms. Anderson said.
quit understand the mechanism of this fight.
is

I

I understood you to say it was

'j)1Possible to fight regulations until they were written.

Then in the next

Iney.r;(3ath I thought you said that you have no access to regulators and no way to
s it
cost?
cost
$7.10
,der

Did you mean you had access to or some control of regulators or
fggulations only through the courts, and that there was no use in fighting the
land?

The AMA's position in influencing legislation before it is

confused to some physicians .
• ANDERSON:

We have always used our persuasion and education prior to the

of legislation.

We have always attempted to use the same tools to

way in which regulations will be promulgated.
~pends

When Casper Weinberger

of HEW he would not even answer a phone call from the AMA.

51

As

nearly as we could tell, he paid no attention to any single written document.

It

was really a point in time when you found that persuasion, education, written
ducument, and offers to be of assistance were totally , ignored. That's when the
utilization review suit was filed. We now have Secretary Matthews and Dr.
Theodore Cooper as Assistant Secretary, and so we have good communications with
the regulatory branches in HEW.

If we were to have another breakdown in communi-

cations, then that would be one of the factors that might enter into a decision
to file litigation, but there are many other factors that,enter into that decision.
We'll never stop trying to have

direct~input

into the. shaping of both legislation

and regulations.
MR. PETERSON:

During the first session of the current Congress, the AMA either

through appearances before committees or statements of letters in response to
proposed regulations, appeared about 80 times.
be going at about the same pace.

This year ':s acti vi ty seems to

The association, in its responsibility to the

public with respect to the health program, continues to be active both before
the Congress and HEW.
QUESTION:

The Kentucky Peer Review Organization has been tentatively designated

as the PSRO of Kentucky.
hospital.

The hospital I work for has been designated a pilot

They told us this about 2 years ago.

1S

What

PSRO as far as the individual states are concerned?

the current status of

My under·standing of our

utilization review criteria is that they are much the same as those that the AMA
had the injunction against, but that we still have 24-hour review in this type
thing.
MS. ANDERSON:

You should remember the differences in the underlying statutes.

We contested utilization review regulations in which the underlying statutes did
not authorize the Secretary to require 24-hour review.

However, in the language

of the Professional Standards Review Act, there is specific authority to require
PSRO's to conduct prospective review, concurrent review, or retrospective review.
So there is a great difference, from a legal viewpoint, in the way you would
view the two programs.
MR. PETERSON:

There is one other aspect to that.

is not organizational even at this point.

In many areas the PSRO program

However, the utilization review programs

which have been in effect in the hospitals continue.

There is in the PSRO law

itself a mandate that where the PSRO finds the hospital's utilization review program to be effective, it is required to use that mechanism as the vehicle of
utilization review.

That is not to say that the requirements of the PSRO cannot

be imposed upon that review system at another time.
Another factor relates to the cost of the program.

Inasmuch as the appro-

priations by the Congress were inadequate to fund all the PSROprograms around
the country, the Congress devised another system to fund theprQ:gram.
provides for funding through the Medicare program.

This wi;};];;;:'

That system
the develop-

ment.
MS. ANDERSON:

~vhat

he's saying is that the hospital
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for parts of

It

utilization review.

That cost goes into your reimbursement formula under

n

the

What is the AMA view on the newly-proposed utilization review
appeared in the March 29 Federal Register?

ith

regula~

Why did AMA stand pat on

of whether you had to have a definite diagnosis made before surgery?

muni-

The Associati.on has not submitted formal comments.

ion

The last date

The Board of Trustees reviewed the regulations and felt
flexibility in them than in the previous one
e there doesn't have to be a utilization-<review on each admission.

The

"a for review don't have to be in accordance with national guidelines, which
her

of the specific provisions in the older utilization review regulations

.0

contested.

Each hospital medical staff in any particular hospital is

o

right under this new set of proposed utilization review regulations to

the

list of diagnoses, conditions, and symptoms that invariably require
What the regulations basically say is that pain in and of itself
enough to const±tute an elective procedure that does not require review.

cated

the other illustrations given in the regulations is abdominal pain that
res further diagnostic testing.

of

these regulations.

This invariably requires hospitalization

If, however, an admission did not me~t one of these

es, symptoms, or conditions, then a member of the utiliza tion"'r,eview
AMA

ttee would be required to review that admission within 3 working days.

If

that admission was not medically necessary, he would then be required to
the attending physician, who would have an opportunity to explain all of
!s.

involved in his decision to request admission.

If the physician

did

of the utilization review committee were not persuaded by this, then a

ruage

physician member of the utilization review committee would have to go over

Iuire
~view.

1

information in the chart, the information provided by the attending physician,
The process would usually take about 5 working days.

Under the regulations,

hospital would establish 5 days per week as working days for the purposes of
The additional provision that you were talking about is the one that says
of elective surgery or other elective procedures--and this is defined as

Law
y

or other procedures which can be delayed without significant medical

pro-

criteria is made by each particular hospital.

The review would

be performed within 3 working days, or prior to the performance of the

f

annot

,

whichever would be shorter.

I'm quite certain that when the AMA s ub-

will be comments on that particular provision of the
?prollnd

sys

Mr. Peterson, you used a lot of superlatives when you described what
consider to be the work of all those boogeymen up in Congress.

You said that

the legislation on national health insurance would clearly impose an
control and have a profound effect on the delivery of health care and so
rts of

I'm still swayed by the proposition that legislation doesn't just materi-
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alize but instead results from at least what is perceived as a need.

Without

getting into a discussion of whether or not regulation itself is needed, you
seem to be taking a position that the AMA draws the line at no regulation at all.
I don't think you mean to leave that impression.

Could you tell me what criteria

you use to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable regulation?
MR. PETERSON:

I don't think you can make a general statement.

to look at each case individually.

I think you have

I did use some terminology as you have

indicated, but I also said that agencies have a proper role in making regulations
and that regulations are mandated by-bhe law and can be beneficial to the public
interest.

I also indicated in my statement

t~at

those regulations that we felt

went beyond the law or were detrimental to the public health would receive
special attention from the medical profession.

As Ms. Anderson has indicated,

when the litigation was filed on the utilization review, regulations, the Association took the action in the interest of the public, and we were sustained by the
court.

However, I would not want to leave the impression that the Association

is opposed to all legislation.

As a matter of fact, in one Congress, we were

there in support of the proposed legislation in 31 instances.
MR. KRICHBAUM:

Let me follow that up with one example.

Section 1122 of the

Social Security Act, which placed limitations on the portion of reimbursement
from federal funds to be used for unapproved capital
"health care facilities."
facility is.

experidi~ures,

used the term

Nowhere in the law does it define what a health care

That's an example of Congress not meeting its effective role.

left it up to the agency to define the term.

That

As a result, the agency came out

with a lengthy regulation defining what Congress meant when it used the term
health care facility.

In essence, Congress writes part of the law and the regula-

tory agency, which is non-elected, continues the writing of the law.

Subsequently,

other problems developed when some states attempted to say what the agency meant in
its regulations.
MR. PETERSON:

They try to take it even one step further.

I'd like to make that point a little clearer.

In the regulation

to which he's referring, the agency included as a health care facility the term
"organized ambulatory health care facility."

That type of general term was

introduced and it created more ambiguities.

It was that term that some states

then tried to apply to physicians' offices.

The net result was that "health

care facilities"was later interpreted by the states to apply to physicians' offices
and this caused a great deal of problems.
QUESTION:

I can understand having difficulty with interpretation, but I think

some of your objections were a little more substantial than semantical.

I'm in

favor of the proposition that the government can impose reasonable limitations on
reimbursement for health services that are provided under a public assistance program.

You seem to like neither the 70th percentile or 90th percentile figures for

reimbursement.

I will agree, however, that I can see where you could professional]

object to the government trying to tell you how to practice medicine.

But in term:

of putting a reasonable limitation on reimbursements, I don't understand your
objection.
54

The language of the Act provides for "reasonable charges" by

t

cians.
all.

The question about the regulations is the matter of interpretation.

Oth percentile that you mentioned was a ceiling arbitrarily
decided for
,
ursement to the hospitals under the program.

That was subsequently arbitrarily

to the 80th percentile without any justification given for the move.
have

As

physicians '. charges under Medicare are concerned, they originally set reimt at the 83rd percentile and then reduced it to the 75th pe·rcentile.

.tions

regulation even before the law was amended to so 'provide .

Lblic

Therefore, I think as attorneys we should, examine wheth.er the regulations

'elt

out the intent of the law.

We should also look

~t

the application of

I economic index formulas that apply to one sector of the economy that are

applicable to any other sector.

These are questions that are

;ociathe

r

it a step further, after the Medicare program established its
as, the Medicaid program could easily pay a lower fee on top of that.

~e

You

t the government should have the right to make reasonable reimbursement
programs that it subsidizes.

That may well be, but when the Medicaid

is paying, 40, 50 r or 60 percent of customary charges in the area, the
under the law is whether that payment will reasonably 'assure that the
term
::::are

are available to all the individuals entitled to care under'tbe program.
of whether i t is reasonable or not, I

suppose, is a matter of inter-

But when reimbursement is set at such low

::mt

close examination.

n

tion
term
tes
h

.ink

m in

~ss

in
)ur
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perce~tiles,

I

think it

PANEL DISCUSSION
REGULATORY IMPACT ON MALPRACTICE,
CONFIDENTIALITY, CLINICAL DECISION MAKING
AND OTHER PHYSICIAN/PATIENT REALTIONSHIPS ,
Harry N. Peterson
John A. Krichbaum
B.J. Anderson
QUESTION:

If a hospital utilization review committee decides that a patient's

stay is not covered under Medicare, and the patient has to leave the hospital
--'

within 24 or 48 hours, and if some harm comes to the patient, is there any malpractice involved in that and who would be responsible?'
ANDERSON:

The utilization review regulations and 'the provisions of

~edicare

do not require that a patient be discharged because of a decision made by a
tilization review committee.

What the utilization review committee decision does

off federal reimbursement for that hospitalization 48 hours after the
patient and the attending physicians.

If, for example, a

ital administrator were to tell a patient that he couldn't stay, and if he
tained an injury directly related to that early discharge, then the hospital
t incur liability.

However, I do not think that hospital administrators do

of thing because most hospital policies state that only a. physician
or discharge a patient.

If a physician felt that it was medically

traindicated to discharge a patient, and if he relied upon a utilization
ew decision, then it is possible that this would be a factual situation in
he could incur liability because liability is based upon knowledge of all
facts.
In a lot of cases it seems that patients just cannot stay in the
because they do not have the money to pay.

I know that a negative

mean that they have to leave the hospital when their
cian thinks they should be there, but in practice the patient has to leave
have any money.
I understand

and you understand that, but you still have to

hypothetical fact situation that is going to result in a finding
Is there a typical case in which the utilization review commitstay is medically unnecessary and in which a physician says
go home?

I just don't think those factual situations occur on

You gave me a hypothetical.

What were the contraindications for dis-

the patient?
This patient had a total knee implant put in by me.
review committee stated that the
I felt that this was a dangerous. situation.

stay was no longer

We had to inspect his

an hourly basis; it stood a chance to open up.
al mechanism--there were two appeals involved.
on review committee decision was sustained.

On the 14th day

We went throught the
On both occasions the

When the patient was almost

',I
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ready to go home, the incision separated and they had to cancel the discharge.
If this had happened just two or three hours later, we might have been in a
difficult situation.
MS. ANDERSON:

What the Medicare law contemplates is that a continuum of care will

be provided for the patient so that you could have transferred him to a skilled
nursing facility where there would be registered nurses to care for the incision.
If he had a sophisticated enough family,you could have sent him home and made
arrangements for home health services; a registered nurse would have made regular
visits for the home for an appropriate' period of time.
There have not been any reported court decisions involving that kind of
fact situation.

Discharging patients is a risk that physicians run many times.

You can discharge a patient who has been monitored for 3 days with minimal chest
pains and have him walk out the door and drop dead of a myocardial infarction an
hour later.

None of us are really astute enough to be able to predict with

certainty what the future medical course will be.
QUESTION:

No, this situation is slightly different.

feels that the patient has to be in.
11S. ANDERSON:

Here the physician himself

I

I~sthe utilization committee. ...

Yes, but what Medicare contemplated was that you would then transfer

that patient to a skilled nursing facility where coverage could continue because
of the registered nurses to observe the incision at the regular intervals.
MR. KRICHBAUM:

I think part of the answer is that what you do is going to be

measured by the necessary standards.

The fact that the utilization review com-

mittee has indicated that there's no further need for the patient to stay in the
hospital is going to be a very strong indication of the prevailing standard of
the community.

Beyond that I think you've extended your protection against mal-

practice by advising the patient of your individual professional jUdgement.
MR. PETERSON:

I think the problem goes a little bit further.

dilemma in which the physician is placed in many situations.

It indicates the
I supposed there's

no real answer from the standpoint of liability until something occurs after the
decision has been made.

For instance, suppose the physician determines in this

case that the patient should stay in the hospital a week longer.

The patient is

able to pay the hospital bill and stay there at the direction of the physician
and nothing happens.

Then he leaves and begins to think about the decision of

the committee that all that hospitalization was not medically necessary.

You can

see the other side as to what might happen in this age of consumer litigation.
MR. KRICHBAUM:

There may be some liability for the additional costs that the

patient incurred, but at least you would have adequately responded to any risk of
malpractice with regard to injury to the patient had he left.
OUESTION:

Can an attorney, when he's investigating a claim of malpractice, secure

the information that came before the review committee in order to determine if a
claim does exist?
MR. KRICHBAUM:
mittee.

I'm sure that depends to a degree on what you mean be review com-

If it is a non-PSRO, the answer may well depend on whether the state has
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granting immunity from discovery of peer review proceedings, as many states

re .

are 21 states that have such laws.

Three or four .of

also specifically say that they apply to· the proceedings of PSRO' s .

I

one or possibly both of our panelists migh±..like to comment on the
Lled

tial availability of PSRO criteria, standards, and norms to plaintiff's .law-

Lsion.
The criteria, standards, and norms are already available in pub-

Ie

the medical and legal community.
these standards will meet the
of

ultimat~standards

treatment is measured in the courtroom.

nes.

in litigation.

The question will arise as to
of care against. which

I don,' t think this has yet been

The organic PSRO law, as I recall it, does not provide

::hest

the committee is immune from discovery.

::m an

ing a proposed amendment to the PSRO law, has recommended protection for

The AMA, in

facilitate the objectivi±.y of the program.
No one knows.
mself

The law had language in it saying that the records

be held confidential, in accordance with regulations
by the Secretary.

The law goes on to say that the regulations will make

that they aren't so confidential that they cannot be used for proper
However, the Secretary has not yet issued any regulation.

He

the position in an initial draft that since PSRO's are agents of the
be

are subject to the federal right to Privacy Act, which means

com-:-

whose cases are reviewed have access to the review records, it

n the
of
mal-

the patient could also have access.

However, the Secretary

addressed the question of whether such records shall be discoverable for
and there is no case law.
I'm not as familiar with that statute as both of you are, but I read

the

the Secretary adopt regulations for the disclosure of PSRO

.ere's

in mind of course the

,r the

say, the Secretary has not done so.

this

protection of the patient and doctor.
Don't you think it would be a fair

this kind of information might have an impact on a cost-effective-

mt is

:ian
l

of

No one has any objection to making statistical studies from PSRO
take the actual minutes of them and make that information generally
tends to harm the general public interest.

.on.

One of the objectives of

of program is to assure the quality of'services and their provision in

:he

cost effective manner possible.

~isk

looking at individual cases tends to have a dampening effect upon the

To open up records of review committees

ivity and judgment of doctors of the work of colleagues.

On the other hand,

are one of the contemplated uses of the PSRO activities.
One of the questions that came up earlier was whether the required
a blacklist of physicians who have repeatedly failed to meet
~w

com-

d standards of the PSRO will create a larger target for medical malpractice
Is this an accurate description of the PSRO law, and if so, are there
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adequate procedural safeguards in the law for a physician?
MS. ANDERSON:

ex

The PSRO law does require the Secretary to publicize the names of

th

physicians who, in a substantial number of cases, have failed to comply with the
norms, standards, and criteria of the PSRO.

pa

Dave Wille~t, a California attorney,

has predicted that this will have an impact upon the number of malpractice suits
filed for one very simple reason.

stl

Once a patient has benefits cut off because of

wh.

a determination by a peer review committee that services are either inappropriate

ou·

or unnecessary, he has been directly affected in his pocketqbook and would be

MS

more inclined to file a lawsuit.

I don 't, know whether plaintiffs' attorneys

would agree with that reasoning or not.
scene, you know that anything

th,

If you've
, ever observed the American

in

that's going to happen in the courts across the

land happened 10 years ago in California.

50

If the California attorneys are saying

this is going to happen, then you can predict in about 7 years you'll see your
first suit in California.

be:
, wil

They you'll have a little bit of time before you're

,,1

MR.

" arE

ready to defend it in your own court.

I attended a seminar on the Kentucky PSRO organization, and I got the :;\ MR.
impression that criminal penalties were prescribed for a breach of confidentiality.~ ti(

QUESTION:

f;! wi 1

Could you enlighten me on this?
MS. ANDERSON:

The Social Security Act itself has penalties for failure to maintair::;' thE
':'i

the confidentiality of certain records that are a part of

the~ocial

~o~

Security

{'I:'

Administration system.

f:: MS~

When HEW wishes to calm the fears of physicians, they

always say there's a criminal

penalty if any of the Secretary's agents violate

~.!;;

phj

But that is a strange and wonderful world

.~~

QUI

because the Secretary at the same time tells the PSRO's that very little of the

,.:,

es~

information they have will be maintained in confidence.

::;MS.

the requirements of confidentiality.

MR. KRICHBAUM:

~;y,'-

You're definitely not going to be in breach of the PSRO confiden- iThE
,(),/

tiali ty provisions if you otherwise engaged in carrying out what the PSRO is

f!(Bui
(,J

intended to carry out.

There is conflict in the minds of many physicians that

the~:Qm

very functions and duties to which the PSRO is assigned violate basic confidentiali typrinciples of physician-patient relationships.

~;; apt

There's a built-in conflictJ!.MS.

in the law, I think.
QUESTION:

You stated that the PSRO utilizes the review committees that already

exist in the hospitals.

Can you tell me something about the mechanics of the

review organizations in each hospital, how they are appointed and of whom they
consist?
MS. ANDERSON:

The utilization review committee must be composed of physicians

who are either members of the hospital medical staff--or if the hospital does
not have enough physicians on the staff--a committee of physicians appointed by
a county or regional medical society.

In the event that neither one of those

requirements could be satisfied, some other mechanism acceptable to the Secretary
must be used.

If you have a hospital with an organized medical staff

you could form a committee of three or more of them.

A physician who has been

directly or indirectly responsible for the care of an individual patient must
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i:onE

himself when that patient's care is being reviewed.
~s

of
the

1.

commi ttee review all admissions of con-tinued stays of
whose care is federally financed.

Jrney,
suits

The law mandates that

review is also a mandated medical staf'f function under the
rds of the A}ffi Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, so that hospitals
apply voluntarily for accreditation by the commission are required to carry
se review functions anyway.

be

s

If more than 10 percent of the physicians in a PSRO area indicate
object to a conditional PSRO as notl:>,eing representative of the physicians

an

area, then the Secretary must poll

the

t~e

physicians.

If more than

physicians that respond to that poll object to the organization
esignated as a conditional PSRO, the Secretary cannot enter into a contract

our
're

The end date for this rule is January 1, 1978.
That doesn't mean you're never going to have a PSRO in such an
entity will be set up as the PSRO.
If the Secretary cannot enter into an agreement with an organizawithin the time limit, then he can enter into an agreement
organization which is not a professional association afterward.

Ultimately,

can be a PSRO imposed in the area by the Secretary of HEW even with.ty
ley

with the physicians .
Such a PSRO would probably be compromised of government employed

llate
lOrld

These review committees are not usually government employees; they are

: the

doctors.

Is that correct?

physicians have a vote on the utilization review committee.
can collect information and make it easier for the physicians.
the lack of medical necessity can only be made by physicians.
:hat
Lden-

Doesn't that make the review committee sort of a rubber stamp of doctors
actions of their brother doctors?
You don't know physicians very well, do you?
know that when you try to get one to testify against another

ready

do

the

Do you know how they solved that problem in California?

they
ians
oes
ed by

They have

of medical experts in California because they found out all it takes
A more basic question on utilization review is whether it should be
But

who else is going to determine the propriety of medical treatphysician?

Are there any suggestions as to who else would do

ose
There are other people in a hospital besides physicians.
exerting pressure also.

Lack of space also plays a role.

They have

The best

been

review takes place in those hospitals that have the highest bed

lust

Where there is a demand for beds, utilization review has always been
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effective.
MR. KRICHBAUM:

One question raised this morning concerned the extent to which

the regulations and legislation have affected the betterment of health care in
the country.

I think it's a very good question.

question of cost-effectiveness.

This is somewhat related to the

Certificate-of-need laws are an example; have

they resulted in any lowering of rates in those states where they've been enacted
as contrasted to the states where they haven't?

All the information that we've

seen indicates that there's been no lessening_,of rates or of occupancy in states
that have the certificate-of-need laws.

In fact, the amount of money that goes

into the regulatory process may have increased the ambunt of money being spent in
this area.
MR. PETERSON:

This general question is one that's surfacing in some df the com-

mittee hearings at the present time.

The questions that are being asked concern

programs that have been enacted by the Congress which are not necessarily achieving
their purpose.

Of course these programs are relatively new, but questions are

being asked as to whether the provision of medical services is most effective in
this regard, or whether federal dollars should be spent in other areas of health
education related to the lifestyle of Americans?
for the betterment of health generally?

Would that be more effective

Congress is now considering extensive

programs with respect to health education.
QUESTION:

Would there be any way for the PSRO's to disclose information to that

Congressional committee or to other committees other than pursuant to regulations
adopted by the Secretary?
MR. PETERSON:

I think that the committees, prior to the initiation of the hear-

ings; solicited information from the PSRO's by submitting questions to them concerning their activities.

At hearings which took place earlier, it was indicated

that some review activities were beneficial in reducing, for instance, lengths of
hospital stay.

This type of reduction took place in the peer review activities

of the profession prior to the initiation of PSRO.
QQESTION:

Ms. Anderson made the statement that there was little the medical pro-

fession could do to improve its image.

I was particularly jolted by the state-

ment that if review results are negative, this causes patients generally to lose
confidence in their physician.
MS. ANDERSON:

I said that there's very little the medical profession alone can

do to change its public image.

All of the polls indicate that the medical pro-

fession is not held in as high esteem as it once was by the general public, but
that individual patients still feel that their physician ranks higher than most
any other professional person.
patient is one of trust.

The relationship between the physician and a

A physician has a fiduciary duty to treat his patient

with the best interest of the patient in mind.

But the public does not perceive

the medical profession in the same way that an individual who goes to a physician
perceives his individual physician.

There's something about the effectiveness of

utilization review that many members of the public overlook.
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That is that there

are fixed costs for maintaining beds in hospitals which continue regardless of
whether the bed is occupied, so that in some hospitals, particularly where there
is a surplus of beds, the government is really paying
decreased lengths of stay.
of those things.

I don't think people

costs for

stop to think about some

Physicians alone can never change the way the press perceives

the medical profession, for example.
QUESTION:

eve~

increas~d

That's

Then I did misunderstand you.

one~public

view of medicine.

You did not say that the review causes

patients generally to lose confidence in the medical profession.
MR. KRICHBAUM:

Ms. Anderson suggested we keep Gur eyes on California to see what's

occurring there.

One bill that's pending in the state senate out there that phy-

sicians view as potentially causing problems is one which would

restric~

physicians

to practice in specialties to which they've been certified by the state. : This
bill has been kicking around out there for a number of years, but it has recently
passed the house.
lation.

Physicians out there are closely watching that piece of legis-

We may see similar types of legislation being introduced in other states

in the coming years.
Would anyone in the audience like to express a view on continuing medical
or legal education and whether it should be a required, or whether it's an effective means of improving quality?
My own view is that continuing legal or medical education ought to be
the practitioner.

I don't think a physician here at the University needs

tinuing education as much as a practicing physician in a rural area of the
I think across-the-board, mandated, continuing education like that takes
n a lot of people that really don't get any value from it.
Anyone with another view or opinion on that?
would think it's a good idea, but the mushrooming of knowledge in
fields about makes it impossible for a single individual to comprehend
going on.

We might have to get researchers on our medical staffs to keep

rest of the boys up to date.
cutive office in the

I've even thought at times that maybe the

country should be filled by a committee and not by an

vidual because its getting to be too much for one person to handle.
ANDERSON:

It was when God appointed the committee that we got the camel.

is occuring in the field of continuing medical education has been an increased
ization that formal courses alone do not answer the needs of individual phyThere is increased emphasis on medical audit studies as being perhaps
more effective mechanisms of assuring continuing medical education in
on hospital staff level where you have the best capability of tailoring
process to the needs of the individual practitioner.
Maybe the lawyers out here have either fallen asleep or they don't
anything on continuing legal education.

Do we have some lawyers that

I

I,
,'

comment on that?
Plaintiff's attorneys do a beautiful job of educating each other
and are not successful trial techniques.
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T
COMMENT:

I have not attended every session--obviously I don't have time,

I don't think anyone has time--of the continuing legal education programs. I
think I would be appalled if the program were made mandatory"

I find them to

be about 50-50 in terms of value, in terms of content, in terms of any utility
that I derive from them.
MS. ANDERSON: Are you talking about your State Bar Association programs?
QUESTION:

The Continuing Legal Education programs.
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It's not mandated in Kentucky.

PSYCHIA'l'RIC/LEGAL CONCEPTS OF DANGEROUSNESS
Dr. Harvey L. Ruben
Department of Mental Health
Connecticut
The problem in dealing with this topic is that, for the most part, legal
and psychiatric concepts of dangerousness fail to coincide.

My hope is that by

the end of our session today we'll both have a better understanding of each other's
position.

Then we can begin to reconcile some our conflicting ideas on this sub-

ject.
Before I start my presentation, I'd like to give,You a small examination.
I'm going to present four hypothetical case situations.
pond to them in two ways.

I'd like for you to res-

First, do you believe that this particular patient

is or will be dangerous to himself or others?

Second, do you believe that

involuntary hospitalization is necessary?
The first case is Jane, a 27-year-old separated social worker who came to
me complaining of feelings of depression and anxiety as a result of having recently
lost her job.

She'd been employed as a supervising social worker in a social

service agency in Boston for several years.

She stated that because of a person-

ality conflict with her supervisors, she was given the ultimatum of either resigning
or being fired.

She refused to resign and so her employment was terminated.

She also said that she' d been having many difficulties. during the past
several weeks while living with her mother.
difficulty getting along with her mother.

She said that ,she'd always had
These problems had resurfaced.

Her

father had been bugging her about the way that she had been dealing with her
mother.

In a fit of anger several days prior to her seeing me, she'd punched

her father in the face.
During several weeks of treatment, she continued to have symptoms of
anxiety and depression.

There was also some evidence of impulsive behavior.

She

was continually preoccupied with legal matters in relation to initiating a
grievance procedure with her former employer and in relation to her forthcoming
divorce.

During a period of 3 weeks she hired and ultimately discharged three

different attorneys.
occasions.

She also became very angry with me on several different

She fired me once only to return the following day and ask if I

would continue to treat her, which I did.
Attempts at stabilizing her behavior by using medications were unsuccessful.
She claimed that she experienced unpleasant feelings from the medications and
refused to take them.

She said that she felt better, but she didn't appear to be

better.
Eventually, in the middle of a group session, another patient made a
simple comment to Jane that she had undoubtedly played some part in her own firing, and
Jane became exceedingly angry.

She started screaming at this particular patient.

When I attempted to make a comment to help alleviate some of hostile feelings,
she became quite angry at me.

She continued to scream and then ran out of the
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office.
Please consider Jane's case in light of the questions of whether or not
she is dangerous to herself or others and whether you believe involuntary
hospitalization would be in order.
The second case is that of John, a 24-year-old single male who received
a medical psychiatric discharge from the Marine Corps for a psychotic thought
disorder which he developed. in Vietnam.
paranoid schizophrenia.

His diagnosis from the Marines was

He came to me about a year after his discharge when he

be.came dissatisfied with the services he was-'receiving at the local Veterans'
Administration outpatient clin~c.

During about 6 morlths of treatment, John

showed an inability to handle closeness with anyone.
difficult time maintaining a job.

He consequently had a

During several different jobs he repeatedly

complained that people he worked with were out to get him or attempting to
control his thoughts.

Ultimately, he left every job.

He also complained of

difficulties in relation to his father; he said that his father did not understand him.

He seemed to wish to be close with his father, but he had a great

deal of difficulty achieving this.

On one occasion he came to my office and told

me that he had purchased a loaded revolver for his protectiop.
Please consider your course of action in John's case according to the two
...

questions that I cited above.
Eric was a 20-year-old single male brought to me by his family upon his
return from a year's trek around the country.

Eric was a high school graduate

who had developed some difficulties during his freshman year at college.

He

started using various illegal drugs such as marijuana and LSD, and he starting
having difficulties with his studies.

At the same time his father, who was a

career military man, was transferred from the city where Eric was attending college.

This left Eric without any familial sources of support while he was

attempting to negotiate his freshman year.

Ultimately, he was unable to complete

the second semester.
He continued to use illegal drugs with greater frequency as he attempted
to deal with his upset emotions.

When he left school

at the end of the year,

he hitch-hiked around the country finding various odd jobs and crashing with
different people that he met along the way.

In this erratic lifestyle, he was

able to survive even though he was suffering a severe emotional disturbance.
Ultimately, he found his way to the city where his parents were then. residing,
and he reestablished contact with them.
When he came to me it was obvious that he was suffering a psychotic thought
disorder.

I commenced outpatient services for Eric, using major tranquilizers to

help combat his psychotic symptoms.

Al though the medication helped 's'@mewhat,

Eric was quite troubled because he felt that he had done himself irr~Fa:table damage

through the use of various hallucinogenic agents and that he woul;;'dnever be

right again.
Because he did not wish to live at home with his parents, he;],.t~dwith
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several young men whom he'd known in the past.

After several weeks in his new

apartment, he called one night at about 12:30 a.m. and said that he had to see
me.

He was calling from a phone booth that was a short distance from my office.

He arrived at my office 30 minutes later; he was quite

upset.

He told me that

his housemates were plotting against him and planning to harm him.
how he knew this.

I asked him

He said that he'd heard one of them mumbling under his breath,

"We're going to get you."

When I asked if he had any other evidence to support

his concern, he said that he had none but that he knew they would harm him.
Is Eric dangerous to himself or others?

Is involuntary hospitalization

necessary?
The fourth case is Robert.
army colonel.

Robert was a 46-year-old divorced, retired
I

He came from a family of career military officers, and his sister

was married to an exceedingly high-ranking military officer at the time he came
under my care.

Robert was stationed in a foreign country in a

when his marriage went awry.

co~sular

position

In the midst of his marital problems, his functioning

on duty had suffered, and he was ultimately relieved of his post and transferred ,
back to the United States.
While the divorce proceedings were still pending and while he was functioning in a relatively low-level administrative

position not commensurate in

any way with his previous position, he made a very serious suicide attempt by
slashing himself multiple times with a razor blade while sitting in Cl-.bathtub.
~

By chance his sister arrived at his apartment while he was in the midst of the
suicidal act, and his life was saved.
I was called into the case while Robert was an inpatient.
from a depression of psychotic proportions.

He was suffering

I worked with Robert for approximately

a year during which time his depression resolved, he retired from the military,
and he set about establishing a new life.

He went back to school in a year-long

program to obtain a master's degree in foreign relations so that he could obtain
a civil service job in a foreign country.
his previous military experience.

This would have been commensurate with

Although he was able to do fairly well in

school, he felt that he was not able to learn as much or as rapidly as he wished.
He attributed this to his age and waning intellectual capacity.
Since things were going well in Robert's life, he decided to visit me on
an every-other-week basis.
town at a meeting.

During a week when I was not to see him, I was out of

I had left a message with my answering service that if anyone

called, they could reach me at the hotel in the other city.

During that week,

Robert called my office and told my answering service that he was upset and that
he had to talk with me immediately.

The operator offered to give him the phone

number or to try to reach me and have me call back.
leaving his phone number.
me of Robert's call.

Then he hung up without

My answering service called me at the meeting and

told

They asked me if I wanted them to do anything.

Please respond to this case according to the two hypothetical questions
that I posed before.
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As you may have guessed, the cases I have presented are actually true.
Jane, the impulsive social worker, had a diagnosis of borderline schizophrenia.
You will recall that she had acted violently in the recent past in relation to
her father.

As she stormed out of my office I experienced several feelings. One

was fear for myself, for the other patients, and for my family.

I have an office

in my home, and it is not inconceivable that a violent patient could do harm to
my wife and children.
She wouldn't listen.

I followed Jane to her car, attempting to talk with her.
She jumped in her car and drove away in quite a rush.

I

was then faced with the decision of whether -to institute involuntary hospitalization on a physician's emergency certificate,

accordi~g

to Connecticut law.

I

chose to refrain from taking that action until I'd hadan opportunity to talk
with Jan~s parents who had an appointment to see me an hour later.

We discussed

what happened,and I told them of my concerns about the possibility that Jane
might be violent to herself or someone else.

We also discussed the possibility

of hospitalization, either voluntary or involuntary.

When her parents returned

home, they found Jane in an exceedingly agitated state.

They talked with her about

the session that I'd just had with them and suggested that she take the medication
that I had recommended.
see me the next day.

She agreed to do this.

She calmed down and came back to

Thus, I was able to avoid involuntary hospitalization.

In the case of John, the former Marine, I decided tha-t althollgh his having
a loaded gun was an exceedingly dangerous situation, I didn't believe at that
point in time his use of the weapon was imminent.

Thus, I suggested to him that

he return with his father for a joint session the followin<jj. evening.

Since I

had seen John with his father in the past, this was not an extraordinary move.
Once he was present with his father, I moved the discussion to John's feelings
that he must protect himself.
gun in the car.

He ultimately told his father that he did have a

By the end of the session, John had agreed to give the weapon to

his father and to seek his father's help more actively when he was feeling as
though he needed protection or wanted to talk with someone about it.
Eric, the hitchhiking drug abuser, seemed to me to be experiencing an
exacerbation of his psychotic thought process when he came to my office in the
middle of the night.

At that point in time I entertained the thought that Eric

might act violently towards his roommates

were he to return to his apartment.

I

spent abbut an hour-and-a-half talking with him, trying to help him understand
the reality of the situation.
medication at this point.

I also got him to accept a major increase in his

I decided that it would not be appropriate to allow

him to return to his apartment.

With his agreement, I called his parents and

made arrangements for him to stay with them for several days until things had
cooled off.
Robert, the retired colonel, possessed an exceedingly high suicidal
potential, for he was over the age of 40, he was divorced, he had few sources of
emotional support in his life, and he had a history of another severe suicide
attempt.

When my answering service was able to reach me--several hours after he'd
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placed the call to me--I decided that Robert was in severe straits and immediately
called his sister and asked her to go to his home.

I felt at that time that

involuntary hospitalization was necessary in order to protect Robert from doing
violence to himself.

The tragic end of this story is that later in the evening

I received a call from his sister saying that he'd been found dead in the bathtub.

He had put a gun in his mouth and shot himself.
What is dangerousness?

It is interesting that neither Dorland's Medical

Dictionary,l Hinsie and Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary,2 nor even the Psychiatric
Glossary

3

ousness.

of the American Psychiatric Associatign contain a

d~finition

of danger-

This finding sugges·ts that "dangerous" is not, a medical nor a psychiatric

term, but rather a legal term.

This happens to be precisely the case.

Very few

psychiatric authors attempt to define "dangerousness," although they do write
about it from time to time.

In a 1967 monograph, The Clinical Evaluation of

Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill, Usdin says that dangerousness relates to
aggressive and socially destructive acts. 4 In an excellent article entitled
"Dangerousness and Psychiatry," Tanany stated that a legal definition of dangerousness is a situation where "an act must occur in the community in the reasonably
forseeable future."
substantial injury.II S

This act, of course, must have a high probability of causing
He derives this legal definition from the findings of the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Overholser 6 and Millard v. Harris?

RoseI1fi~ld

v.

The problem for me as a psychiatrist is that it's impossible to say with
virtual certainty that an act will occur or that such an act will be associated
with substantial injury.

However, a review of the legal and psychiatric

literature about dangerousness indicates that such a prediction is just what
the law wants when a psychiatric expert testifies concerning an individual's
dangerousness.

It appears that the law requires an exact accounting.

Unfortunately, however, dangerousness is a quality that we can only measure
in degree.

We cannot give an exact accounting.

dangerous or they may be exceedingly dangerous.
subjective finding.

A person may be only slightly
A finding of dangerousness is a

Dangerousness is not an inherent quality of an individual.

Dangerousness can only be ascertained in one individual in relation to another.
Thus, a lion is only dangerous if it's standing beside me and is not separated
from me by a series of iron bars.

Similarly, Eric (in the case related above)

had the potential for being dangerous to his roommates since he thought that
his roommates were attempting to harm him.
me as he sat in my office that night.

He was not dangerous in relation to

Alan Stone in the section "Dangerousness"

A System in Transition, has said thati~angerousness,
like beauty, is to some extent in the eye of the beholder. 8 Thus, dangerous-

in Mental Health and Law:

11

ness is a word which we use to describe a person who is potentially harmful from
the frame of reference of the person who is doing the classifying.
The problem with the lack of consensus between law and psychiatry leads to
the difficulties we encounter in utilizing the concept of dangerousness.
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court asks the psychiatrist to make a crystal ball prediction about the behavior
of the particular individual in order to determine what legal course of action
should be pursued.

Dangerousness is usually at issue in relation to involuntary
,
civil commitment and in relation to the insanity defense in criminal proceedings.
In relation to both of these issues, a court goal is preventive detention.

In my

view preventive detention is valuable in the case of the mentally ill when there
is substantial evidence that a person is likely to do harm to himself or others
in the reasonably foreseeable future.

In the case of an insanity defense for a

crime already committed, there is good evidence of the dangerousness of the
individual so that incarceration is in order to

prev~nt

committing a similar dangerous act again in the future.

him from harming or
In both these contexts,

the court asks the psychiatrist to "guess" whether or not the person will behave
in a dangerous fashion in the future.

In the case where there is previous history

of violent behavior, it is much easier to make such a prediction.
it is difficult if not impossible.

With no history

In fact, Kozol and his associates in Crime

and Delinquency state that "no one can predict dangerous behavior in a person with
no history of dangerous acting out."9
A number of recent law review articles have dealt with the issue of whether
or not psychiatrists can predict dangerousness with any degree of reliability or
validity.

A 1971 Arizona Law Review article on "Dangerousness and <.::ommittability"

and the 1974 California Law Review article by Ennis and Litwack entitled
"Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom"ll
are two notable examples.

Both of these articles attempt to prove that psychia-

trists are exceedingly poor predictors of dangerousness compared to laymen or to
even actuarial devices such as experience tables.
Ennis and Litwack discuss the fact that psychiatrists tend to "overpredict"
dangerousness; they are culturally biased; they don't have the proper orientation,
training or experience to make these judgments;

the entire diagnostic system in

psychiatry is ambiguous and inadequate and so forth.
particular presents a number of misleading facts.

For example, it is based for

the most part on studies that were done at least 10
not reflect the current state of the art.

This latter article in
or more years ago and does

What is more, a number of the articles

relating to inadequacies of psychiatric diagnosis are from the schizophrenic
research literature, and they were written at a time when behavioral scientists
were attempting to standardize their diagnoses so that they could do more reliable
and valid research.

Also, a number of their studies were done in state hospitals

where attending staff was compared against psychiatric residents, who may have
little experience and little command of the English language.

The major fallacy

of the Ennis and Litwack article is the assumption that a diagnosis of psychosis
perforce means involuntary hospitalization will be instituted.

Without going

into more detail about this particular article, the authors were saying that there
have been many abuses of involuntary commitment procedures based on psychiatric
expert testimony concerning a patient's dangerousness.
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This point neither I nor

any other thoughtful person would dispute.

However, their assertion that justice

would be better served by flipping coins in the courtroom than calling in psychiatric

expert testimony is a major distortion and unfortunately causes more damage
I

than good in relation to the reframing of civil commitment statutes.
One basic problem concerning civil commitment is that the legal and
psychiatric professions perceive civil commitment as serving different purposes.
The legal view of the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is in order to prevent injuries such as suicide, homicide, or assaultive behavior., The prevailing
psychiatric view is that involuntary
ment.

hospital~zation

Because the law says that involuntary

is for ,the purposes of treat-

hospital~zation

is to prevent harm-

ful behavior, the law demands substantial proof that harmful behavior has in fact
been prevented when someone is involuntarily hospitalized.
Based on developments in Donaldson v. o'connor,12 the law also says that
hospitalization must not merely prevent harmful behavior; it must also provide
treatment

for the patient.

The irony, then, is that where a statute cites

dangerousness as a criteria for commitment, it uses not a diagnostic but a
predictive label,

perhaps better served by detention of

nonmedical

sort.

Yet

our society has evolved to the point where it specifically requires that treatment be offered in response to such a prediction of antisocial behavior.
The legal literature spends much time talking about the high

.n_~mber

of

false positive identifications of potentially dangerous people that occurs when
psychiatrists attempt to predict dangerousness.

A classic, view of this type is

from a 1974 Harvard Law Review article called "Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill. ,,13

Citing Livermore,

they demonstrate that if we had a 95 percent success

rate in identifying potential killers and only a
rate, and if

1

1

percent false identification

person of every 1,000 was a killer, and if we tested 100,000

people, then we would find 95 of the 100 killers in the population.

However,

we would also incorrectly identify 999 other people who are not killers but who by
our tests are called

killers.

Thus, if we used this test to confine people, we

would lock up 1,094 people to stop 95 killings and would still end up with 5
homicides.

This type of reasoning suggests that we should not utilize

of dangerousness as an indicator for involuntary hospitalization.

the test

As I will show

later, I actually agree with this last premise, but not for the reasonS stated.
Psychiatrists are trained to deal with clinical states.
not a clinically definable state.

Dangerousness is

Rather, it is a word that can be used to

define or to describe certain types of behavior.

When I am treating a patient,

I am mostly concerned with my ability to successfully help that patient.

When

I see a patient who manifests some type of potentially violent behavior, as did
Jane in the case described above, I am obviously concerned about whether the
patient will hit me--or one of the other patients if it's a group--whether the
patient will return to do harm to my family or to my personal property or perhaps
just drive off the road into a tree or a bridge abutment.

In the case of Jane I

was also concerned that she might turn her anger and hostility inward and thus
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attempt to harm herself as punishment for her hostile and agressive outbursts.
I thought of hospitalizing her involuntarily to prevent this harmful behavior.
However, I was most concerned about whether hospitalization would help in her
I

treatment.
In relation to the issue of overpredicting, allow me to make th,e unqualified
statement that as a psychiatrist I would far rather overpredict than underpredict.
I realize that those of you that are civil libertarians are upset when I say this.
You believe that I'm talking about a wholesale removal of civil rights from the
unsuspecting masses.

However, what I am

sayi~g

is that when a patient is sitting

in my office, ! am wholly concerned with the welfare pf that patient and of his
family.

If I make a wrong judgment about that patient's suicidal or homicidal

intent, even when all the odds are in my favor, someone may end up dead.

At the

time of my earliest medical school surgical training, I was taught that if I did
not take out some healthy appendices--either 20 or 30 percent depending on who
the teacher was--I would most likely not be operating on appendices frequently
enough.

I would have patients dying of ruptured appendices.

Similarly, as a

psychiatrist, if I underpredict rather than overpredict suicidal or homicidal
behavior, I am going to have patients either dying or killing other people.
This is a difficult concept for the law to accept.

If you personally are the

victim of the patient, then the law of averages flies out the windo,,!:,.

If I

make a wrong call and you wind up dead, you are 100 percent dead no matter what
the probability of the patient killing you was.
One legal misconception is that when a psychiatrist makes a diagnosis of
a psychosis, this in and of itself is grounds for involuntary hospitalization.
Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of the American Psychiatric Association describes patients as psychotic when
"their mental functioning is sufficiently impaired to interfere with their capacity
to meet the ordinary demands of life." 14 This impairment may be accompanied by
a number of bizarre symptoms of unusual behaviors.

There is no particular psychi-

atric psychotic diagnosis that inherently connotes dangerousness.

As a matter of

fact, a number of different studies have shown that psychotic patients are less
.
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As an illustration of this point, of the four cases that I presented above, the
first three patients had psychotic diagnoses.
or others.

They did not do harm to themselves

Robert, the fourth patient, had a previous diagnosis of a psychotic

depressive reaction.

However, at the time that he killed himself there had been

no evidence of a psychotic disorder for well over a year.
Although psychotic individuals do sometimes commit suicide and homicide,
the proportion of those who do compared to the number of non-psychotic persons
who commit these acts is small.

One author has estimated that approximately

50,000 mentally ill people a year are predicted to be dangerous and are thus
preventively detained. 17 As I said above, psychiatry in truth is not able to
accurately predict the likelihood of a patient's future dangerous behavior, nor does
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it claim it can.

It is true that we as psychiatrists determine specific diagnoses

for patients, and as we do this we are able to predict various behavorial likelihoods or tendencies.

However, in no instance could this be construed as a specific

prediction of some future event.

It is this misunderstanding'on the part of the

legal profession that has lead to the current disenchantment with psychiatric
expertise.

When I make a prediction that a patient is suicidal or homicidal and

seek involuntary hospitalization for that patient, there is no way that I wish
to have my prediction verified as to validity or reliability.
well mean the loss of human life.

However,

w~~n

To,do so might

in the course of treatment I

see the patient's state of mind improved, then I am quite
, satisfied with the
veracity of my prediction and am obviously quite pleased with the result of my
treatment.
Some writers suggest that pe:rhaps dangerousness should not be a criterion
for involuntary hospitalization.

They find the operational definition of

dangerousness that must be used in order to satisfy the court places psychiatry
in the position of being unable to fulfill the demands of the court.

One suggests

that were the court to request the psychiatrist to predict whether a particular
patient is homicidal or suicidal rather than dangerous in the broad sense of the
definition, we would then have a task amenable to current psychiatric practice.
Another goes a step further and suggests that since dangerousness in, ,and of itself
is not treatable, it does not make good sense to confine dangerous persons in
treatment institutions.

Rather, he suggests that

preventiv~

detention in

criminal institutions--since we are attempting to prevent criminal acts--would be
more appropriate.
I think it's fair to say that psychiatrists, in the clinical sense, find
in dangerousness a concept that has very little usefulness.

It is far more

appropriate for psychiatrists to think in terms of psychiatric illness and its treatability or nontreatability than ,of the consequence of potentially violent behavior.
which may occur in relation to specific psychiatric illness.
in relation to these violent behaviors may be in order.

Preventive detention

However, psychiatrists

believe that therapeutic detention is far more appropriate when possible.

The

question the court asks the psychiatrist should not be whether the patient will
commit a violent act at some specific time in the future, but whether this disease
process could best be treated through involuntary hospitalization.
question that we as psychiatrists could answer.

This is a

Then you as lawyers would not

have to spend so much time telling us how poor we are at making predictions of
behavior.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION:
tendencies.

Dr. Ruben, your talk was geared more towards the suicidal and homicidal
To your knowledge, does the concept of dangerousness go beyond the

realm of physical injury?

For example, would a person who is a complusive check

forger be considered dangerous?
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DR. RUBEN:

First of all, I think that's a legal question.

has made such a classification.

I don't think the law

I don't think there's any-thing psychologically

dangerous about a check forger, either.

It could be the result of a psychological

problem, but I don't think that in and of itself would be con~trued as dangerous.
MR. BRUTON:

I think you've put your finger on one of the problems that Dr. Ruben

mentioned.

A patient can be a high social risk for committing an act such as

forgery, but with our commitment statutes, there must be some danger of physical
harm either to the patient or to others.

This is a source of frustration to

psychiatris-ts because if they commit someone aDd his only predictable risk is that
he's going to write a cold check, then they're going tq get hit with a habeas
corpus or a false imprisonment action.

It's a fine line they have to draw in

applying the statute.
QUESTION:

In scanning the occasional obituary columns of the AMA Journal, I not

only see more deaths due to overdoses of drugs, but I also see more homicide deaths,
sometimes defined as gunshot wounds to the chest and things like that.

Comment

please.
DR. RUBEN:

I am sensitive to whether or not I am dealing with what I would con-

sider a potentially dangerous person.

But as I said in my talk, I think about

that in terms of whether or not they may do harm to me, or, frbm what they've
told me, whether they would do harm to themselves or to someone else.

I know of

instances where psychiatrists have been murdered by their patients, and so I am
very concerned about that.

And because I have an office in my home, I'm

even concerned about my family's safety.

The only thing I can say is that there

are times when I become involved with the patient's delusional system.
a very dangerous situation to the physician.

That's

The physician may be unable to deal

with it in any appropriate way, including involuntary hospitalization, and the
unfortunate result is occasionally death.
MR. PROSSER:

If it's any consolation, lawyers quite often suffer the same demise.

Mr. Barber would also like to respond to that question.
MR. BARBER:

My comment is a little bit different, but I think when we put this

panel together we wanted to have full integration.

One of the fact situations

that Dr. Ruben came up with--the one concerning Jane--plugs into a case out in
California, Tarasoff v. Board of Regents.

In that case there was a student

was under psychiatric care at the University of California at Berkley.

who

He told

a psychologist who in turn told a supervising psychiatrist that he was going to
kill his girlfriend when she came back into town.
fied the police authorities.

The University officials noti-

This notification was subsequently countermanded

by the psychiatrist, and ultimately this man did in fact kill this young lady.
Suit was brought against the individuals involved and the University, and the
Supreme Court of California ultimately decided that this action could be maintained on the theory that there was a duty to warn the girl and her family in
this situation.

I ask Dr. Ruben to comment upon that in light of the way that

he handled Jane's case.
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DR. RUBEN:

As I understand the facts in Tarasoff, a psychologist saw the young

man who ultimately committed the murder.

It was the psychologist who notified

the campus police, who then picked the guy up.

If I remember correctly, they

kept him overnight in the university health service.

It was then that the super-

vising psychiatrist decided that the man was not dangerous.
and also, for unknown reasons, had the record expunged.

He had him released

He actually removed the

references in the record to the fact that the patient had said that he would
perform a violent act against the young woman.
I been in that situation, I would have

I personally

notifie~_~he

family.

belie~e

that, had

That doesn't

necessarily mean I would immediately make a phone call, but I would definitely
1

not just send a patient off and say, "I don't believe you."
to follow the patient and treat him.

I would perhaps try

If the patient persisted with his stated

intent, then I would think about involuntary hospitalization and most likely
about warning the intended victim.

In Jane's case, she didn't have a specific

focus for her potentially violent behavior. She yelled and screamed at the
patient in the group, she yelled and screamed at me, she'd already punched her
father in the face, and in other family sessions, she'd been screaming at her
mother.

My wife was one of the attorneys who represented her for a short

period of time, and when she fired her, she yelled and screamed'at her, too.
So she was focusing her anger on everyone, but on no one in particulat:.

I was

actually more concerned that she might attempt to commit suicide--that she would
turn her anger inside.

I did discuss it with her parents.

~e'd

already had

family sessions, so that I wasn't violating her confidence.
QUESTION:

On Mr. Bruton's comment that dangerousness must be physical danger:

as I read the law, your statement would be an interpretation of the law, but
not how the law is specifically written.
MR. BRUTON:

Would you comment on that?

Granted, it's a statement of opinion.

things drawn in black and white.

But courts sometimes like

The drawing is always done in the brilliant

light of hindsight, and so this is probably the least subjective of the criteria
that they focus on.
MR. BARBER:

There's a brand new mental health law in the state of Kentucky.

read to you the definition of danger in the statute:

I'll

Immediate danger or

immediate threat of danger to self or others means substantial physical harm or
immediate threat of substantial physical harm upon self or others, including
actions which deprive self or others of basic needs of survival, etc.

Substantial

physical harm or substantial threat of physician harm, including actions which
deprive self or others of basic means of survival, includes a provision for reasonable shelter, food, or clothing.

But it does boil down to something physical,

some act.
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CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL PATIENT
William D. Weitzel, H.D.
Assistant Professor of Psychiatry
College of Hedicine
Lexington, Kentucky
This morning I'd like to review how civil commitment of mentally ill
patients to hospitals evolved in our country.

Then I'd like to talk about the

current state of things and about developing legal decisions and guidelines which
I think are going to have a profound impact.

I'd like to conclude with some of

Dr. Alan Stone's ideas on this topic which are different from the way things have
been and are being done now.
The history of American psychiatry and law document a struggle between two
major themes.

One involves society's expectations of protection against arbitrary

and unconstitutional restrictions of freedom of behavior.

A tension, it seems to

me, must exist inevitably between society's need and individual rights.

Civil

commitment of the mentally ill patient involves real life dilemmas in which we
must balance both desirable goals.
During our nation's colonial period the only laws concerning violent and
dangerously insane people dealt with detention under authority of the sovereign's
police power:

those considered dangerous to others were simply arrested.

Massachusetts statute of 1696 ordered the selectmen

A

of towns with "darl'gerously

distracted persons" to take care of them that "they do not damnify others."

Not

until the 1780's, however, did various states enact legislation which explicitly
provided for the lawful confinement of those who suffered from lunacy or were
otherwise so furiously mad as to be harmful to others.

No specific laws con-

cerning commitment procedure which provided legislative safeguards protecting
personal liberty and patients' civil rights were enacted until the middle of the
19th century.
Prior to the American Civil War, or during the era of what we call moral
treatment, commitment of patients to hospitals under statutory authority was
effected quite easily and often merely on the request of a friend or a relative.
Commitment could even take the form of a hastily scribbled few words on a scrap
of paper signed by a member of the hospital staff.
In 1845 a new idea was introduced to this process.

In that year Josiah Oaks

petitioned the Hassachusetts Supreme Court to release him from confinement, claiming
that his family had committed him to an asylum without justification.

The Chief

Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied this request and endorsed the
idea that the confinement of a mentally ill patient continue as long as it is
required for the patient's own safety or for that of others and that this is the
proper limitation.

This decision is reputed to have established the foundation

for justifying and limiting the extent of confinement of mentally ill patients.
It was probably the first time that a therapeutic justification for confinement
was decided in a court in this country.

A discernable trend now began toward

broadening the reasons for commitment of the mentally ill patient to include

77

therapeutic reasons.
The evolution of involuntary commitment legislation in the United States
changed further in the 1860's.

A woman by the name of Mrs. E. P. Packard was

committed for a period of about 3 years to a state mental institution in Illinois
after differing publicly on a religious issue with her husband who happened to be
a preacher.

The preacher won the argument by having her committed.

The Illinois

statute provided that a married woman could be committed on the petition of her
husband "without even the evidence of insanity or distraction, required in other
cases."

At the time of her discharge in 1863 she claimed that she had been

victimized by her husband and was quite sane when committed.

She launched a

nationwide campaign after her release for the enactment of protective legislation
to benefit the insane.

Her successful campaign resulted in changes of civil

commitment laws to include such important safeguards already present in criminal
law such as notice to the patient that a petition has been filed for commitment,
a fair hearing on the issue, and finally the right to a jury trial.
There were no provisions in the United States for voluntary hospitalization
to public mental institutions until the end of the 19th century.

Some of the

earlier laws limited voluntary admission patients to only those who could pay.
After emphasis on early diagnosis and treatment of mental illness gained momentum
in this century, states began to alter their policies and

allow~pluntary

admissions.
The National Advisory Mental Health Council in 1949 requested the Council
of State Governments and the United States Public Health Service to develop what
might be considered a model act with guidelines and suggestions for preventing
the obvious indignities and humiliations which psychiatric patients were still
experiencing.

The recommendations in this document were transmitted to all state

governors and used to help modify legislation in many states in this country
during the next two decades.
In 1959 the British Mental Health Act was passed with the stated intent of
protecting psychiatrically ill patients from humiliating pUblicity and deprivation
of their rights and opening easier access to treatment.

According to this Act,

an insane person may be hospitalized for an indefinite period on the recommendation
of two private physicians without procedures of a hearing by a court or an administrative tribunal.

In addition, the act authorizes compulsory hospitalization of

patients afflicted with mental illness, mental subnormality, and a variety of
psychopathic disorders.

However, these concepts are not clearly defined.

Some authors feel this legislation is a step backward in terms of effective
protection against indiscriminate detention and involuntary commitment of the
mentally ill.

It is consitent, however, with the trend in recent years toward

emphasizing the justification of commitment of the mentally ill on the basis of
therapeutic reasons.
squared with reality.

Unfortunately, therapeutic good intentions have not always
In 1961 the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Mental

Health published a report in which it was alleged that over 80 percent of the
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state hospitals in the United States at that time offered no treatment whatsoever
to patients confined in them.

Statistics compiled by the World Health Organiza-

tion indicate that only 10 percent of the psychiatric hospital's in 1955 were on a
voluntary basis.
The enormity of the problem can be appreciated when it is remembered that
it is estimated that one person out of ten in this country will be hospitalized
at one time or another for treatment of a mental disorder.

In 1973 one half of

the hospital beds in the United States were occupied by mental patients.
308,000 resident patients were in the

country'~,

Over
I

321 state and county mental

hospitals and one third more were in private hospitals and in the psychiatric
I

wings of general hospitals.

In addition, approximately 260,000 of the more than

6 million mental retardates in the country are now in mental institutions.
The morality of involuntary hospitalization is now being vigorously challenged.

Outright repeal of all laws of civil commitment is urged by the

k~erican

Association for the Abolition of Involuntary Mental Hospitalization which was
organized in 1970, and a lot of the leadership in this organization has come from
another familiar figure in American psychiatry, Dr. Thomas Szasz.

The group

urges members to "oppose currently accepted psychiatric and psychological practices
that rest on the use of state supported force and fraud."
A current report suggests that the number of involuntary
is declining.

civi'lI,G~mmitments

As of 1972 it appears that the pendulum has swung such that

voluntary admissions to psychiatric facilities now

outnumbe~

involuntary ones.

However, data also suggests that two out of every five persons admitted to state
and county mental hospitals during 1972 were there, against their wishes.

It's

difficult to know how many of them chose to enter voluntarily only because of
threat of commitment.
Let's talk now about the choices of admission that an identified mental
patient has.

In the 20th century a patient can request an informal voluntary

admission to a mental hospital.

This is with a minimum of formality and the

patient retains the right to depart the hospital when he chooses.
grounds for involuntary civil commitment are usually allowed.

Three

separate

These vary from

state to state but are usually found when the patient presents danger to others,
danger to himself, and now in Kentucky when his actions would lead to the deprivation of the basic means of survival.

The first is based on a threat to society

and the latter two on the concept of parens patriae.
clearly a strong justification.

The threat to society is

The right of the state to confine persons

dangerous to themselves rests on different grounds.

In spite of John Stuart Mill's

maxim from his 1859 essay on liberty, the state has frequently intervened with
the mentally ill who are considered dangerous to themselves.

Mill wrote, you

remember, that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others.
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
There are at least three

types of involuntary commitment or compulsory

79

1

admission. Commitment is defined here as the legal process whereby at the request
of a relative or a friend two doctors explain to a court why it is necessary to
deprive a patient of his freedom.

An emergency commitment usually

,

uses a

simplified form and is the most often used means of effectively getting a patient
into the hospital with a minimum of delay.
valid only for a limited duration.
After June 18 it is 72 hours.

This forced hospitalization remains

until June 18 in this state it is 48 hours.

An American Bar Foundation report notes that

emergency care commitment is not technically a hospitalization but rather a form
of detention.

During the period under \<7hich_,an emergency hospitalization commit-

ment is in effect, family or friend must petition

fo~

a formal judicial commitment

and two physicians must vouch that it is appropriate as defined by the law.

This

process can be avoided if the patient signs a voluntary admission form during the
course of the emergency commitment.
Under a formal judicial commitment a patient may be hospitalized either for
a prescribed period or for an indeterminate period.
it is indeterminate.

until June 18 in this state,

After June 18 it's 60 days or 360 days.

So he can be

hospitalized for a prescribed period without his consent and over his objection
based on the certificates of two physicians.
A third type of commitment involves observation.

This' procedure is designed

only to help formulate a diagnosis or determine whether long term ,cC?,mmi tment is
required.

Such a procedure can be used with people who are arrested by police

and accused of a crime, a vicious sex crime, for example.

This kind of an

individual can be sent to a state hospital--in this state the forensic unit--for
a period of observation with a report subsequently being sent to the court.
The following comments are an overview; not all apply specifically to this
state.
In a survey of approximately 2,500 commitment proceedings, fewer than 1
percent were found to be formally contested.

The chief reasons for the "no contest"

is that the patient's psychotic condition makes an organized effort to defend
himself impossible.

In addition, the physician will seldom press for commitment

in the face of opposition from the family unless the patient is clearly homicidal
or suicidal.
I'd like to review for you now the following groups which have been or
currently still are committable.
individual is defined

First of all is the mentally ill person.

This

variously as a person who is suffering from an illness

which so lessens his capacity to use his customary self-control, judgement,
discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it
necessary or advisable for him to be under care and supervision, guidance and
control.

The second group is made up of mental defectives, otherwise called

mentally-retarded persons, mentally-handicapped persons, or feeble-minded persons.
We also have a new law in this state with respect to these people which takes
effect in July.

This group is now covered, as I mentioned, under special legis-

lation and not under the usual commitment legislation.
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It was interesting to me

that when our legislature acted on this, their coverage was proposed in two
separate bills with two separate numbers but were dealt with in committee and in
the voting as if they were one package.
Another group is made up of epileptic persons.

These individuals are

described in various state mental health laws as "persons suffering from any condition which brings about lapses of consciousness which mayor may not be accompanied by convulsive seizures which may become chronic."
uncontrolled as to be dangerous is subject to commitment.
is from Dr. Slovenko's book, Psychiatry and Law.

The epileptic so
The following remark

Dr. Slovenko claims that

according to epilepsy agencies in this country only 20 'percent of the known
epileptics in the united States are receiving adequate treatment.
Inebriated persons are defined in various mental health laws as persons
who are habitually so addicted to the use of alcohol or other intoxicating or
narcotic substances as to be unwilling or unable without help to stop the
excessive use of such substances.

Judicial commitment is usually resorted to

only in cases in which the patient is psychotic and needs confinement for tr.eatment of this phase of his illness.
The so-called sexual psychopath is described as a mentally ill person under
the broad legal definition of some mental health laws and has been committable in
some jurisdictions.

These laws are increasingly challenged and usually are

found unconstitutional.
The aged are committed with greater frequency to public mental hospitals.
comprise approximately--according to Slovenko--40 percent of many psychiatric
hospital populations even though not psychotic.
Probate court has full jurisdiction over neglected or delinquent juveniles
the age of 17, usually.

If a juvenile is committed, the court retains

custody over him while he is in the institution.
It seems to me the principal abuse in commitment procedures occurs not at
time of the initial commitment but rather subsequently when the patient
be allowed greater freedom or placed in a halfway house or a foster care
Such facilities are rarely available or have limited capabilities.
the writ of habeas corpus becomes an important tool.
s for its object speedy release by judicial decree.

~here

The writ, as you know,

It may be obtained on the

f of anyone who claims he is being restrained of his liberty illegally.
ince involuntary commitment may continue only as long as the patient needs care
he may at any time petition for the issuance of such a writ on the
he is now sane and entitled to release.
I'd like to talk to you now about some procedural developments.

In 1972 a

federal court while reviewing the Wisconsin commitment laws held for the
time that--imagine now, we're talking about a patient, that's what bothers
about this--in addition to requiring notice, hearing and right to counsel, the
ted States Constitution mandated three other procedural protections for persons
ecting involuntary commitment:

(1) beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
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proof,

(2) a Miranda warning to enforce fifth amendment rights against self-

incrimination, and (3) a principle favoring the least restrictive alternative with
I

the burden on proponents of hospitalization to prove that necessity.

This case,

Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wisc. 1974); vacated 421 U.S. 957
(1975)

f

was vacated on a technicality by the united States Supreme Court but is now

back again for futher consideration.

Beyond a reasonable doubt certainty is

something like 90 percent certainty.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals

has recently held in a 1973 case that beyond a reasonable doubt standards must
apply in commitment cases in that jurisdiction.
In Bell v. County General Hospital at Eloise 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich.
1974), a three judge federal court struck down the
law as unconstitutional.

~1ichigan

temporary commitment

These findings are similar to those in the Lessard case

and I'd like to list them for you.

In order to be constitutional the Michigan

court required the following changes:

the law must provide for service of the

commitment petition itself on the respondent himself sufficiently in advance to
permit him to evaluate the allegations and prepare his response.
must be notified that he has a right to legal counsel.

The :respondent

The statute may not provide

for a prehearing determination that the respondent's condition is such that he
ought not to be present at the commitment hearing.

The statute mU2t provide for

notice to the respondent that he has a right to a jury trial, and a balance has
to be struck between dangerousness to self or others and the patient's amenability
to treatment as against the curtailment of liberty that commitment represents.
The law may not permit involuntary detention without a hearing for more than a
short

period, probably for 5 days.

The statute may not permit a voluntary

treatment of a "physically intrusive nature" prior to a final adjudication of
mental illness except when the patient is presently dangerous to himself or
others and provided such treatment is necessary to maintain physical health.
You remember when I talked about admissions procedures I mentioned that
the emergency commitment is by far the most common legal vehicle for involuntary
confinement and most often utilized in the management of psychiatric crises.

The

overwhelming majority of our patients within the short period of time--48 to 72
hours--realize the wisdom of becoming a voluntary patient and accept treatment.
Ydu understand, though, that what I just read was an attack on that approach in
Michigan.

So it seems to me that these procedural requirements in Lessard v.

Schmidt and Bell v. Wayne County created a serious practical impediment to the
effective management of psychiatric emergencies.
is going to end up.

Of course, we don't know how this

All these cases remain unresolved in any final way.

I'd like to talk to you now about the Lanterman-Petris-Short Law,

(LPS) ,

the 1969 California law which made the criteria for involuntary commitment more
stringent and increased the legal rights of committed patients.

LPS was the result

of legislative distrust of the decision-making process in commitment.
provisions of the LPS law are as follows.

The major

A person may be detained 72 hours on

the request of any private person or police officer and a written application by
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a mental health professional--whatever that is--designated by the county following
a preliminary screening of the patient.

The staff of the psychiatric facility

may then certify the person for an additional 14 days of treatment and observation.
After 17 days any further confinement requires judicial review.

If the court

believes the person is suicidal, he can be held for 14 more days and then he must
be released.

If the courts find the person immediately dangerous to others,

another 90 days of confinement is allowed and if gravely disabled, a conservatorship is granted the person detained and his status is periodically reviewed.
It was anticipated that the flow of mentqJ patients to in-patient facilities
would be diminished since LPS made screening mandatory Fnd screeners would, of
course, refer all those suitable to alternatives in out-patient facilities.
fact,

In

though, the most important changes have been in the decreased duration

mandated by law and the locus of hospitalization rather than in the number of
people hospitalized.
improved.

The quality of care has not been demonstrated to have

While some who would formerly have been committed are undergoing out-

patient care, a much greater number have refused referral and found their way
into the criminal justice system.

This resort to criminal processes confirms

again what I think I see again and again, a widely known phenomenon that the
penal and mental health system operate

presently in an overlapping and reciprocal

way for the control of deviants.
I'd like to go on now to some of Dr. Stone's ideas.

We've reviewed how we

got here, what's going on, and what may be coming in terms of further legal guidelines.
Research reports and clinical experience to my mind have produced a growing
and renewed confidence in traditional diagnostic nomenclature in psychiatry,
particularly in terms of psychoses.

The development derives in part from a variety

of biological and genetic studies as well as the accepted effectiveness of psychotropic drugs and other somatic treatments that seem to confirm aspects of the
medical model.

As I mentioned, Allen Stone, who is a professor of psychiatry and

law at Harvard, has suggested that the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis could
be improved if for the purpose of civil commitment, psychiatrists would confine
themselves to broad diagnostic categories and in addition only diagnose severe
conditions.

A review of the literature confirms this hypothesis and reveals that

the more severe the illness the greater the diagnostic agreement.

Stone proposes

a five step procedure which he refers to as the "thank you" theory of commitment.
The five steps are :
made,

(1) reliable diagnosis of a severe mental illness must be

(2) an opinion must be rendered that the person's immediate prognosis

involves major distress,
treatment is available,

(3) a conclusion must be reached that the appropriate
(4) an opinion must be made as to whether the diagnosed

mental illness impairs the person's ability to accept treatment, and (5) an
opinion must be made as to whether a reasonable man would reject the treatment
recommended.

All these questions could be addressed at a hearing with counsel

within a few days of confinement.

What the psychiatrist does in this system is
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first make his diagnosis.

If it cannot readily be demonstrated that this is a

reliable diagnosis of a severe condition, the process would go no further.

The

reliability and severity could be challenged or demonstrated by independent
psychiatric examination.
The "thank you" theory of civil commitment asks the psychiatrist to focus
his inquiry on illness and treatment and asks the legal profession to guarantee
the treatment before it intervenes in the name of parens patriae.

This proposal

is radical in the sense that it insists that society fulfill its promise of benefit when it infringes on human freedom.
function.

Civil commitment is divested of a police

Only someone who is irrational, treatabte, and incidentally dangerous

would be confined in a mental system.

Developing Professional Standards Review

Organizations should now be able to provide courts with base line perspectives
with respect to treatment standards for specific diseases.

Expectations among

all participants in this process will be clear.
It is well known that where mental services have been upgraded and psychiatrists have become sensitive to legal issues, involuntary commitment can and has
become a more infrequent event.

In communities in which

i~provement

treatment

opportunities do not exist, the result is battles over legal standards and procedures for admission.

The end result of such activity

many times is the freedom

of mentally ill patients to suffer their illnesses outside aninstititution without
access to effective medical care.
I'd like to conclude my remarks with an observation.

I have read a lot in

preparing this paper and I have reviewed a lot of Dr. Stone's work--and if there's
a spokesman on this issue in American psychiatry today, it's probably he.

He

reflects a growing pessimism when he speaks as a psychiatrist to other psychiatrists that the hour is very late and that things may have gone too far in terms
of all the laws, restrictions and regulations that have been written and imposed.
Of course, what you see happening in this community and nationwide is that there
are indeed fewer civil commitments.

This has aroused fervor in some authors who

have written such impassioned papers as "Dying with your Rights On" and have
reported several cases of people who have been allowed to kill themselves or be
killed or kill someone else while free.
I wonder sometimes, how much good we do when we write all these rules and
restrictions.

I'd just like to make the observation that for a very seriously

depressed person, who especially hasn't responded to anti-depressants, EeT really
works.

And you know, there's a state hospital in the neighborhood here where

they haven't used that procedure in 2 years.

Now it's too much for me to believe

that they don't have sick patients that need it.

I asked about that and what

happened is that the guidelines are so cumbersome and so strict that it doesn't
happen.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MR. BARBER:

Dr. Weitzel has a comment on the seeming continuation of a trend with

respect to commitment procedures.

Mental retardates, as usual, are lumped in with
84

people with mental disorders.

Retardation is by definition a noncurable condition.

As far as I'm concerned I see no rationale for using one as a precedent to the
other in involuntary commitment procedures.
DR. WEITZEL:
QUESTION:

No, I would agree with you.

Perhaps you do.
I don't disagree with you.

This goes on with the controversy_

I'll give you the case of a 47-

year-old man, a white-collar worker, modest income of $15,000 a year, a very
stable family man who at the age of 47 had his second episode of manic illness.

In

this illness he developed the idea that it was his duty to influence legislation
h~

in various parts of the country.

To do this

began to fly hither and yon in a

rather wild, impassioned manner.

He exhausted the

fami~y

savings, he took a

second mortgage on the house, immediately when getting his paycheck he used it to
buy airline fares and he was discharged from his job after this had gone on
for approximately 6 weeks.

The family then became practically destitute.

In the

interim of the 6 weeks the wife, recognized that her husband, who had previously
been quite stable and reliable, was mentally ill.

If we stick to this idea of

physical dangerousness the psychiatrist has a very easy task; he simply throws
up his hands and says, "Don't talk to me, there's nothing I can do about it."
That's a very easy way to practice psychiatry, but in my opinion it is not a
very responsible way if one is interested in treating the
MR. PROSSER:

ment~lly

We just has a consensus on this side of the table.

ill.
What,sou do then

is you go to a conservatorship by going to probate court and having a committee
or guardian appointed to handle all this man's money so he can't buy an airline
ticket.

I don't know how you gentlemen feel, but I think the legal side would

say you can't commit this man because he's not dangerous.

Would you agree

gentlemen?
DR. RUBEN:

My opinion is that it obviously depends on the jurisdiction.

In

Connecticut they have just reframed the commitment statutes to include imminently
dangerous, in the physical sense or gravely disabled, and therefore, I would
institute the 16 day emergency certificate and put him in the hospital during
which time he could perhaps get treatment started.
very treatable.

Obviously a manic state is

We might be able to get him under control and then into out-

patient treatment and never have to go into a conservator proceeding although
perhaps he would have to go for a longer term commitment if his manic illness was
intractible.
MR. PROSSER:

Let us realize something about commitment and safeguards.

These

safeguards are there to protect the innocent just as the criminal law safeguards
are there to protect the innocent.

Everyone in this audience is fully aware of

the abuses which are inherent in our commitment proceedings.
we don't want hanging around so we commit him.
but he's not.

We have someone

If he were rich, he'd be eccentric,

We're uncomfortable, so we commit him.

We don't want Uncle Harry

spending our inheritance which we're going to get when Uncle Harry dies so we
commit him.

These are the reasons we fight so hard for these constitutional

safeguards.

Quite often it appears as though the legal profession is at logger-
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heads with the medical profession.

But if you think behind the reasons for our

fight, I think you can accept the reasons why we are fighting.
QUESTION:

Another question?

I would like to know how often you really see'that happen.

really happen?

Is that your data?

Have there been studies?

Does that

I'm talking about

the 1970's.
MR. PROSSER:

All right.

I'm going to ask either Mr. Barber or Mr. Bruton because

my field is mental retardation not mental illness.
gentlemen want to say anything about
MR. BARBER:

I can't

~espond.

Do you

tha~~

Well my field is mental retardation, too, but I suggest that it

might come not in the form of fighting to keep a patient out but suing the doctor
that put him in there.
MR. BRUTON:

There's a lot of law being made in that direction.

At the risk of blowing a good portion of my speech, I think it's fair

to say that since the first of October of last year I've had nine different
individuals come into my legal office in Louisville with stories of having their
rights violated in treatment in mental institutions, both private and public.

Of

the nine people, and I checked out the story, six of them had really substantial
deprivation of rights by the standards that I'm going to talk to you about today.
That's just my personal knowledge within the last 9 months.
MR. PROSSER:

The situation is this.

In Fayette County, in

Je~;erson

County, in

our major popluation centers, we may not have the problem as seriously as it is
in these rural counties where if the power structure
their county

~oesn't

want someone in

or their community and they cannot find a criminal charge to bring

against him, they'll say this guy's loony and ship him off to Eastern State
Hospital.

Eastern State will say there's nothing wrong with this man and send

him back, but he is still taken out of the community and his constitutional rights
have been violated.

We cannot judge Kentucky by Lexington.

It happens all the

time.
QUESTION:

I can give you a more precise illustration than that.

I represented

a lady who had filed a suit for divorce against her husband in eastern Kentucky.
He had her committed.
MR. PROSSER:

So you see it still happens.

The 19th century is still with us in

a lot of areas.
QUESTION:

Let's hear the rest of this case.

Did the physicians at the hospital

to which this person was committed then conspire in this criminal way with the
husband or did they behave as responsible people and release the patient when it
was adjudged that she did not need to be there?
MR. PROSSER:

Do you feel you would have a cause of action against the doctor who

conspired in this commitment?
QUESTION: No, No.
MR. PROSSER:
QUESTION:

How did the husband proceed in this commitment proceeding?

He went to the county court and got statements from two doctors which

was the proceeding under our statutes.

So he proceeded legitimately under the

statutes but the room for abuse was there.
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HR. PROSSER:

All right, the lady was incarcerated for a week; in effect she was

in jail for a week although the jail was labeled hospital.
talking about, fighting these abuses.

That's the thing we're

Is there another question?
I

QUESTION:

There were two references to physical evidence.

I wonder if we might

have a definition?
MR. BARBER:

When this mental health statute was written there was a lot of

reference in this state as to the other case law.

In correspondence with the

Attorney General from the state of Missouri and also the attorneys that are
involved in the Lessard case up in Wisconsin

t~e

feeling was generated that you

would have to have some type of overt threat or some type of overt action on the
I

part of the individual before the doctor would be able to say substantial threat
of immediate danger to self or others as is defined under the statute.

The

courts are not too specific on exactly what would constitute an oyert threat or
what fact situation would constitute an overt threat or exactly what type of
physical activity would have to take place.

In order to help explore this problem,

before the mental health law was adopted here in Kentucky in April of this year,
there was a national conference on mental health law focusing on dangerousness and
incompetency.

We brought in experts for 450 people to listen in the southern

part on Indiana right across the bridge from Kentucky.

We tried to get some type

of working definition of what type of act and what type of statements would
implement this type of statute.

We simply weren't able to do it.

The experts

that we brought in at that time--including the man that's the head of the center
for behavioral studies of violence at the University of California at Los Angeles-basically indicated that you have to go on a case by case basis.

I believe that's

What's being done in the major hospitals in Kentucky at this time.

I really feel

totally incompetent on giving you specific facts or specific statements that would
have to be made by an individual before you trigger the statute.
MR. PROSSER:

Mr. Barber has admitted incompetence but he's not dangerous.

can't commit him this morning.

We

One more question then we'll go on to the next

speaker.
QUESTION:

Doesn't the decision or opinion on the part of the doctors to commit

a person depend upon the philosophical outlook of the doctor on the subject.

For

example, you have a close case of dangerousness and one psychiatrist will say
"Yes, that person should be committed" and another psychiatrist will say no.
Doesn't it depend on the philosophical outlook in many instances of the doctor?
DR. WEITZEL:

I'd like to make two points in response to that.

One, I'm amazed

at how many of my colleagues are unaware of the details of the commitment law
under which we operate.
crisis situation.

I think some of us are uninformed when we react to a

Two, I think Dr. Ruben has already stated that we as a profes-

sion tend to be overly cautious and when in doubt do what we would consider the
safest thing.

We'll find out later this morning if we'd be more culpable for

allowing someone whom we thought was likely to commit suicide and. whose family
brought him in for an evaluaticn to be committed than we could be if we didn't
act.

..................---------------------

MALPRACTICE HAZARDS IN PSYCHIATRY
Oliver Grant Bruton Jr., J.D.
Middleton, Reutlinger and Baird
Louisville, Kentucky
There was a time when psychiatrists and psychologists appeared to be
avoiding the malpractice claim explosion and were high up on the most favored
list of medical malpractice insured.

Various reasons were given for this.

My

private hunch is that there is a very real correlation between doctor-patient
contact and the willingness of patients to file suit.
-,

It's no coincidence that

the highest risk category of medical malpractice defendants are those super
specialists who have very little contact with the patient; anesthesiologists,
neurosurgeons, and so forth.

Almost by definition psychologists and psychiatrists

establish personal contact with their patients.

In spite of this, these prac-

titioners are now finding themselves in court with greater frequency.
of published cases involving psycmatrists was
trend is growing.
to 1950, seven.
found.

A study

made, and we can see how the

From 1931 to 1940 three of such cases were found.
From 1951 to 1961, nine were found.

From 1941

From 1961 to 1970, 25 were

And I would bet that the number of cases will increase in the same pro-

portion in the decade of the '70's.

Again, this increase in not surprising when

one considers that about half of the hospital beds in the entire county are
occupied by mental patients.

One article I read established the number to be

at about 750,000, but I couldn't determine the source of those figures although
I gather Dr. Weitzel can confirm that 50 percent figure.
Compared to the many, many cases involving other types of physicians,
published cases involving psychiatrists are few and far between.
lection I've found so far is 99 A.L.R.2d 599.

The best col-

The title of the annotation is

"Malpractice Liability with respect to Diagnosis and Treatment of Mental Disease."
I suppose every physician or practitioner will become voluble on the
subject of why his

special-ty

trists are no different.

is so vulnerable to attack by lawyers.

Psychia-

They complain that the legal profession constantly

requires them to steer between Scylla and Charybdis.

For example, there are

several cases which hold, particularly with respect to voluntary suicidal patients,
that failure to restrain them may be malpractice.

Yet there are other cases

which hold that improper confinement or supervision can be characterized as
battery or false imprisonment.

Because of this, reams have been written in

psychiatric journals about the benefits to be obtained from an open door policy
of returning the patient to the community.

Yet when this is done and the patient

injures himself or injures someone else here come the summonses.
Every physician and most lawyers are aware of the importance of the
informed consent of the patient before a course of treatment is begun.

Yet in

many instances the psychiatrist's patient is incapable of giving informed consent,
and there's no time in emergency situations to go through commitment procedures
whereby someone else can give a legally binding consent.
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As we've seen up to

Ii:::

sa:

now even the commitment procedures themselves are traps for the psychiatrist.
Keep in mind that all these malpractice cases arise and are tried in the brilliant
light of hindsight.

If, for example, a patient contends

tha~

he was falsely

imprisoned and wants money for it, he can put on an awfully good appearance, convince a jury or a judge that he's very meek and mild, and they can really wonder
how the doctor concluded that he was dangerous.

I submit to you, these recent

cases we've just discussed to the contrary notwithstanding, that

there can be

no beyond reasonable doubt criteria with respect to diagnosis of whether a patient is confinable or dangerous, whatever

tha~

means.

In my view some of the reasons for the confused body of law that relates to psychiatrists and psychologists is illustrated by the title of this
talk., "Malpractice Hazards in Psychiatry."
practice is professional negligence.
about.

The implication from the word mal-

This is something we lawyers know something

Normally, the precedents, the analogies, and so forth are made by other

physicians who fail to abide by a standard of care.

Unfortunately the psychia-

-tris-ts, and the psychologist' s exposure goes way beyond negligence.

Witness all

these false imprisonment cases, the cases for defamation, the cases for battery.
Of course, there are also many cases that fit within the classic
malpractice pattern, but I submit to you, that they'll be falling off in the
future.

These are the electroshock therapy cases, the insulin shock,.cases, and

wet pact treatment.
cular reaction.

Electroshock therapy involves a real risk of violent mus-

Bones get broken, people die.

treatment cases are similar.

Insulin shock cases and wet pack

But in these type of cases we can and do have the

usual expert testimony relating to standards of care.

I hope these claims will

be falling off, because I hope with the discovery of new drugs that these types
of therapy will be used less and less often and, to express a layman's predilection,
I hope they will go the way of frontal loqotomy.
Most of the cases that are tried are the ones that result from injuries caused
by mental patients either to themselves or to others.

The usual allegation is that the

physician is negligent in failing to supervise treatment or to restrain the patient.
It's in this type of case that the psychiatrist is heard to wail "What do you want from
me?"

It may be determined that it would be a good thing to keep a depressed patient in

a closed ward, or it might not be good for him.
jumps out the window.

So they put him in an open ward, and

It isn't hard to create a jury issue on the subject, and if you

have a jury issue, you will have laymen hearing conflicting theories of treatment.

If

you have a serious injury, you will have a possibility of a substantial jury verdict.
Medical malpractice lawyers have noted the weakening of the so-called
locality rule.

The time was when, for the benefit of the practitioners in the

boondocks, the courts held that a physician would be held to the standard of care
for his community and not necessarily the more sophisticated standards of care
in the country.

The locality rule is now in disrepute and that protection for the

under-informed physician is falling away_

However, more often than not a

psychia~

tristwill want to invoke standards of practice that developed in other communities
as a rationale for treatment that is unfamiliar to the community.
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Everyone knows

psychiatrists shuffle themselves around the country quite a bit.

Mr. Barber and

I, for example, are taking opposite sides in a case where therapy for drug addicts
developed in communities other than Louisville is an issue.

'You'd better believe,

Mr. Barber, that we will invoke national standards of care i~ our proof.
In addition, there are other precedents which I contend are misapplied
in the realm of psychiatric malpractice.

All of us know that with a little

application and a little discovery' we can make a jury issue out of failure to
warn.

But what is a psychiatrist supposed to do?

Does he tattoQ a warning on

the patient's head?
Keep in mind that because of the unjustified I stigma which is attached
to mental illness, psychiatrists are getting exposed to claims that other
specialists don't worry about too much.

One psychiatrist--to give you another

example--failed to note when he was writing a report about a pa:t,ient that the
patient was a junior.

A patient with a similar name but who wasn't a junior,

sued him for defamation.
lawsuit

In another case the doctor wrote what was alleged in a

to be a derrogatory letter about a patient's condition.

a hostile spouse.

It was used by

The doctor got hit with a libel suit.

The most tears are shed by psychoanalysts who think they are doing the
right thing and then are told by a court that they are not.
165 N.E.2d 756,

In Hammer v. Rosen,

(N.Y. 1960) Dr. Rosen had achieved considerable

sU'cc~ss

with

~

schizophrenic

patients by the device of lowering himself to their level in

order to communicate with them.

In this case even though the doctor denied it

not too convincingly, there was evidence that the patient was actually beaten
by the doctor.

The appeals court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the

malpractice charge and even held that the plaintiff did not need expert testimony in that case.
Another bad case, in my view, came from England.
March 7, 1961.
le

Landow v. Warner,

There the physician employed the transfer phenomenon, the es-

tablishment of a close personal relationship with his patient, to the extent
that by most people's definition his patient fell in love with him.

.m

uncommon in psychiatric practice.

This isn't

However, the doctor made the mistake of

.n

extending this relationship beyond the analyst's couch and had social contact

h

with his patient.

The court held him liable for this, failing, in my view, to

realize that the psychologist's therapy can't always be confined to the office.
Don't get me wrong. I don't mean to condone cases where a psychiatrist took advantage of his relationship and seduced the patient.

There are several of those.

In Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1969), for example, it might be said
that there were sufficient grounds to uphold a jury's award against a psychiatriist.

During therapy the patient realized she felt nothing for her husband or

her family and transferred her affection to Dr. Freeman.

She became more and

more involved with her doctor, went to parties with him, and tried group
therapy, including a nude swimming party. On overnight trips Dr. Freeman undertook to advise her on how to handle an inheritance.

He advised her to leave

her husband and allowed her to move to his farm, part of which was purchased
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with her money.

He finally told her to divorce her husband and told her that

in order to rid

herself of hostility she should break into her husband's home

and steal a desk and two beds and take them to the doctor's home.
stole some suits and a
therapy didn't work.

television~

set for the doctor.

Later she

Unfortunately, Dr. Freeman's

By the time of the trial Mrs. Zipkin still had the head-

aches she complained of when the therapy began and she still rejected people and
she still had guilt feelings.

I don't think anyone will weep too many tears

for Dr. Freeman although, as I'll point out a little later on, you might weep
a few tears for his malpractice insuror because it wound up having to pay the
judgment.
So pity the poor practitioner.

Not only is he exposed to the classic

type of malpractice claim, but he also has to answer for defamation, false imprisonment, libel, failure to warn, and quite often superhuman powers of prediction are being required of him after the patient injures himself or injures
someone else.

In addition, there are many different standards of care and

conduct and to add to the psychiatrist's woes, the claims that are made are
usually so bizarre that the insurance companies get skittish and start looking
at the policy in an

effort to avoid liability.

are written for other types of physicians.

Unfortunately, the policies

The usual policy has a hospital

professional liability language and obligate the insurance company-to pay and
defend suits for "damages because of injuries of any person arising out of
the rendering of or failure to render during the policy period the following
professional services:

medical, surgical, dental, or nursing treatment, fur-

nishing or dispensing of drugs, etc.

That doesn't quite fit.

I was looking

at one file the other day and I saw this under exclusions: "liability of an
insured for his personal acts or omissions of a professional nature."

This

appears to me to unravel in the exclusions paragraph what the coverage of the
paragraph was supposed to omit.
course strike that exclusion.

Most insurance agents will as a matter of
But if they don't, it makes you wonder what

premiums are paid for.
Additional problems arise when the policy is written, as it usually
is, in conjunction with the general premises coverage.

Any of us who deal in

insurance know that nowadays for premises coverage, or for automobile coverage
for that matter, the insured event is an occurrance and an occurrence is defined
in terms of an accident neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured.
ful act.

This clause was put in to exclude coverage for a conscious, will-

I had occasion to examine the history of that clause in Continental

Insurance Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1974).

The general idea of this

clause was to give expression to strong public policy often announced that a
person should not be allowed to insure against a willful tort unless the language
is very plain.

Unfortunately, the language isn't very plain in some of these

insurance contracts that are purchased for psychiatrists.

For example, unlike

the surgeon who didn't mean to leave the sponge in his patient's abdomen, many
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claims are made against psychiatrists and psychologists with the allegation that
there was an injury or there was an occurrence based on a conscious course of conduct, and that the psychiatrist meant this to happen.

Punitive damages are asked,
J

and that's when the insurors start getting nervous.

They remember the first

opinion in Hancock where the Court of Appeals adopted the rule that punitive
damages are not covered under an ordinary insurance policy.

They now hold, how-

ever, that you are covered for punitive damages if those punitive damages arise
as a result of gross negligence.

There is a big question now as to whether you

are covered for punitive damages if it is
were the result of a willful act.

all~ged

and proved .that the damages

Many claims that

I'~e

seen made against a

psychiatrist usually include a punitive damage count, and therefore you usually
get a letter of noncoverage fromyourinsuror.

Just as a practical matter I ad-

vise you psychiatrists and psychologists to make it plain to your insurance
agents that you want coverage tailor-made to your profession and not pieced together from coverages for other types of activities.
Finally on the subject of insurance most mental health services in
our state are rendered by agencies of the commonwealth.

As we all know, the

commonwealth is protected by soverign immunity, but individual physicians,
administrators, etc., cannot draw the cloak of sovereign immunity around them,
and our enlightened state government still does not buy insurance
consider this to be shocking.

for.~hem.

I

However, despite all these gloomy insurance prob-

lems I might remind you of Zipkin v. Freeman.

That case wap not a review of

the judgment that I knew Ms. Zipkin obtained against Dr. Freeman.
nishment proceedings where they attached his insurance policy.

It was gar-

Fortunately

for Dr. Freeman his policy covered him for claims based "on professional services rendered by the insured."

Over a rather vigorous dissent the Supreme

Court of Missouri decided that Dr. Freeman was covered because there was some
relationship with what he said was "professional services."
Having hung the crepe, let me assure you as a practical matter that
psychiatrists make poor targets in a lawsuit.

It's still fact that it's awfully

hard as a practical matter for a plaintiff to make a case against a psychiatrist
and psychologist.
and far between.

There are many practical reasons why these cases are so few
Often a claimant is ashamed to bare his soul in court.

It's

awfully difficult to show very real emotional damages in a way that the jury
will believe it.

The plaintiffs themselves are not very attractive people.

They're crazy, they're junkies, or they have some other stigma justified or unjustified.

But assuming the plaintiff takes the bit in his teeth and files

a suit, he still has a hard way to go.

To begin with there is a lack of de-

finitive standards by which the courts can tell the jury they can find one way
or the others that rights were violated. This is particularly true with respect to
standards for diagnostic negligence.

For example, in Baker v. U.S., 226 F.Supp. 129

(S.D. Iowa, 1964), a known suicidal was assigned to an open ward and he jumped
out the window.

The

court held in effect that assigning him to an open ward
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was a calculated risk which the doctor as a matter of law is entitled to take.
A directed verdict was entered.
Another problem is the problem of privileged communication.
,

In Kentucky,

communications between a psychologist and a patient are absolutely privileged.
They got that in when they put in their psychologists' review law.

But when I

tried to get a similar privilege for a patient and a psychiatrist, the legislature wouldn't go along, so communications between a psychiatrist and a patient
are only conditionally

privileged.

In any event, the plaintiff has an awfully

hard time trying to find willing witnesses and finding records which will substantiate his side of the case.
On,

the other hand the defendant can and usually does find a convincing

witness that will solemnly testify that just about any course of conduct including
beatings and wet pack treatments, has the approval of some school of thought or
another in the profession, and they can usually sound pretty convincing about it.
Another hurdle that's hard for a plaintiff to jump is proving that some
bizarre act on the part of the patient was proximately caused by the malpractice
of the physician.

In other words, you have to show not only malpractice but

you have to show that it was the cause of the injury.

If the injury was suf-

fered by the patient himself, our legal concept of volenti non fit injuria--that
you won't be heard to complain about something you've done to yours.elf--is as
deeply ingrained in our juries as it is in our courts.

If there is some sug-

gestion that a disturbed patient hurt himself, it's awfully hard to hang it on
the psychiatrist.

I don't particularly appreciate that because I think it's rather

ironic that after many, many years the Court of Appeals of Kentucky finally set
up guidelines for measuring the standard of conduct of a minor.

In other words,

they gave you guidelines whereby you can gauge whether or not a minor who was
making a claim was contributorily negligent or not.

But I don't know of any

court that's attempted to give a similar guideline with respect of contributory
negligence of a patient.

In addition, it's well known that psychiatrists are

not liable if injury results from an error in judgment.
and claim error in judgment.

They can always come in

The most extreme case I was able to find involved

a child who was assaulted by a prematurely released mental patient and the error
in judgment rationale absolved the defendant.
2d 495.

(App. Div. 1963).

the thing

That's Taig v. State, 241 N.Y.S.

Now the plaintiff's old friend,

~

ipsa loquitur--

speaks for itself,is seldom ever available in this type of case.

Hammer v. Rosen was the only case I could find, and there are many cases holding
that things do not speak for themselves in a psychiatric malpractice case.

In

one case in Kentucky, Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964), the Kentucky
Court stretched a bit to find there was consent when it was obtained from the
spouse of the patient and not the patient himself.
We've heard a lot about commitment.

I won't go into it in detail ex-

cept to point out that now commitment has become a quasi-judicial procedure at
least in Kentucky, and there are cases which grant immunity to psychiatrists if

94

they are acting in the capacity of an official participant to commitment procedures.
As I said, psychiatrists are not an easy target.

I think this is unfortunate de-

spite the horrendous effect that malpractice claims have on the cost of medicine,
I

because the threat of malpractice does tend to keep all types of practitioners,
our own profession included, in line.

At least one psychiatrist agrees with me.

Dr. Hamilton, writing in the Maryland State Medical Journal in an article entitled
"Malpractice from the Private Practice and Institutional Psychiatric Viewpoint"
said

this~

"the psychiatric practitioner may be tempted to become,lackadaisical

and cursory in his application of standards

aQ~

generally

physical principles to the psychiatric and medical

acc~pted

emer~ency

medical and

which occurs in an

area for which he is responsible or to a patient in his care."

Most psychiatric

hospitals provide proper medical specialty care by qualified consultants, even
full time staff members.
gencies.

These persons are not always at hand to. manage emer-

The fact that one is, being a psychiatrist does not relieve one of

general medical responsibility as long as one is a licensed practicing physician,
especially when an emergency situation arises.
I'd like to conclude with a little commercial or editorial comment.
In any state in the country, and certainly Kentucky, more money is spent on
prisoners in correctional institutions than is spent on mental 'patients.
rights of prisoners in correctional institutions is a developing

Civil

field~of

law

but development of civil rights of mental patients is lagging far behind.

The

development of rights of mental retardation patients is even behind that.

As I

mentioned, mental retardation is by definition an incurable condition,and yet
mental retardates are always lumped together with mentally ill patients and their
programs almost are invariably administered by persons trained to administer to
the mentally ill, some of whom in my opinion are capable of making the distinction.
There are several cases imposing liability for the acts of a prematurely
released patient, but usually these cases arise when the patient has harmed someone else.

Nowadays hospital administrators make a big thing of returning the

patient to the community.

Often as not in a tort case much expert testimony can

be marshalled to say that it's a good thing they returned the patient to his family.
But I think legislative attention ought to be paid to release procedures.

I

think we should be sure that there are community services available for the patient
before he's released simply to make the hospital statistics look good.

I think

some attention ought to be paid to the welfare of the patient in addition
to the welfare of the people harmed by the patient prematurely released.

Inciden-

tally, there's a good annotation on the liability of a person releasing an institutionalized patient for the harm he causes to others at 38 A.L.R. 3d 699.
One or two cases have held that a submissible jury issue was made because a doctor sent a patient to the wrong hospital.
those cases.

I'd like to see more of

Many of our mental institutions are no more than human warehouses.

If some liability is attached to the sending of people to these places, there
might be some pressure to upgrade these institutions.
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It's interesting to note,

Leu #""ae

for example, that the Somerset Institution for Mental Retardation was specifically
designed to prevent crowding more and more patients in.

I think that the pres-

sure or fear perhaps of malpractice suits just might be ?ne way of upgrading these
warehouses that we've seen like the Frankfort State Hospital.
With respect to psychiatrists and analysts, I think some attention ought
to be paid to imposing a fiduciary standard of care on them and not a standard
made for negligent surgeons and anesthesiologists.

While it's been said that

physicians have a license to commit manslaughter and lawyers'have a license to
steal, psychiatrists have a license to cOn\rni-t
that line of thought be followed.

battery and false imprisonment if

Now the law iSlputting constitutional con-

straints on this license.
I think it's not without significance that in O'Connor v. Donaldson,
a damage case with a verdict of $38,500 compensatory damage and $10,000 punitive
damages was rendered despite the state official's dissent that he was acting in
good faith reliance on state law when he confined a nondangerous mental
patient and gave him no treatment.

I think the significance of O'Connor v.

Donaldson is that it is based on a so-called patient's constitutional right to
liberty.

The verdict was reversed, by the way, on the very narrow issue of the

quasi-immunity of a state official.

The fallout from O'Connor may be more damage

suits such as Whitevee v. State, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486

(Ct. Cl. 1968) .. where a $300,000

award for illegally confining a patient for 90 percent of 14 years was affirmed.

I think it should have been.

be healthy.
act.

But on the whole I think the fallout will

It was one impetus that caused Kentucky to rewrite its commitment

I would take slight issue with Dr. Ruben.

He said he would overpredict.

I would suggest to you psychiatrists that perhaps if you would err why not err
on the side of liberty.

But I think we all agree, particularly when we still

use danger as a criterion, that we've got a lot to work on as far as commitment
is concerned and maybe in time we'll bring our two professions a little closer
together as was done in Durham v. U.S. when we finally had a workable definition
of insanity in a criminal case.

So I'd like to see more attention paid to the

constitutional rights of patients to live decentlyonc£they are confined.
it take more damage suits to accomplish this?
way to make the law.

I hope not.

Will

It's an expensive

Claims are growing in their variety and their volume.

I hope psychiatrists, psychologists, and lawyers will get some fixed frame of
reference out of it and maybe some definitive standard of care and treatment.
MR. PROSSER:

The lawyers have problems in the field of malpractice too.

Let

me tell you this about malpractice actions.- It is the responsibility of a responsible attorney to filter out medical malpractice cases.

The fact there are

attorneys sitting in this audience today I think is indicative of the fact that
the legal profession is concerned about the increase
actions.

in medical malpractice

Over the past 3 years I've had some 50 cases come into my office of

people wanting to sue a doctor.

Out of those 50 cases I've filed 2 lawsuits.
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One was against a doctor for performing an abortion and one was against an orthopedic surgeon.

Just yesterday I wrote a man a letter telling him that after

some month and a half of investigation and analysis of his meaical records we
cannot represent him in a medical malpractice suit because we' found no malpractice.

I sent that letter certified return receipt requested because I don't

want him coming after me claiming that I didn't do a good job either.

In ad-

dition, over in Louisville there is a case in which a doctor is suing a lawyer
because the attorney took on a client who fell out of a hospital ¥indow and he
sued the doctor.

The case was dismissed

when_~iscovery

disclosed that the pa-

tient had been on a furlough, came back to the hospital, drunk, and then fell out
the window.

This to me is probably an indication of' irresponsibility on the

lawyer's part since he didn't do the appropriate discovery before he filed
suit.

Sometimes someone will walk in and say, "I've got this great medical

malpractice suit.

Tomorrow is the last day of the statute of limitations."

If

someone came into my office like that, I'd tell them,well they'd better spend
the rest of the afternoon finding another lawyer.
the filtering process.
statistics.

Attorneys are working on

You in the medical profession I'm sure are not aware of

None have ever been kept as to the number of people who go run-

ning out convinced that they've got a problem that is medical malpractice and
the legal profession precludes a suit because they refuse to file it,..

We'll

take a little time for questioning now.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION:

I'd like to respond to a couple of remarks you made.

It troubles me

when you indicate that maybe one of the ways to improve our state hospital system is to threaten the psychiatrist with more suits.
Stickney, I believe, or Wyatt v. Alderholt.

I'm reminded of Wyatt v.

A number of these class action suits

started out with the psychiatrist administrators going along with them.
they were called sweetheart suits or something like that.
started to go wrong.

I guess

Then things suddenly

The psychiatrist became the scapegoat it seemed to me.

I remember in the Alabama case, Judge Johnson found in favor of upgrading the
facilities and wrote some standards after getting a lot of input from various
people nationwide, and

Governo~

Wallace then refused to give them the money.

I mean it was not the psychiatrist, it was the state government.

Then, of course,

Judge Johnson threatened to take Alabama state lands and sell them, if I remember
correctly.

On Donaldson v. O'Connor I think the rest of your story is that the

damage suits were reversed because the criteria was stated that a doctor couldn't
be held accountable for standards that would take effect in the future.
it was something like that.
work in a social context.

I think

But I want to make the point that psychiatrists
In a way we can only do as much as we're allowed.

made the remark earlier,Mr. Prosser,about the bell and salivating.
also works in terms of batting you head up against a wall.

You

I think it

I think a awful lot

of people who work in the state mental hospital find themselves repeatedly stymied
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in implementing new and improved programs if in no other way in terms of funding.
My final remark will be in terms of your law, Mr. Barber, which was recently passed.

I thought there were an awful lot of important
changes.
,

very interested in it.

I was

But there didn't seem to be many other people interested.

There was nothing in our Lexington paper about it.

I really feel that the people

we're talking about today are really the disenfranchised minority or one of the
important ones in our society.
mentally ill people.
yawning going on.
MR. PROSSER:

Not very many people speak up too often for the

So that law went through and I felt there was a lot of

Most people didn't care.'

The fact is that it isn't very

newswo~thy.

I was in the journalism

profession and frankly a murder trial seems much more interesting than what's going
on here today although what I s going on here today is going to have a .much more far
reaching effect than whe·ther or not the jury comes back with a guilty verdict.
DR. RUBEN:

I have several comments.

you made, Mr. Bruton.
prediction.
hospitalize.

By and large I agree with the remarks that

One thing I would like to clarify is my comment about over-

When I overpredict, it doesn't necessarily mean I involuntarily
I too am quite concerned about the patient's right to liberty, but

in terms of overpredicting, the dangerousness of the clinical state of the patient
is also important and as long as I'm concerned and sensitive to the fact that the
patient may be dangerous, then I think that I won't be perhaps rnis::;ing dangerous
people and letting them slip through and not taking appropriate action which might
lead to hospitalization, but surely not necessarily.
One of the other comments that I would like to make in relation to your
mention of ECT, wet packs, and insulin shock therapy is your statement that you
will be glad when they're no longer in use.
uation.

This is quite an unfortunate sit-

As Dr. Weitzel mentioned,ECT is appropriate in certain emergency psy-

chiatric situations.

There's no question that ECT has been overused to some

degree in the past and there have been times when people perhaps have been injured because of the use of ECT.

What this

led to ultimately was the Cali-

fornia legislature last year passing laws that said that you could not do ECT
without some sort of review board and setting up very stringent guidelines so
that it's virtually impossible to have ECT performed in the state of California,
in spite of the fact that there's good medical evidence that for certain specific
illnesses such as the most severely depressed and catatonic excitement, for instance, that you would use ECT.

Wet packs are putting the patient in cool wet

sheets, wrapping them up and letting them be in cool wet sheets.

At Yale

Psychiatric Institute, for instance, which is a long term hospitalization facili ty for the most severely psychotic individuals, wet packs are s·till used on occasion when we have people who are recalcitrant to drug treatment.

Obviously we

use psychotropic medication when possible, but there are times when the patient
cannot tolerate the drugs for medical reasons and wet packs are used.
known of a patient to suffer from wet packs.

With ECT it's true that in the past

a number of people suffered physical injuries such as fractures.
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I've never

Currently when

ECT is administered, muscle relaxants are given so that the patient doesn't have
the severe violent seizure that they used to have before the advent of the muscle
relaxant usage.

So I think the physical injuries under ECT are quite rare now.

I do agree that at times it's overused and it has been overused in the past.
I think

its

MR. BRUTON:

But

judicious use is still called for in certain instances.
I didn't mean to intrude on your profession and to rule them out.

know they are still being used, but

i~

nology arise that will make automobiles burn cleaner, should not
kind of an emphasis to find other less

I

for example, Congress can mandate that techdanger~~s

t~ere

be that

physiological drugs for treat-

ment than electric shock therapy.
DR. RUBEN:

Obviously I agree, and I think it is not a procedure without risk, but

I think that there are times that are quite appropriate for ECT and other types of
treatment.

The problem in what's happened is just what you're alluding to:

that

we take from one area, consumer protection, and decide. that consumer protection
then applies to medical treatment.

I don't like having to deal with people where I

don't understand what's going on in relation to my car or my t.v. set, and I'd like
protection.

I think by the same token medical patients deserve protection.

But I

think it's gone too far when you have to go to a judicial review body in California
to see whether or not a certain medical treatment is indicated.
There are two more comments that I wanted to bring up.
lem that you alluded to, situations in which the insurance

One was a proB-

~ompany

decides to

settle a matter out of court when in fact the physician believes that he has not
committed any negligent act, would be willing to go to court, and feels quite
certain that he would be able to prove his innocence.
insurance company settles.

But unfortunately the

I've seen that this is an increasing problem re-

cently.
MR. BRUTON:

Most medical malpractice policies have a clause in them that settle-

ment cannot be achieved without the consent of the insured.

But we lawyers are

pragmatists, and we know that a jury can't always understand the fine issues, so
sometimes we advise a settlement.
DR. RUBEN:

Just one other issue, too.

I wanted to ask a question.

The 1972

Social Security amendments that established the PSRO, the Professional Standards
Review Organizations, also had a civil immunity clause in them that I'm sure you're
aware of and that I know has been hotly debated.

I wonder what your opinion is

about this civil immunity clause as it might pertain to malpractice suits in the
future.
MR. BRUTON:

In Kentucky you cannot have this type of civil immunity; it must be

a federal mandate solely. It might tend to decrease the cost of medicine, and
that's the only reason I'm in favor of that provision.

On the other hand, I am

firmly convinced that the threat of suits is something that should be kept in the
background to keep all our professions honest.
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PROTECTED RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS
Oliver H. Barber, Jr., J.D.
Gittleman, Charney and Fitzgerald
Louisville, Kentucky
When Dr. Weitzel and I set up this program, I suggested that I go last
because I felt that by that time, between Mr. Bruton and Dr. Weitzel, I would have
enough rebuttal to keep me going.
Weitzel says.

Fortunately, I agree with most of what Dr.

Although Mr. Bruton is a mean old defense attorney 'most of the

time and I am attempting to become a mean old plaintiff's attorney, we agree on
some of the things that he had to say this morning.

Whj3,t I would try to do is

focus on that which I know best, the patient's rights when individual patients
i

are inv~lved in psychiatric settings.

'

,

:

As the program indicated and as was

dutifully read to you by Mr. Prosser, I was staff attorney for a forensic
psychiatric unit here in the state of Kentucky.

Translated that means that I'm

one of the very few attorneys I know who was paid to spend ti'me inside a mental
In 1973 at the time I was on that staff, I was part of the treatment
team actively involved in the treatment process as a staff attorney and patient's
advocate.

I spent a full year in that capacity.

I try to divide patient's rights into two areas.

The first area is commibnent

and the rights of individuals as they face the commitment procee,dings.

I'll

little bit about that because that hasn't been touched on this morning.
also spend some time talking about the second area, the rights of individuals
are in institutions.
If my 4 years in the Army in The Judge Advocate General's corps as an active
anything at all, i t taught me that when giving a speech the
is best:

you tell them what you are going to tell them, tell them, and

them what you told them.

Following that rule I ' l l tell you that I have

one sentence that if I can get across to you I think will sum up what I
say.

Each individual who's involved in the psychiatric-legal process has

rights that you and I have no matter what has happened to him or what
of psychosis or what degree of bizarre behavior he was involved in.

He

has the full panoply of every right that you think is accorded to you,
to him.

Only after procedural process rights have been established and

may certain things be taken away from an individual patient.

Primarily

are concerned with the freedom of movement and the freedom to harm someone
In the state of Kentucky the seminal decision that generated the instituthe new mental health law that we have was a decision by Judge Alan,
v. True, decided in February of 1975.

In this case a man named Terry

felt that his wife was acting very bizarrely.

He claimed that she was

around in the park in the wee morning hours without any clothes on, that
being hostile, and wasn't taking care of their baby.

He took out a mental

warrant to have her committed for 60 days to River Ridge Hospital in
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Louisville, Kentucky.

In talking with her defense attorney, Curtis Stuckey, at

legal aid in Louisville, I discovered that Mr. Stuckey's theory is that what Terry
Kendall was doing was projecting his particular aberations on his wife.

Mrs· Kendall

went down, got herself a legal aid attorney, and went into court to contest the
whole civil commitment procedure.

During the course of contesting the procedure

one section of the statute was thrown out because it didn't have the rights of
confrontation, the right to have a hearing before the 60 days were initiated, and
also because in the judge's opinion it didn't have a standard for dangerousness
built into the statute.

As a result of that Elecision there .have been quite a few

changes in the procedural due process rights here in

~entucky

which I think are

mirroring the procedural due process rights all across the United States.

For

example, in order to commit someone in Kentucky for longer than 72 hours, there
has to be a full court hearing.

When I say a full court hearing,I mean you have

to have an attorney present representing the individual patient, and you have to
have the doctor or doctors present and testifying unless that is waived by the
individual and his or her attorney.

You also have to have a final and full

de-termination of -the case by the judge.

By that I mean that the court would have

to determine in accordance with the statute upon completion of the hearing that
the individual is (a) mentally ill,

(b) because of his or her illness presents an

immediate threat of danger to self or others--and we've already had .some discussion
to that--

(c) that the least restrictive alternative mode of threatment requires

hospitalization, and (d) that the treatment which can reasonably benefit the
respondent is available in the hospital.
Breaking that down a little bit, some of the changes that have been brought
this law came from Lessard v. Schmidt 379 F.Supp. 1379 (E.D. Wisc. 1974); vacated
421 U.S. 957 (1975), or at least some of those concepts did.

One of -the concepts

in there and also in Kendall v. True is that the patient has a right to be in the
courtroom and has the right to confront his or her accuser.

I have heard the

argument time and time again that you should not take the patient into the courtroom because most of the time it is detrimental to the individual's mental condition.
I do not buy that argument.

At the time that I went to work for the forensic

psychiatric unit there was that requirement in the Kentucky law, but it could be
waived by the doctor through certain magic language such as "it's not in his best
interest."

At that time approximately 30 patients a month were going throught the

civil commitment process from the forensic psychiatric unit.

None of them were

ever given an opportunity to confront the doctors or the accusers or to understand 1i17hat the judge had to say.

The staff was plagued by innumerable questions

of why am I here, nobody has ever taken me to court, nobody has ever ruled on me,
my rights are being violated.

We changed it all around.

In the past 2 years

there has only been one patient that the doctors have said was so psychotic, so
disoriented, or so ill, that it would be harmful to that patient to take him into
the courtroom.

Consistently, it has proven to be beneficial to the patients to

know what is going on with their case.
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Another facet of the rights that are protected under our statute and which are
accorded in all the state statutes or at least should be is that each individual
at any stage of civil commitment beyond 30 days, 72 hours, 3 ,days, or 48 hours
should have an attorney.
I was just commenting to Dr. Ruben that one of my major
theses is that the biggest problem that I see in the civil commitment process
other than the situation where two doctors agree that an individual should be
hospitalized without ever seeing him is that most of the time there is not an
articulate, well-informed counsel willing to represent the individual rights of
a patient at the hearing.
pay.

It is well known that mental health law does not

It was stated here this morning that no one was

of the Kentucky mental health law of 1976.
are basically disenfranchised.

i~terested

in the passage

It's further felt that these people

I believe that after the emergency commitment

of 72 hours when you come to the hearing, if at the hearing you have the patient,
you have a patient's attorney who is reasonably well-informed on psychiatric
jargon, reasonably well-informed on what is going on with the patient, and is
willing to act as the patient's attorney--not just accept what the doctor says-and you have two psychiatrists who are willing to testify as to their opinion
based upon observable facts that they had seen or read in the file, and a reasonably competent judge who is willing to make

the decision, then from there on

many of the problems that you would have on habeas corpus actions or"v..tolations
of rights actions would fade.

I further contend that if you follow this concept

and work together on the front end as doctors and as lawyers for well-informed
members of the bar, for a well-informed physician and a well-informed judiciary
and put this money on the front end, that it would save a lot of money in the long
run.

Money would not be expended for lawsuits, money would not be expended for

treatment that doesn't work because the patients are recalcitrant, hostile, upset,
and staff time would also be saved.
One of the things that I think it is necessary to understand concerning
patient's rights is some of the history of the patient's rights concept.

You've

heard a rather chilling narrative, at least from my standpoint, from Dr. Weitzel
this morning concerning the evolution of the civil commitment laws in the United
States.

Initially the individual who was "insane" in old England was made a ward

of the King.

I think you'll find, however, if you read some recitations of how

this worked that only those individuals who had some land and who "went berserk"
or weren't able to care for themselves or their land came under the king's wing.
This concept come down through the law and through the medical profession and was
translated into something called parens patriae here in the United States.
At the same time that he was writing this article in 1960 or a few years
thereafter a man named Kenneth Donaldson had some kind of falling out with his
father, and he was hospitalized at the state hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida,
which is a huge place.

It is, if you'll pardon my statement, one of the largest

mental hospitals in the world outside the Soviet Union.
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At the Chattahoochee

Hospital he was placed on the forensic psychiatric ward.

As you read his account

of his trials and tribulations, which was in the Fifth Circuit opinion, you'll find
that he says that he spend every night before he went to bed praying that some of
the crazy people in there who were charged with very serious crimes would leave
him alone so that he would be able to wake up in the morning.
Scientist and he refused their medication.

He was a Christian

He told them that he would partake of

individual counseling, that he wanted occupational therapy, and that he wanted
grounds privileges so that he would have an opportunity to pursue what he thought
were reasonable means to show the

individua~~

that he could. live in society.

was denied all of these things for a number of years.,

He

For example, one of the

statements in the Fifth Circuit opinion was that over a 10 year period one of the
staff physicians may have treated him only for approximately 8 hours during this
10 year period.

That doesn't translate to very many minutes per year.

Evidently, as Mr. Bruton has told you,

the jury believed the man and

after Dr. Morton Birnbaum and the National Mental Health Law Project took the
case and brought the damages suit, he was released.
and he recovered in damages.

They dropped the class action

Then the case went on up through the Fifth Circuit

where it was affirmed and a constitutional right to treatment was delineated.
Just as in the Kendall case, Chief Judge Wisdom indicated that parens patriae is
dead.
I suggest to you that after the decision was rendered by the Supreme Court
in Donaldson v. O'Connor 422 U.S. 563 (1975), what you have is a statement that you
may not simply incarcerate or warehouse a patient in a mental hospital without
treatment unless there is a showing that that patient is dangerous.

Donaldson v.

O'Connor would take mental hospitals in the state of Kentucky and empty out of
them every single patient who is not dangerous and whom it cannot be shown is
receiving adequate treatment for their type of mental illness carried to its logical
extreme.

I further contend that if you take Kendall v. True, apply the precepts

of the Fifth Circuit opinion--whidh has been overruled to a certain extent--and
the logical extension of the Donaldson case, then even the dangerous people, if
they are committed, have to be treated.

If you don't do these things, what you

really have is some kind of preventive detention which has been stricken in court
decisions in the District of Columbia and elsewhere.
One of the factors that you have to consider in the treatment concept is
what type of treatment is good treatment.

As has been indicated this morning,

there are many psychiatrists who would be willing to support various theories,
behavior modification programs, chemotherapy, and all of the other types of programs.

If you go to

~att

v. Stickney you will see listed reams and reams of

ideas on what are the basic proper treatments, patient staff ratios, what type of
program should be available to the individual patients and concepts and ideas on
how to implement those programs.

That case had a very interesting genesis.

There

was a new director of the state mental hospital system down in Alabama in 1972,
Dr. Stonewall Stickney.

Dr. Stickney was interested in finding a way to balance
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his budget.

He took a look at the system and said, "What am I paying the most for?"

He says, "I'm paying the most fOli salary, as in any mental hospital situation.

I'm

obviously not paying the most for the food and the housing of the patients; it's
for the salaries of my staff.

Who makes the most money?

The' people that make

the most money are the psychologists and the psychiatrists and the social workers,
not bhe aides." He looked at his situation and he said, "I can't fire a whole bunch
of aides in order to save money because if I do that I'll have nobody to take care
of the patients.

,I'll have somebody to counsel them and perhaps treat them but
he~ired

I'll have nobody to take care of them."

So

workers, psychologists, psychiatrists.

When he did

150 professionals, social
th~t,then

the professionals

said, "By George, he's hurting these people's individual treatment programs.
the only treatment programs that the hospital has."

We're

In particular this was the

cry of the psychologists because at that time there was quite a controversy between the psychologists at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa and the psychiatrists who were running the hospital.

They found a very

flamboyant attorney

from Alabama to come in and bring a lawsuit in the name of Ricky Wyatt.

So the

genesis of this particular lawsuit was not some parading civil rights attorney
st-rolling through the south looking for wrongs to be r1ghted,but a very simple
economic issue on the part of the professionals who'd been fired.

As a result

you had those standards that are put forth in Wyatt v. Stickney.
Some of the concepts that we have heard concerning the rights of patients
have been embodied in recent litigation.
Lessard case, for example.

Some of the

litig~tion

would be the

Those concepts all start with one basic assumption,

that each patient should be entitled to humane care and treatment to the extent
that the facilities, equipment, and personnel are available in accordance with
standards accepted in medical practices.

I believe that the quote from the

Wyatt case is that each patient should receive care or treatment which would give
them a reasonable opportunity to improve his or her condition.

If you start with

that basic assumption, you start with the concept from the very outset that the
patient knows he's going into the hospital.

Then the patient

should be consulted

immediately concerning the treatment program that he or she is going to be involved
in.

The patient should be adequately and duly informed of what's going to happen

to him and should be asked to make suggestions in terms of his or her own treatment.

It is my contention--and I'm stepping into the realm where Dr. weitzel and

Dr. Ruben can really get in some licks--that the great majority of people who are
admitted on a court order to a mental hospital are disoriented, and psychotic,
seriously disturbed, or whatever you want to call it in only a certain area of
their ability to see and hear and understand.

Most of the people that I've seen

are not so totally out of it that they can't give you some kind of interaction on
their program.

Those people are the individuals to which this statement applies.

Thereafter there should be a treatment program drawn which will give some
type of realistic opportunity to cure or improve the individual patient's health.
This goes back to the original statement that I made to you concerning the four
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things that the judge has to find before he decides to commit someone to a hospital.

He has to find on medical testimony given in court that the patient can

reasonably benefit from that hospitalization.
ment.

There's a h09ker in this state-

The hooker is that in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual you'll find a

listing of antisocial behavior.
longer.

It's not called psychopath or sociopath any

It's antisocial behavior, and it has

its own little number like all those

things in the DSM.
The individual patient has to be able to be treated to a' certain extent.
What does that mean?

Does that mean that f:l:--'the diagnosis 'is antisocial behavior

that the individual patient does not belong in a hospital, that where he belongs
is in the jailor he belongs in prison?

That's a very interesting question

because one of the jobs that I had when I was with the forensic unit was to assist
the doctors in figuring out a way of releasing a very dangerous individual whom
they had made a final determination after 6 years was not psychotic, was no longer
schizophrenic and did not have an organic brain syndrome, but all he was was mean;
antisocial

personality was the final diagnosis.

would release this man.

They came to me and said they

I said that under the definition of the statute, the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual would list that as a mental disorder and if it
lists it as a mental disorder and we release him, you might be violating the
statute.

If you violate the statute, you're going to be in real 'tEouble if he

kills someone.
I went to him and I said, "Let's talk about this.'"
while.

We talked about it for a

He said he wanted out and didn't care what they called him and that he

was going to get an attorney to get out.

I said that's beautiful.

I went back

to the doctors and said now look, are you reasonably certain that this man is going
to harm someone else if he's released?

They said they were as reasonably certain

as they could be based on a long history of violent assaultive behavior both
inside and outside.

I was able to find an attorney to represent him and we had

a habeas corpus hearing.
protect my doctors.

I was able to get enough information on the record to

The individual attorney was able to get enough information

on the record to get his patient out.
mate.

The patient went out.

We got him a room-

He stayed with the male roommate for 2 days, stole a suit of clothes,

wound up in prison, and I've lost track of him.
Another aspect of patient's rights inside of a mental institution is that
I believe that each patient has the right to refuse the treatment program accorded
to him.

That has a caveat on it.

If you take Dangerous Joe and put him in the

hospital and Dangerous Joe goes over and sits down in a chair and starts communing
with God and God tells him do not take any of this medicine because it is going
to poison

his mind, and Dangerous Joe on the outside assualted all four members

of his family and was threatening to kill half a dozen neighbors with a gun, but
he's inside the mental setting and he's not doing anything that's dangerous, simply
because he's inside that setting, do you have the right against his will to give
him the thorizene which would help him?
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In this situation when the staff came to me I said, "Let's work with him for a
while."

They said, "It's a pain; we can't spend all this time with him."

I said,

"Look, it's a whole lot more pain for me going to court and have the judge throw me
out when I come in because it's not in the statutes to have him order this man to
take this medication."

So they worked with him for 2 weeks and came back to me

and said you're going to have to go into court.

So I got all my petition

prepared, and I went into court and I submitted it to the judge.
I was
prepared to make my argument and the judge looked at me and said, ,"I'm a Christian
Scientist, I can't order this."
over 2 weeks."

That actually ....happened.

He said, "I'll lay it

I said "Judge, it really shouldn't make any difference."

"I'm a Christian Scientist; I can't handle this."

He said,

So I went back to my staff and

said you have to work with him for 2 more weeks because there's nothing I can do.
The judge won't even listen to me.

So I went back 2 days later an,d we sat down and

I said, "What's the thing that he likes best in the whole world?" They said he liked
two things best in the whole world, playing bingo with the little girls that come
over from St. Agnes

Parish on Wednesday nights and smoking cigarettes.

O.K. "Who's providing him the money to buy the cigarettes?"

I said,

They said "We are."

I said, "I don't see that the man has a constitutional right to require you to
give him money to buy cigarettes."

So one of the staff members went over to him

and said that if God tells you you shouldn't take medication then
you that we're not going to give you any more cigarette money.

we,'.r~

And furthermore

you can't play bingo on Wednesday night because that's what,we call an
added

attraction.

telling
extra

He took i t for 2 days then came over and told the staff that

God had changed his mind.

He took the medication, and I didn't have to go back

into court.
The object of this story is that in 90 percent of the cases--and that's
purely my figure, I can't document it except by my own personal experience--there's
a way to talk the individual into taking the medication or cooperating with the
treatment program.

In 10 percent of the situations where that is not available,

then hopefully your hospital, be it state or private, will have a responsible"
aggressive attorney who will try to figure out a way under the present statutes
or under some type of theory to go into court and try to get the medication order.
Dr. Weitzel and I discussed this type of fact situation before and there's disagreement on my theory here.

One of the countervailing theories is that if you

place someone in a hospital by a court order who's dangerous, the quid pro quo
is that you're going to treat them so that they are no longer dangerous.

There-

fore you should be required by the original court order to give them the medication
if that's what it will take.

I argue that's stretching it too far.

One of the aspects of the new mental health law which is not included that
was included in the Lessard case was the Miranda warning right.

I didn't put

that in there and no one else saw fit to put it in there either, because it was
my intention that when an individual is admitted to a psychiatric unit, it doesn't
really make any difference whether or not the psychiatrist spends a lot of time
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talking to him.

If the psychiatrist and/or the treatment team does an adequate

workup based on information they can get from the outside and spends a significant
amount of time watching the individual behavior on this particular
unit, most of
,
the time they should be able to come to some type of feel or some type of informed
opinion on the case.

I've been told this; I've also been told that that's

ridiculous.
There's been a particularly aggravating aspect of this problem that just
occurred here in the state of Kentucky.
record--named Charlotte Edwards who was

There was a woman--and all this is in the public
just~ried

for murder in Louisville, Ky.

It appears that she'd had long term psychiatric problems and had been hospitalized
quite recently.
October.

I guess she was hospitalized in the early part of September or

In November or December or so she went out to a local shopping center

and without having much cause and no connection at all with the individual, she
shot a Major from Ft. Knox to death.

One of the aspects of that case that is

really tragic from the standpoint of Charlotte Edwards only--I know it was a great
tragedy to the family of the Major but from her standpoint--she was placed at the
forensic unit for diagnosis and evaluation.
to talk with the psychiatrists.

She was extremely paranoid and refused

She refused to cooperate with them in any way.

She said she would not cooperate unless her attorney told her to do so.
attorney chose not to do so.

Her

One of the contributing factors to her,,_ conviction,

and what is going to be her subsequent long term incarceration unless there's a
successful appeal, is the fact that nobody took evidence of the counselors and
the individual aides at the psychiatric unit concerning her behavior while she
was on the unit.

The psychiatrist took the stand and testified that he, during

the course of her care there, did not personally observe any psychotic behavior
or indicia of symptoms of psychosis.

That was accurate.

And he was not allowed

to testify concerning other things that other people had seen.

I'm not convinced,

as wild as I may be about patient rights, that the Miranda warning is a good thing.
I think by and large most of the people who are going to be committed to a
hospital are going to have the opportunity to talk to someone and they're going
to do it and I don't think it's really necessary to warn them that whatever they
say may be used in civil commitment procedure or some other types of civil action
against them that pertains to their staying in the hospital.
In conclusion, I want to go back to what I originally stated.

Except for

certain strictures of protecting individuals inside and outside the hospital setting
from violent behavior by a person and except for certain strictures on movement,
every single right that you have is reserved to the individual mental patient.
If you can focus on that concept, I think you'll find that if you apply that concept, you'll have better treatment programs, you'll have more work or individual
therapy perhaps, but in the long run i t ' l l be a lot less expensive than having to
deal with me or people like me who are coming from a background of horrendous
decisions and horrendous fact situations in mental health law who feel it
necessary -to get involved in litigation in this area.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MR. PROSSER:
come to you.
MR. BRUTON:

Let's open up the questions to the entire panel in case anything has
When I listened to you talk about all these new ~ights that need to

be r.espected, I have two responses:

(1)

Who's going to pay for it?

I say that in

a real way because the way the present system is staffed and funded has to bear
the brunt of these new agendas.

You're going to have even more good people leave

the system rather than be bogged down in it.
of the treatment plan, the development of

I understand, for

whi~~

e~ample,

in terms

our commited .patients under this

new law are going to be able to participate, that the Department
of Human Resources
I
is floating the current idea that within 3 days the patient will be provided
with the written report of the assessment and the problems in the proposed treatment plan and that the patient at least once a month will be

giv~n

a written

progress report which the patient will be able to discuss with the physician.

It

seems an awful lot of new bureaucratic work; I'm afraid there isn't new money
to pay for that and it discourages me a great deal.
DR. WEITZEL:
out.

Let me answer that new money business.

I consider this to be a cop-

It's a cop-out that we've heard excusing a multitude of sins and a multitude

of violations of civil rights.

There is a case that I consider to be in point.

The state of Iowa was sued in district court and the state

legislatur.~~

was ordered

to raise sufficient tax money to provide pupils in special education with the
type of education to which they were constitutionally

entit~ed.

So the short

answer to your question is that the state legislature should pay for it.

To say

we don't have the funds is a cop-out.
DR. RUBEN:

May I comment please?

but I also agree with Dr. Weitzel.

I agree with what you're saying, Mr. Bruton,
I myself am quite pessimistic about the current

political situation in relation to some of these issues.
I'm throwing in the towel or copping-out.

That doesn't mean that

For instance, in relation to what Mr.

Barber just said, I agree with him totally about the problems in the current
commitment procedures.

I think that what he outlined as reasonable procedure I

too agree is reasonable, but I'm afraid that I see it pessimistically as pie in
the sky.

I don't want it to be that way, and I want to do anything that I can to

help change it.

But the current situation is that in my own experience a great

number of judges who deal with these matters don't understand enough about psychiatry to understand what the issues are.

As you point out, a number of the

attorneys don't and unfortunately a number of the psychiatrists who come into
court don't know what they're talking about either.

The reason I say that is

that coming into court is a very unpleasant experience for anyone, and especially for
a psychiatrist who's supposed to know what he's talking about and yet is dealing
in intangibles, is dealing in matters of opinion where very frequently you can
get another psychiatrist who has a different opinion and rightfully so.

Most of

the cases that come in about commitment are coming in from state hospitals.

The

worst of the mental health system unfortunately most of the time shows up in the
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state hospitals.

That's not always the case, but more

~oreigntrained

physicians

who don't speak English adequately--and you know this and I know this,end up in
the state hospital system--physicians as we've said here, who, really don't have
any idea what our commitment laws are, physicians who don't understand the legal
issues., Good doctors unfortunately--and I hate to use that term--but I think that
the most competent physicians are unwilling to go into court a lot of the time.
In this past month I spent 3 hours in jail interviewing one patient for the public
defender in New Haven and then I spent about 3 hours writing a report.

The

state of Connecticut only wants to pay $75 for -a psychiatric evaluation, I submitted
a bill to the public defender for what my time was wor,th, which was far more than
$75.

I don't know whether I'll get paid.

The problem is that good psychiatric

expert testimony is hard to come by and it's expensive.

I spent another 16 hours

this month in court in a conservator proceedings where a very competent attorney
is trying to protect a large estate and rightfully so.
witness.

I was the defendant's

The problem is that it's possible to spend a lot of time and money in

a situation where the judge really didn't understand what was going on and there
were a lot of medical issues that I was there trying to explain that hopefully
will allow this patient to protect her own rights.

Other attorneys, the plaintiff's

attorney, didn't understand either, from my medical perspective, and a big case
was made out of something which needn't have been that way.

The prol?lem is, I

think, that the whole system needs to be reformed, and I think it calls for
legislative reform at the highest level.

I think that's going to take a lot of

money, and I'm quite pessimistic because I see the current administration cutting
back on money for different types of mental health reform and underwriting dif-ferent types of research, the sorts of things that the criminal justice and the
legal system will need to be able to come up with the right kinds of answers.
I surely don't have an answer myself, but I'm very concerned because I don't see
the right kinds of reforms coming.
I just want to comment on two other things, the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual which you poke fun at Ollie, is an inadequate system and is currently being
revised.

It's an offshoot of the international classification of disease that's

been set up by the World Health Organization and other people, and it's necessary
for statistical purposes and research purposes and also unfortunately for purposes
of third party reimbursement because there are payments available from insurance
companies for different types of illness.

You have to classify people; as psychi-

atrists we don't like to classify people, but we're constrained

to do that.

There is also in the DSM,category number 318 which is no psychiatric disease found,
so that you wouldn't necessarily have to classify everyone as having a psychiatric
illness.
A lot of the time, in my experience, we're able to get people who are
gravely disabled to accept voluntary hospitalization and a lot of that has to do
with the type of relationship that the professional sets up with the patient the
minute the patient walks into the office.
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Someone can drag a patient in saying

you have to lock this person up, and there's a lot of heated feelings between the
patient and the family, and the patient is dead set that they're never going to
go into the hospital, especially since mother or father is telling them they've
got to.

But a lot of times if I can get that family member o~t of the picture

and sit down and talk to the patient about what's going on and what's been happening
to

him and discuss wi.th

him why hospitalization will be appropriate and one of

the things is to get them away from the spouse or parent who's driving them crazy,
I've had a lot of success getting people to accept voluntary hospitalization.
So even when someone wants us to involuntarilyj1ospitalize in. many of the cases, and
again this is impressionistic--I don't have any hard da,ta--a large percentage will
accept voluntary hospitalization.
MR. BARBER:

I think that's true.

It's an excellent point.

I should have alluded

to it, and I think a classic example of how that can be done, and ..this is a stroke
for you Dr. Ruben, is the four cases that you cited this morning.

A lot of

psychiatrists in all four of those cases would have gone for civil commitment and
to your credit you were able to work it out in the first three without having to
resort to that.
QUESTION:

I think the issue of separating hospitalization and treatment as two

separate categories is absolute nonsense.
too.

Hospitals and physicians have rights,

One of their rights is not to have to act as a detention

much less expensive places where this can be done.

center~

There are

In my opinion any judge whom

I would respect would not be willing to take a list of proposed psychiatric treatments which are recommended and say" "All right give that one."

A sensible judge

would realize that this is not his area of expertise.
QUESTION:

In the new laws did they make a provision to pay the attorneys for

representing these people in court?

In other words, the court appoints a lawyer

to represent the person charged with incompetency.

Did they make provisions in

the new law to pay the attorneys for their time and effort.
MR. BARBER:

When I wrote the law I wrote it so that a public defender could be

appointed to do that.

I've been told in conversations that I've had with the public

defender that no funds were provided to accomplish that objective.

I don't know

whether that's true or not because I have faithfully requested from the legislative
research commission copies of the bill, and they have so far not seen fit to send
it to me.
MR. BRUTON:

Mr. Bruton has had exactly the same problem.
I have a copy of the bill.

I've read it, and I haven't seen anything

about monies for it.
MR. BARBER:

I thtnk that might be included in another bill that I requested which

would be the new bill that was passed concerning just public
DR. RUBEN:

defender~.

I wanted to make one comment in relation to this gentleman's comment

about separating treatment and hospitalization.

I'm not sure if I understood your

comment totally, and I'm not sure who you were addressing your comment to either,
but I had some feelings about it.

I know that Mr. Barber said something about

having various treatments that could be recommended.
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I think in terms of a major

revamping of the commitment system and the question of monies, if the law stipulated
that the attorneys for the defense and the plaintiff's attorney, whatever, depending on the matter, would be paid a certain fee and if the experts were to be paid

,

a certain fee and if the expert testimony would come in to help the judge understand rather than trying to discredit/the experts perhaps might agree on different
types of treatment that might be appropriate.

Rather than the judge sentencing

or remanding for treatment, a specific treatment at least could be decided upon.
If there were a certain range of treatment that might be appropriate, the judge
would be in a better position to decide that treatment was appropriate and, given
the least restrictive alternative doctrine, whether

th~t

treatment needed to be

offered in a hospital or on some sort of out-patient basis.
MR. PROSSER:

There is a provision in the statute and in the civil rules for an

expert to be appointed in the defense of a person whether it's in a criminal
case or a commitment case.

I had occasion in a criminal case recently to seek

a forensic pathologist in a case for which I was not receiving a fee although it
was not a legal aid case.

The judge said "Mr. Prosser, I'll be more than happy

to appoint a forensic pathologist for you if you can find one and if you can
find the money, because the rule specifically says the court may appoint someone
and pay them out of available funds.

But the funds aren't available."

is the money isn't there, and we in this room are not the people
get the money.

who~re

The point
going to

Unfortunately it's going to have to be courts that are going to

have to order us to sell public lands or raise taxes or do something else to do
what the legislators should be doing in the first place.
QUESTION:

I have one brief comment perhaps on the money situation.

There was a

case from the District of Columbia which relied on an earlier Supreme Court case,
Goldburg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) to hold that in a case of mentally retarded
children, the money had to be divided equitably between retarded children and those
who were not handicapped.

Although the state had a legitimate right to preserve

its funds, it had to do so in an equitable manner so that all people in society
would benefit equally from it.

Of course, saying that in a decision and implement-

ing it are two different things.
I want to direct a question first to Ollie Barber.

You mentioned that under

the new law if there's going to be a commitmen-t for greater than 72 hours, there
has to be a full court hearing, and the court must find those four separate elements
that you menbioned.

I want to know what standard of proof

is required?

Does

the court have to decide by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable
doubt?
MR. BARBER:

I wrote it to put beyond a reasonable doubt, but that was taken out.

I don't remember that there is any standard of evidence specifically delineated
in this statute.
QUESTION:

Secondly, Mr. Bruton mentioned, by way of opinion I think rather than

by reference to any particular legal precedent, that it would be impossible to
have a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a commitment hearing.
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I'd sort of

like to throw this up to the panel both through a legal and a medical side to
discuss what kind of standards, practically speaking, you can expect in order to
preserve the rights of the patient and still not totally foul 'up the system
where people do need help.

iffi. BRUTON:

You're perfectly correct.

pragmatism.

How can you have something that is so sUbjective.

That was my opinion, but it's based on

something that is beyond a reasonable doubt?
You're going to get all kinds of opinions.

How can you prove

It's just an unworkable criterion.
It's a matter of

prove opinion evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
--'

opin~on.

You cannot

I submit to you that it's an

-

unrealistic criterion to impose on an area where there aren't any standards anyway.
QUESTION:

However, there is precedent for it.

MR. BURTON:

That's right, there is a precedent for it, and I don't have to accept

all precedents either.
QUESTION:
Barber.

I'd like to address this comment or question either to Dr. Ruben or Mr.
Yesterday we went into some depth on arbitration and malpractice which

is a pet project of mine even from years ago when it was unpopular.

Is there

some place for this in the commitment proceedings or in the rights of patients
in the absence of judges who understand or is there legislation that would be
appropriate?
~

MR. BARBER:

As far as I know, and Mr. Bruton just read for us my feeling on it,

there's no particular statutory language that would lead to that arbitration
proceeding.

I'll tell you that I have a particular case now where a young lady

claims that she was improperly kept in a private hospital in one of the major
cities in Kentucky.

What we're interested in is not a lawsuit.

We just want to

find a vehicle to sit down and discuss the procedures of the hospital with the
physicians so that this type of thing doesn't happen again.

I think even though

the statute doesn't provide for it, arbitration and mutual discussion is very,
very important.
DR. RUBEN:

I'd go a step further to say that I think you're making an excellent

suggestion and perhaps that's really what's needed rather than adversary proceedings of some sort, arbitration proceedings that would allow the parties to sit
down and try and make a determination.
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Honorable L. T. Grant
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Lexington, Kentucky
William G. Winter, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Surgery, Orthopedics
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Robert J. Turley, J.D.
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Lexington, Kentucky
William D. Grubbs, J.D.
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Charles Landrum, Jr., J.D.
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As part of the seminar on Law and Medicine the simulated examination and
cross-examination of an expert medical witness was conducted.

Because the most

valuable aspect of this part of the seminar was its actual performance, it has
not been reproduced. Participants in the examination were Judge L.T. Grant, of
the Fayette Circuit Court; Dr. William G. Winter, Assistant Professor of Orthopedic
Surgery of the College of Medicine, Robert J. Turley, of Turley, Savage and
Moore of Lexington for the Plaintiff, William D. Grubbs of Woodward, Hobson and
Fulton of Louisville for the Defense;

and Charles Landrum, Jr. Landrum, Patterson

and Dickey of Lexington, for the Defense.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE
MR. SAVAGE:
If you'll look in the seminar outline, you'll see a synopsis of facts of
this hypothetical trial. We have styled the case Mickey Green, an infant suing
by and through his father and next friend Ed Green, against the defendants Torn
Dunn and Acme Motor Express, Inc.
This is a suit for personal injuries by this young boy against the driver
of

a

truck and the company that owns the truck.

The boy received the injuries

when, as he alleges, he was walking along a narrow strip of grass next to the
street.

The truck carne to an intersection on that street and made a turn.

Its

trailer wheels tracked inside, carne across onto the grass, struck the child, and
knocked him into a culvert.

The defendant's allegation is that the young boy ran

out to the street to chase the rear wheels of the truck and became entangled in
them.
The part of the trial that we want to stage this afternoon includes the
medical testimony of the treating doctor, Dr. Spring.
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Dr. Spring treated this

young boy from the first and helped him through his initial injuries.

He has

opinions, and will express these opinions to you, as to what the future holds
for this young boy, Mickey Green.
I

It's important before we start to explain to you how the case has reached
the point where the treating physician is ready to take the stand.

Of course,

the young boy and his father went to see counsel and the attorney agreed to
represent them in the case.

The Acme Motor Express, Inc. and its driver, Tom

Dunn, retained counsel and that defense firm is present.
through the usual filing of the complaint

and~he

The case has proceeded

answer, and the pleadings were

then completed.
Next, discovery proceedings have taken place so that each side knows what
the other has in the way of facts.

In the process of that discovery, for example,

counsel for the defense has taken the deposition of Dr. Spring and basically knows
what the doctor is going to say at the trial.
In the course of preparing for trial, the defendant's counsel also had
the opportunity to have this child examined by a physician of his own choosing.
That examination was performed by a hypothetical orthopedic surgeon by the name
of Dr. Daniel.

The plaintiff's counsel then had an opportunity to take the

deposition of Dr. Daniel, which was done in this instance.
That brings us to the trial.
this morning.

In reality, we would have st'arted this trial

The plaintiff's counsel would have made an opening statement

lining the theory of the case and what the plaintiff expected to prove.
would have been followed by the defense counsel's opening remarks.
plaintiff would present evidence to try to prove the case.

out-

That

Then the

The first witness

would have probably been either the little boy or his mother or father.

That

would be followed by an eyewitness to the accident, or other liability-oriented
witnesses.

Now we've had our recess for lunch and we're ready to continue the

trial and the next witness will be Dr. Spring.
PANEL DISCUSSION
MR. SAVAGE:

In this discussion I'll call upon each of the participants in the

trial, beginning with the judge and then the witness and then the attorneys, to
ask for their comments.

Then let I s throw it open to questions and see what's on

your mind.
I think in this trial we see one of the problems of the law of evidence in
Kentucky.

That problem concerns how certain a physician must be of his opinion

before he is allowed to give it, on a question about the future course of a
particular patient.

That leads us into a discussion of "reasonable medical cer-

tainty," as it was phrased.
The key on this is Rogers v. Sullivan, 410 S.W.2d 624 (1966).

The real

issue arises after you've established that there's negligence, causation, and an
injury.

You then begin asking the doctor what's going to happen in the future to

this boy, because after all this is his only day in court.
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The jury has to give

him an award that will be fair for the rest of his life.

Must the doctor talk

in terms of certainty?

May the doctor talk in terms of probabilities?

probabilities defined?

Mr. Turley says it means more likely than not.

How are
I've heard

some lawyers say 51 percent.
The Rogers case brought all this up.

It was a shoulder case.

asked the question this way. "Based on the fact

The lawyer

that it has now been some 16 months

subsequent to the time he sustained his injury, and that there is presence of
atrophy, what would you say his possibilities are for complete recovery?"
Judge Palmore overruled existing case
answered in terms of medical certainty.

l~w

that said the question has to be

He said that the phrase "reasonable

probability" is the preferred expression.

But in the, opinion he never: really

defined what probability meant.

The clue is that he said that in any case where

you're trying to prove damages,

the plaintiff has to take the issue out of the

area of speculation.

An analysis of the facts and holdings of the cases supports

the conclusion that courts have used the term "certainty" to mean only that the
fact of damages must be taken out of the area of speculation.

So I think that

test is really whether the doctor is speculating or not.
Let me now ask Judge Grant for his opinion

with respect to the trial as

observed it.
JUDGE GRANT:

When you get into the area of probability versus certainty, I think

have to consider what we're dealing with.
the medical field.

We're dealing with an expert witness

Some standard, I suppose, would have to be set in order

him not to testify on matters of speculation.

Our Supreme Court has defined

standard to be probability, but the definition of probability is a very
Mr. Turley during the trial attempted to get into some speculaon how this injury would affect other people, not from a probability standbut from a possibility standpoint.

But we need some standard, I think in

for the medical expert to testify.
One of the doctors posited, for instance, that if you deal in percentages,
51 percent.
chance of dying?

What about a man whose doctor says he has a 40

Is that probability?

I feel that if a case gets to the

Court with a set of extreme facts like that, perhaps they might define
as such.
For the physicians in the audience, I'll comment that I share a
concern about what the whole

area

of litigation--not just malpractice--

doing to our society for a host of reasons.

One is that I seem to see some of

physician friends spending more and more time concerned with litigation.

It

to me we'd all be better off if somehow we were again able to focus on
vity more progressively.
As far as today's mock trial goes, I'll just add one further question.

If

someone with eight or nine injuries--and that is a regular part of my
tice--and there is a 20 percent chance of residual injury here and a 30 pert chance there, then we're really playing the numbers game.
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We could add

,..
~\

~;

~~:

~
~

them all up and come out with a total possibility of just one of those things
going wrong for the patient.

That happens, too.

distort reality for whatever necessary purpose.

~~

,~,

It's obvious that the law can
As far as

I~m

concerned, all I

I;

~i\

can do is do my damndest not to distort reality.

~i
@~

The two areas that cause the most problems here are when I'm in the embarras-

~:
~.

ing situation of having to admit holes in my knowledge and when there are limitations to medical knowledge.

f

All you can do is come up with the best opinion you

.~

'"
!£'

can and then document it by the best facts that you have.
MR. SAVAGE:

i::~

~i

f:

~;

We'll now let Mr. Landrum give us his comments.

MR. LANDRUM: I want to say two things.

f

First, in a ca'se like this where a child

is hurt as badly as this child was, when you are a defendant's lawyer, you want

~

to minimize the injury as much as possible.

~

A defendant's lawyer should never

~

ask a question unless he knows what the answer is going to be. I asked one question on

'I'

which we got a speech from the good doctor.
anyhow.

~

I should not have asked it,but I did

0'

~J

I did that to demonstrate how a lawyer can literally be gutted by a doctor

f~

by opening the door, giving him the opportunity to make a speach.
I w1.sh to make another comment in response to Judge Grant.
we are dealing with expert witnesses.

I differ with Judge

Gr~nt.

He stated that

~

I do not

1X:

~

believe that a doctor who is an attending physician is an expert witness any more
than an eyewitness to an accident is an expert witness.

f~
~~'

The doctor who attends

I~
~'

that patient owes an obligation to testify as to what facts he found as attending

,;

physician the same as the eyewitness to an accident is required to testify as to
what facts he saw.

~

~

That's a realm that doctors and lawyers have been differing

about for a long time, but that's my opinion.
not an expert witness.

I think he's a factual witness,

~t,

J
~i

Until he is asked what his opinion is as to the future

of that patient, he is not an expert witness.

I believe that is the point where

a defendant's lawyer may, if he can, properly attack the doctor's judgment by
showing that it is a matter of expert opinion upon which learned men disagree.
MR. SAVAGE:

I'll now call on Mr. Grubbs for some comments.

MR. GRUBBS:

When defense is cross-examining a physician who is as knowledgeable

~)t

~:

f

I"

~
~:

~j

and as capable as Dr. Winter is, he should get on and off as quickly as he can.

;

I prefer, where there is a real difference of opinion, to present it through my

it'

own medical witness.
my own approach.

I prefer a low-key cross-examination.

That's just

In the cross-examination

of the fourth metatarsal, because I wanted to bury it in the middle of his testiI wanted to end with some points where the doctor was agreeing with me.

I also took the plaintiff's exhibit, and where it had been marked in red to show
a fracture, I took a blue marking pen to show that those areas had healed.

Again,

that's just a little thing that will sometimes make an impression on the jury.
MR. SAVAGE:

I::

~j

today, I tried to take what I thought was our weakest area, namely the nonunion
mony.

~,'

~'

Unless I feel that he has taken a position that I can

clearly dispute with many case studies, I won't go after the witness.

~j

I might add that one of the things the audience mayor may not have

observed is that the key to any successful practicing of a case is through pre-

~;

Is
~,

~.Il'

!
~::

~;

If

#.
i

I

It

t
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paration.

This keeps the doctor, in a sense, consistent with his colleagues in

any particular area.

If a doctor departs from the standards of the profession,

a well-prepared lawyer can bring him up short and make him explain
why he holds
,
a different view than most of his colleagues.

Mr. Turley, give me the closing

remarks from the plaintiff's counsel.
MR. TURLEY:
ness is a

First, I think the key to the direct examination of any expert witpretrial conference with that witness in which the lawyer sits down

with the doctor and explains to him just exactly what is expected, of a physician
when he's called to testify--what parameters

~De

expert testimony beyond the scope of which the

law provides with respect to

physici~n

is not permitted to go.

The lawyer should also tell him what he proposes to ask on direct examination.
Obviously, the pretrial conference is used for other purposes as well.
The second point I would like to make arises from what Dr. Winter said.
He said that physicians have become more and more concerned with litigation.
That, of course, is true.

For the benefit of the physicians, let me say this in

defense of my profession.

Law simply means an authoritative verbalization of

society's minimal values.

It's no more than that.

The purpose of jurisprudence

is to adjust, in as satisfactory a manner as can be done,

the differences that

develop between people in any sort of a society or a community:

So the law and

the lawyer have as their purposes in society to serve as the lubrican~by which
people can live together and at the same time as the cement by which the society
can be held together.
Most often the choices are not between what's right and what's wrong; the
choices are between the rights of one citizen and the rights of another.

The

choices become even more difficult when they involve some forecast of the future.
This is the reason we get into opinions.

At one time the old Court of Appeals

talked about the requirement of proving future damages with reasonable certainty.
This led to the use of the phrase "reasonable certainty" in interrogating doctors.
And doctors, as explained by Dr. -Winter on the stand, have a different notion of
certainty than lawyers.
Lawyers are more pragmatic in that they know we can't solve disputes unless
we can talk in terms of something less than certainty.

So the law has come to the

point where we talk in terms of reasonable probabilities.

That has become the

code phrase in interrogating an expert as to his opinions about the future.
We tried to point up today the next choice that we think the courts will
have to make.

I join Judge Grant in believing that if the right case is taken

to the Supreme Court, we'll have a decision which will deal with this problem:
that is, how one can show a jury, assuming evidence of a permanent condition
resulting from an accident or an injury exists, that no one knows what will happen, but that there are many complications, none of which occur more than 50 percent of the time so that the doctor can't predict anything definite.

There may

be six different complications, the incidence of which may run from 5 percent to
30 percent.

Bearing in mind that the plaintiff is in court only this one day,
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isn't it fair that the jury be able to consider in some fashion the incidence
of possible complications of his condition?
by

We're casting about for a method

which that can be shown.

MR. SAVAGE:

,

We'd like to entertain questions from the audience if we could do

so now.
QUESTION:

Mr. Landrum, is it not possible to call a doctor as an expert or as an

ordinary witness, and
MR. LANDRUM:

can you examine him under the rules of both?

A doctor is subject to subpoena the same as any other person.

There

is a misconception in Kentucky that a doctor; doesn I t have .to go to court if he
doesn't want to.
QUESTION:

That's not so.

Do you subpoena him as an expert?

MR. LANDRUM:

Either as an expert or as a factual witness.

It depends on whether

he's a factual witness--if he's an attending physician to testify to the facts
that he found when he examined and treated the patient.

Where he leaves the realm

of a factual witness and becomes an expert and you ask him what the extent of
residual injuries are, then he becomes an expert because he's expressing an
opinion.

I~t

QUESTION:

might be a very expensive one, depending on where he's from.

Could you ask him to give an expert opinion if he were called as an

eyewitness?
MR. LANDRUM:

No. Whether he's an expert or not depends upon hisq1:lalifications.

If he's a gynecologist and comes upon the scene of an accident and attends a broken
leg, he would not be an expert orthopedic surgeon; he was a factual witness in
that he found a man with a broken leg lying on the side of the road.
DR. WINTER:

Does a physician in a situation like that have the right to decline

the mantle of expertise if it's offered to him by an attorney?
MR. LANDRUM:
QUESTION:

Yes.

Mr. Grubbs, you had a book ready to bring out against the so-called

Dr. Spring if he didn't agree with what you could find in the literature.
this fair?
MR. GRUBBS:

Is

I presume it's legal.
The distinction has always been that an accepted treatise can be

used for purposes of cross-examination if the witness accepts it as a generally
recognized treatise.

Even though it's a generally recognized treatise, the wit-

ness still may say that he disagrees with a certain portion of it.

By saying

it's generally recognized, he's not undertaking to vouch for the accuracy of
every page.

The law is in flux right now on that.

Our state Supreme Court

recently handed down an opinion which indicates that an accepted text can be used
as substantive evidence and not just for impeachment.

The interesting thing is

that the book that I had didn't have anything to do with the proper way of
measuring

leg shortening under 1/2 inch.

in another case recently.
evaluating disability.

That was just something I'd run into

The book that I had dealt with standard criteria for

What I did have but didn't get a chance to use, simply

because the doctor was very candid and stuck to the script, was the deposition.
That's where the physician must often becomes tripped up.
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He expresses an opinion

in his deposition that is slightly different from what he expresses at the trial.
Then the deposition is used for purposes of impeachment.
QUESTION:

Judge Grant, I'm speaking about the plaintiff's schematic exhibit.

Were the predesignations which located areas of alleged injuries on plaintiff's
exhibit drawn prior to its introduction.
JUDGE GRANT:

This particular diagram was used in an actual trial and that's the

reason the red marks were on there when it was introduced.

Ordinarily, my

opinion would be that the diagram ought to be introduced with notbing on it.
QUESTION:

Thank you, Judge.

Bob Turley,

cou~g

you have prevented defense counsel

from drawing on your exhibit his self-serving comments?I

That exhibit might ac-

company members of the jury to the jury room.
MR. TURLEY:

In a trial, had I objected to his having marked "healed" on my

exhibit, I might have been sustained, but that would simply have .attracted more
attention to his having done so.
QUESTION:

Could you not have gone to the judge and asked him out of the jury's

audience to direct defense counsel not to do that?

The jury might possibly feel

he would have no right to mark up the exhibit anyhow.
MR. LANDRUM:

Well, it's matter of judgment in a particular instance.

If he tried

to stop me from writing on it, I'd say, "Well, he has healed hasn't he?"
JUDGE GRANT:

One way to get around the obj ection would be to have· th.e doctor

himself come down and mark the areas that have been healed.
MR. SAVAGE:
QUESTION:

Do we have any other questions?
I've been in Dr. Winter's situation where plaintiff's attorney did not

tell the doctor in the pretrial conference about the second expert's opinion.

I

think the expert witness used by the plaintiff's attorney should always know what
the defense medical witness is going to say.

In this trial, Dr. Winter's position

was weakened when the defense attorney read Dr. Daniel's statement which did, of
course, contradict Dr. Winter's opinion.
suit, right?
MR. SAVAGE:

The second question is, this was a damage

How long are you allowed to bring a damage suit for a minor?
Until the 19th birthday.

We have a one year statute of limitations

in personal injury actions, and it does not run out on a minor until he reaches 18.
QUESTION:

I ask the plaintiff's attorney, since the probability of future damage

to this child is somewhat in doubt as demonstrated by this trial, would it have
been better to advise the plaintiff not to bring this case until the child became
of age?

Maybe this child would have had symptoms of arthritis by the time he was

18 or 19,

in his hip and almost certainly in his foot.

Then plaintiff would have

solid grounds for a higher settlement.
MR. TURLEY:

A agcee.

Bear in mind that in a case like this, one must prove

liability as well as damages.

Witnesses move away.

They die, they forget.

There

is a risk that you'd lose on the liability even if you did have better evidence
as to the residual injuries.
QUESTION:

I'm afraid this may be a trivial question, but since the facts of the

case initially revolved around whether the little boy was on the grass or on the
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street, why didn't anyone ask the expert witness if grass was found in the wound?
That might have solved the whole thing right there.
MR. LANDRUM: Dr. Winter said he found grass, rocks, mud, and pirt in the wound.
QUESTION: Aha! Grass was there. Doesn't that prove something?
MR. LANDRUM: No. Because he was thrown from the wheel into the grass.
where they found him.
MR. SAVAGE: We lost that case once.

That's

It's very painful to bring that up again!
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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS & ADVERTISING
Leslie G. Whitmer, J.D.
Director, Kentucky Bar Association
I.

The history of the ethic prohibiting advertising by the legal and medical
professions.
The word "professionar is hard to define, but it has, as a vital element,

the interest of the public above personal gain.

Robert N. Wilkins, in his 1938

book entitled, The Spirit of the Legal Profession, made a statement about professions that is particularly significant today iri relation to members of the legal
medical professions advertising their services.

Mr~

Wilkins stated:

The professional spirit sets its seal against self-seeking and
self-aggrandizement. It awakens a social consciousness and
conscience.
It tends to inspire men with the zeal of the
scientist, the devotion of the saint.
It teaches that by the
advancement of men wise and good all men prosper.
"Advertising" has always been a bad word among lawyers and physicians.
of ethics for the medical and legal professions have always contained strict
against advertising, as we commonly think of that term.

The rules have

In that they have spared both from the excesses often
tted in the name of advertising.

The negative connotations to the word

vertising," however, should not overshadow the duty of the professional to
t informative communications about his services with the public he serves.
to the public's advantage to receive information from the professions in
person can make an intelligent selection of a physician or lawyer.
While both physicians and lawyers are professionals and have a common
rest in ethical prohibitions against advertising, it must be realized that the
professions have one great dissimilarity--Iawyers are officers of the court.
are officers charged with the administration of justice within the third
of a free, independent democracy. This distinction may, in future litigain the area of advertising restrictions.
Professional codes of ethics are receiving intense review in the field of
sing prohibitions.

The pressures for change are mounting at an alarming

If the customs of the past are healthy, they will survive.

If they are

they will fall.
rohibition

inst advertis

wave of consumerism is challenging prohibitions against advertising on
as evidenced by federal court suits in some five states against bar
The first ground for litigation in both the
nd medical professions is that the prohibitions serve as a restraint on
the provisions of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
ground for litigation is that the prohibition inhibits first amendment
the u.S. Constitution, as applied to the states through the fourteenth
t, concerning the right of free speech, press and assembly.
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It is even

being argued in the legal clinic of Jacoby and :Heyers in California that the
prohibition cuts the consumer from receiving information through the news media
from a lawyer--one of the most fundamental. guarantees in the' constitution, it is
alleged.

The suits challenge the validity of Canon 2 and DR 2-101, 102 and 103

of the code ofProfesional Responsibility.
Canon 2 imposes a duty on lawyers to assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available.

The duty includes facilitating

the process of intelligent selection of lawyess.
The American Bar Foundation and the American Bar Association special comI

mitteeto survey legal needs will soon publish a final report showing what the
committee's chairman, Randolph Thrower, stated is the long-suspected fact that
tens of millions of Americans of moderate means, who have legal problems and
know it, do not seek legal counsel because they do not know how to find a lawyer
and they are afraid that they cannot afford one.

As far as the legal profession

goes, an argument can be made that consumers must have more information about
lawyers.
What then are the legal implications of prohibitions against the market
place type of advertising by physicians and lawyers?
III.

Advertising prohibitions may violated Sherman Act.
Consumer groups consider the Goldfarb case the first opening of the door

to expose the professions to all customs of the open mark,et place, including unlimited right of the "professional" to advertise his services.
Before we talk about Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. CEo 2004 (1975),
however, we should refer to Northern Pacific Railroad V. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958).

In that opinion, Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the court, stated:

" [T]he unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions."
With that general philosophy in mind, the Supreme Court considered the Goldfarb
fact situation.

It was a flagrant one.

Some 20 lawyers were contacted by the

Goldfarbs in an effort to obtain a fee quotation to do a title search.

The same

fee was quoted by all 20 lawyers and some stated that they clearly would not
charge less because of the minimum fee schedule of the Fairfax County Bar
Association.

The local fee schedule was not in any way adopted by the state bar,

which is an agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia just like ours in Kentucky.
Still the Virginia State Bar has issued ethics opinions, the same ones that we
issued, saying that if a lawyer habitually charged under the minimum he would be
subject to disciplinary action.

The Goldfarbs maintained in their lawsuit that

there had been a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; in other
words, price fixing.

They asked for an injunction against the use of the fee

schedule in joining both the state and local bars and also asking for damages.
The Federal District Court found for the Goldfarbs. In doing that they dismissed
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the state bar as a party on the state action theory; that is, where a governmental
agency restrains trade, it is exempt from the Act.

The court did hold the local

bar liable, however, the case went to the Court of Appeals and it reversed the
district court except as to the state bar portion of the opinion.

It agreed that

the state bar was covered by the state action exemption and said further that the
local bar was not engaged in interstate commerce because the practice of law did
not involve interstate commerce.

It also held that bar schedules had insufficient

effect on interstate commerce to come under the act.

The Supreme Court went along

with the district court and held the local bar liable and also held the state bar
I

liable.

It reversed on four grounds.

I think it is essential that we toOk at

each one of those grounds and analyze each of them because together they ilay the
foundation for federal court intervention into state regulation of all professions,
just the legal profession.
The first of the four

grounds was price fixing.

The Court said that

Goldfarb was a classic illustration of price fixing, that the fee schedule was
not advisory, and that it was not fee information on past standards, but was
rather a standard for the charging of fees in the future.
price floor was established.

It found that a rigid

The Court also found that local bar associations

and the state bar had enforced the fee schedule at least through
not through direct disciplinary action.

its

,et~ics

Second, the Court found that

fee schedule had an effect on interstate commerce.

It was found that

on most residential property, money came from outside of Virginia
interstate commerce was involved.

Third, the Court said that there is no

profession exemption" under the ,antitrust act.

The Court said that

gress did not intend a sweeping exclusion and in fact there was a presumption
ainst application of the exemption.

It was held that the nature of the

of practicing law and the public service involved, the lawyer being
of the court was immaterial.

The opinion said that there was, in fact,

commerical intercourse in any competitive activity that may exert a
on trade involved in the fact situation.
imum fee schedules are not state action.
no state action as such.

Finally, they said that

In the Goldfarb case there clearly

There was no statute, and there was not court

e approving a fee schedule.

The same

condi~ion

existed in Kentucky.

In fact,

Supreme Court of Virginia, like the Supreme Court of Kentucky, had adopted
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility that stated
the fee provision that the fee schedule was one of some eight items to be
determining a fee.

So that was probably the weakest defense that

had.
The decision went on to say, however, that it was very limited in its
in regard to professions.

The opinion said that the decision intended no

of the authority of the state to regulate its professions, to set
and to police itself.
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Again, consumer groups, and even the American Bar Association, are of the
firm belief that the Goldfarb case places the heretofore "untouchable professions"
in the commercial market place to the extent that present advertising
restrictions
,
serve as a restraint on trade.
On December 19, 1975, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against
the American Medical Association, the Connecticut State Medical Society, and the
New Haven County Medical Association.

The complaint alleged violations of section

5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and that the proceeding was in the public
interest, specifically, the commission charged. that the respondents were engaged
in business and through the publication and

enforceme~t

of the AMA Principles of

Medical Ethics, had entered into an agreement to prevent or hinder competition
among medical doctors in that it prevented members from:
1.
2.
3.

Soliciting business, by advertising or otherwise,
Engaging in price competition, and
Otherwise engaging in competitive practices.

It is further stated in the complaint that these acts and practices had
the following results:
1.
2.
3.

Prices of physician services were stablized, fixed, or otherwise
interfered with;
Competition between medical doctors in the provision of such
services was hindered, restrained, foreclosed and frusti~ted; and
Consumers were deprived of information pertinent to the selection
of a physician and of the benefits of competition.

The case is scheduled for an October 1976 hearing before an administrative
law judge.
The position of the Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice,
on advertising by lawyers is clear. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Wilson,
in an address before the Philadelphia Bar Association early this year, stated:
Advertising by the legal profession has "traditionally been limited
to law lists.
I suggested, last June, that perhaps this was unwise, and perhaps, if pursuant to an agreement, illegal.
I suggested that some forms of advertising might indeed be beneficial.
IV.

Advertising prohibitions may be unconstitutional.
It has been traditionally held that the constitutional protection of free

speech does not extend to delivery of legal, medical, or financial services by
persons not licensed to render those services.

It has always been held

that the

states, under their health, welfare and police powers, have the right to control
the practice of professions and place reasonable restrictions on their activities.
The prohibitions against advertising by a profession came to the United States
Supreme Court in 1934, in the leading case of Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608.

In this case, Oregon, in regulating the practice

of dentistry, enacted a statute banning the advertising of professional service,
the performance of professional service in a superior manner, advertising prices
or fees, employing or making use of advertising solicitors, the use of certain
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types of signs, etc.

Semler attacked the statute as overbroad,

and repugnant

to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment.

,He stated

in his complaint, that he had advertised his practice in newsp,apers and period...,.
icals, stating the prices he would charge and represented he had a high degree of
efficiency and was able to perform his services in a superior manner.

Of course,

he alleged that his advertisements were truthful and made in good faith.

Further,

he claimed that by these methods he had developed a large and lucrative practice,
and thereby he had been able to standardize his office practice, and so establish
a uniform scale of charges for the majority of lIis operations.,
is being advanced in courts today.

The latter argument

By advertising thein services and fees in

newspapers and the media, it is argued, practitioners ,will be able to feach the
poor and middle classes who are now disadvantaged, because they cannot afford
expensive legal costs and do not know how to reach competent lawyers.

Thus,

they will thereby increase their volume of business, so they can use more paraprofessional employees, thereby lowering the cost of legal services and serving
a great portion of the unrepresented public.

The Supreme Court answered this

argument by saying:
The legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities,
different standards of conduct from those which are traditional
in the competition of the market place. The community is con -"
cerned with the maintenance of professional standards which
will insure not only competency in individual practitioners, but
protection against those who would prey upon a public peculiarly
susceptible to imposition through alluring promises of physical
relief. And the community is concerned in providing safeguards
not only against deception, but against practices which would
tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members into an
unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the
least scrupulous. What is generally called the "ethics" of the
profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the
necessity of such standards.
It is no answer to say, as regards
appellant's claim of right to advertise his "professional superiority" or his "performance of professional services in a superior manner", that he is telling the truth.
Lawyers, physicians, and dentists are subject to control and regulation by
legislature and the courts.

The courts have uniformly held lawyers subject

their control, in their admission to the Bar, in discipline and the standards
conduct by which they must abide.

With the formulation by the American Bar

the Code of Professional Responsibility and its adoption by the courts,
except as narrowly permitted by the code, has been proscribed.
In determining the effect of the 1st amendment on advertising, the Supreme
carefully distinguished between commercial
lentine v. Chrestensen
ted by the free speech

and noncommercial

advertising.

316 U.S. 53, it held commercial advertising is not
and press clauses, and noncommercial advertising

tected.
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
the Pittsburgh Press used an advertising system in its daily newspaper
by job opportunities were published under headings designating job performances
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by sex.

Upon an appeal from a cease and desist order of the Pittsburgh Human

Relations Commission that such classification of ads was violative of the city
ordinance against sex discrimination, the Court in a 5 t04 decision, held the

,

ordinance valid and not a violation of the freedom of the press, because the
advertising was commercial.
It is plain

that the advertising proposed by the plaintiffs in the various

cases pending in the courts is one way of soliciting business.

prot~cted

whether such advertising is commerical and therefore not
under the 14th amendment.

The question is
as free speech

In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, the court had before

it for consideration the validity of a Virginia

st~tute

forbidding soliciting of

litigation.
The NAACP engaged in a program of sOliciting for persons to become plaintiffs in school desegregation cases.
purpose.

The NAACP maintains a legal staff for this

Typically, in school desegregation cases, a staff lawyer will address

a meeting of parents and children to explain the legal steps necessary to achieve
desegregation.

He will bring to the meeting printed forms authorizing him

and

other NAACP or defense fund attorneys to represent the signers in legal proceedings to achieve desegregation.
Virginia has had statutory regulation of unethical and non-professional
conduct by attorneys since 1849.

These provisions outlaw, among other things,

solicitation of legal business in the form of "running" or "capping."
statute was amended to include as "capper" or "runner""

The

an agent of an individual

or organization which retains a lawyer in connection with an action to which it
is not a party or has no pecuniary right or liability.
The Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the statute as a reasonable regulation
of the legal profession and was located to strengthen the existing statute to
control the evils of soliciting legal business.

Upon writ of certiorari, the

Supreme Court, by a 5 to 4 decision, reversed, holding the statute violated the
1st and 14th amendments, of free speech and assemby.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated:
We meet at the outset the contention that "solicitation" is wholly
outside the area of freedoms protected by the first amendment.
To this contention there are two answers. The first is that a
state cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by
mere labels. The second is that abstract discussion is not the
only species of communication which the cons·ti tution protects;
the first amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly
of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion.
The decisions
of this court have consistently held that only a compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's
constitutional power of regulation can justify limiting first
amendment freedoms.
Thus it is no answer to the constitutional
claims asserted by petitioner to say, as the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has said, that the purpose of these regulations
were merely to insure high professional standards and not to
curtail free expression. For a state may not, under the guise
of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional
rights.
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The rationale of the opinion is that NAACP and the defense fund, in soliciting for people to start suits in desegregation cases, engaged in a political
activity protected by the 1st and 14th amendments.
The court concluded:
Although the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall
within the first amendment's protections, the state has failed to
advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of
substantive evils flowing from petitioners'activities, which can
justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed.
Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart

diss~nted,

holding.the statute was a

permissible regulation having its origins in the long standing common law prohibitions of champerty, maintenance, and barratry and the canons of ethics against
soliciting, stating that the state's felt need for regulation of professional
conduct may reasonablly extend beyond mere "ambulance chasing."
Three cases followed NAACP which are important in two respects.

They further

chipped away at the canons of ethics and showed the concern of the Court toward
attorney's fees.

In these cases the majority opinions relied on Button's appli-

cation of the 1st and 14th amendments.

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen

v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, and United Transportation union v. State Bar of Michigan,
401 U.S. 576, involved the same union under different names.

In order to assist

the prosecution of claims by railroad workers injured or killed on'th~ job, the
union maintained a department of legal aid counsel.

Under its operation the union

selected lawyers to represent claimants in railroad personal injury cases.

When

a worker was injured or killed, the secretary of the local contacted him or his
widow, recommended against the claim being settled without first seeing a lawyer,
and advised consulting the lawyer selected by the union.

The State Bar of

Virginia sought an injunction restraining the union activity as a violation of the
solicitor rule.

In a 6 to 2 opinion by Justice Black, the Supreme Court reversed

a decree of the Virginia Supreme Court barring the union's practices.

In his

opinion, Justice Black relying on Button, reiterated that a state cannot foreclose
exercise of constitutional rights by labels, and then stated, what "Virginia
sought to halt is not commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten
the moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice."
In dissenting opinions, two justices stated that the court by this opinion
overthrows state regulation of the legal profession and relegates the practice of
law to the level of a commercial enterprise.
In the Michigan transportation case, after the Virginia court amended its
decree in accordance with the court's decision, the Michigan Supreme Court entered
a decree similar to that of Virginia.

This decree was also reversed in a 5 to 4

decision by Justice Black, with the observation, "The state bar's complaint
appears to be a plea for court protection of unlimited legal fees."
The third of this trio of cases is united Mine Workers v. Illinois State
Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217.

This case involved the right of the union to hire
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a lawyer on a salary basis to handle workmen's compensation cases for its
members.

The Illinois court enjoined the union's activity as constituting the

unauthorized practice of law.

The Illinois Supreme Court af,firmed, overriding the

contention that the union's activity was protected under the free speech and
assembly rights of the 1st amendment.

Consistently, Justice Harlan wrote a strong

dissent against the erosion of the state's power to regulate in the maintenance
of the high standards within the legal profession.
In summary, the court's earlier holdings that commerc~al'advertising is
not protected by the 1st and 14th amendments~has been modified, so that some
commercial advertising is protected depending on the 'nature and purpose of the
advertisement.

Whether a statute or ethical canon proscribing certain conduct

and activities, including members of the bar, will be violative of the 1st and
14th amendments will be subject to the balancing principle expressed in Button
and the subsequent cases.
In Cohen v. Harley, 366 u.S. 117, a disciplinary action for soliciting,
Justice Harlan said:
It is no less true than trite that lawyers j\1st operate in a three-fold
capacity, as self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted agents
of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just
solution to disputes.
It is certainly not beyond the re~lm of permissible state concerns to conclude that too much attention to-~he business
of getting clients may be incompatible with a sufficient devotion to
duties which a lawyer owes to the court, or that the "payment of awards
to persons bringing in legal business" is inconsistent with the personally disinterested position a lawyer should maintain.
In Goldfarb, Chief Justice Burger stated that it is relevent in determining
if a particular restraint violates the Sherman Act, whether the restraint operates
upon a professional as distinguished from a business.

In the concluding para-

graph, the court stated:
We recognize that the states have a compelling interest in the
practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as a
part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and
other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards
for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. We also recognize that in some instances the state may
decide that "forms of competition usual in the business world
may be demoralizing tb the ethical standards of a profession."
[Citing Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners] * * *
T.he interest of the state in regulating lawyers is especially
great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental
function of administering justice, and have historically been
"officers of the courts." * * * In holding that certain anticompetitive conduct by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman
Act we intend no diminution of the authority of the state to
regulate its professions.
In Bigelow v. Virginia, 44 L. Ed.2d 600, a case in which Bigelow published
an ad for abortions in New York, he was convicted of violation of a Virginia
statute making it amisdemeanor by the sale or circulation of any publications
encouraging or prompting the procurring of an abortion.
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Justice Blackmun in a

7 to 2 opinion said:
We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their
assumption that advertising as such was entitled to no' first
amendment protection and that appellant Bigelow had no legitimate
first amendment interest * * *
'
To the extend that cbmmercial activity is subject to regulation,
the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor,
among others, to be considered in weighing the first amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of all first amendment pro~ection.
The relationship of speech to the market place of products or of
services does not make it valueless in~he market place of ideas.
The U.S. Supreme Court just decided the case of'Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council v. State Board of Pharmacy involving a state statute prohibiting
prescription drug prices.

It stated that advertising is protected under the first

amendment although it may be regulated under different standards than noncommercial activities.

The Court specifically stated its decision did not limit the

rights of the states to license and regulate to ensure professional conduct.

The

court specifically stated the decision did not apply to the medical and legal
professions,which may require consideration of different standards.
V.

The position of the American Bar Association on

Advertisiq~.

Under the 1969 ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, still effective in
Kentucky under the provisions of RAP 3.130, lawyers can only place their names,
the fact that they are a lawyer, addresses,and telephone numbers in telephone
directories and yellow pages in geographic areas where the lawyer resides and/or
practices.

A lawyer may place biographical data and areas of concentration or

limited practice in ABA approved law lists.

Of course, law lists are not readily

available to the public at large.
The ABA Ethics Committee, earlier this year, caused an uproar in the legal
profession by recommending to that Body's House of Delegates that lawyers be
permitted to engage in any type of advertising as long as it is not "false,
fraudulent, misleading or deceptive."

Enforcing such a provision with discipline

would be impossible because of its ambiguity.

Fortunately, the ABA Committee on

professional discipline skillfully amended the proposal only to permit lawyers to
put information into law lists, legal directories, directories published by bar
associations,and the yellow pages.

In addition to the essentially biographical

information now permitted under the 1969 code, an attorney may, under ABA guidelines, list:

1) a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation; 2) avail-

ability of a written schedule of fees or an estimate for a specific service; 3)
whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are permissible; and 4) office
and other hours of availability.
The form and language of any published information must be the same for
all lawyers in any given state.
Justin A. Stanley, ABA President-elect, has stated that he is "opposed to
commercial advertising by lawyers beyond that now permitted by our code (after
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the February amendments).If
Each state must adopt or reject the ABA amendments adopted at its February
1976 meeting.

The Virginia State Bar Association, an agency of the Supreme Court

of Virginia, in view of being sued by a consumer union unde'r the 1969 code, prohibits publication of lawyers' fees and specialties

in law lists, recommended to

its state's supreme court the adoption of the new ABA amendments.

The state

supreme court rejected the recommendation.
The Michigan State Bar Association is taking a middle grpund in its recommendations.

Its proposal will limit the numper of items permitted for publication

to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
VI.

Name, name of law firm, if any, and legally related public
office held, if any;
Business address and telephone number;
Whether or not available for private practice (if not, no
further information to be given);
Extraordinary office hours, if any;
Age and date of admission to practice in Michigan;
College degrees other than law degree and where earned;
Where law degree received;
Areas of concentration in practice of law if and when
certification or selection thereof is approved by state
bar assembly;
Whether or not each lawyer will consult for the initial
conference on any matter at the limited fee or not more
than $10 for the first half hour;
Fluency in any foreign language.

The position of the American Medical Association on Advertising.
A statement on advertising and solicitation by physicians, reaffirming

longstanding policy, was adopted by the AMA judicial council at its meeting in
San Francisco in April.

The council said the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics

"are intended to discourage abusive practices which exploit patients and the
public and interfere with freedom in making an informed choice of physicians and
free competition among physicians."
In its statement, the judicial council points out that "the principles do
not proscribe advertising; they proscribe the solicitation of patients."

Physicians

may furnish information to the public through "the accepted local media of advertising or communication which are open to all physicians on like conditions," the
council stated.

As examples it gave office signs, professional cards, dignified

announcements, telephone directory listings and reputable directories.

The council

said the information could include the physician's name, type of practice, office
location, office hours, and other information "that will enable people to make a
more informed choice of physician."

If the physician chooses to supply fee in-

formation to a reputable directory, the council stated, the "data may include his
charge for a standard office visit or his fee or range of fees for specific types
of services, provided disclosure is made of the variable and other pertinent factors
affecting the amount of the fee."
The council defines "solicitation" in the principles as "the attempt to
obtain patients by persuasion or influence using statements or claims which (1)
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contain testimonials;

-------·-----------------------------'~-~,..--T''''

(2) are intended or likely to create inflated or unjustified

expectations or favorable results;

(3) are self-laudatory and imply that the

physician has skills superior to other physicians; or (4) contain incorrect or
incomplete facts, or representations or implications

that are likely to cause

the average person to misunderstand or be deceived." The Kent'Ucky Hedical Association adopts the position of the Judicial Council of the National Association.
VII.

The position of the Kentucky Bar Association.
At its regular board meeting on January 16, 1976 the board of governors of

the association adopted a resolution in opposition to the proposed rules of the
ABA Ethics Committee and any other action by the ABA to commercialize the practice of law and inserting a commercial interest-' into the client-attorney relationship.

The resolution supports other possible means to 'provide useful information

to the public to assist the public in finding appropriate counsel including a
statewide lawyer referral service.

The KBA has a committee studying the ABA code

amendments relating to advertising.
Governors at its July meeting.

The committee should report to the Board of

The Board will make such recommendations to the

Supr,eme Court of Kentucky as it deems appropriate.
VIII.

Benefits of communication and evils of advertising.
The evils of professionals advertising are reflected in the humor of Art

Buchwald when he wrote an ad for

"Ivladman Dr. Kelly" announcing the greatest

surgery bargain in history to the first 100 people who showed up at his Wesley
),--

Heights clinic on George Washington's birthday.

The lucky patients were to be

given a complete operation, including anesthesia and post-operative care, for
only $2.

Other bicentennial bargains offered by Dr. Kelly included a brain

operation for $14.95, a kidney transplant for $29.50,and a complete blood transfusion for $3.95.
This was not an example of a communication to assist the public in
obtaining competent services, of course, it was an advertisement.
sional.

It was unprofes-

It clearly had a solicitation goal.
A communication designed to inform a member of the public of qualified

professionals to meet either their legal or medical needs is beneficial.

Perhaps

our respective professions should be more careful in their deliberations to use
the word "communication" rather than "advertising."
IX.

The future.
The advertising issue will be decided by the courts.

There may be a

distinction made between the right of a physician to advertise and the lawyer's
right.

Lawyers are government officials in that they are officers of the court

on which the administration of justice depends.

I believe that the KBA will be

slow to recommend changes in the Code of Brofessional Responsibility; however,
it may be more diligent in discovering methods to inform the public of the availability of competent counsel through a program of legal specialization and perhaps
a statewide lawyer referral service.

Ultimately, I believe the U.S. Supreme

Court will hold that the legal and medical professions are not businesses; therefore, advertising, as we know it in the business world, is not a right protected
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by the 1st and 14th amendments.

From the antitrust position I believe the Court

will not permit commercial advertising by lawyers or physicians.

Such findings

would seem to be in the best interest of the public we work to serve.
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION--PROS AND CONS

ngs

Robert E. Rich, J.D.
Taft, Stettinius and Hollister
Cincinnati, Ohio
The subject of professional corporations and whether

a practice should be

incorporated are subjects that are receiving a lot of attention these days.

The

basic choices involved in incorporation are the .same for lawyers and doctors.
eventually

It

boils down to the question of how the professional is going to manage

and invest the income from his practice.

I tliInk every professional in this day

and age will have to consider whether or not to incorpcirate his practice.

If he's

already incorporated, he must consider what to do with this monster that he may
have on his hands.
There are no automatic formulas for incorporation.
not all lawyers should be incorporated.

Not all physicians and

But there are many who should, depending

on the facts and circumstances that surround their practice, their lifestyle, and
their age. Age is a very important consideration.
I'll give you one word of warning at the beginning:
advisors

who

come to you with a set, established program.

you should beware of
Not all doctors should

be incorporated, but some doctors should not get by without incorpor~ting.
There are a number of problems that can be encountered in professional
incorporation.

The mere mention of the words "accumulated earnings problem" or

the "unreasonable compensation problem," sound horrible.
even for technicians and tax lawyers.
about those problems.

They can be pretty bad,

I could make your hair stand up with stories

But I don't think you should shy away from the subject just

because those technical problems are there.
be solved by proper planning.

Most, if not all, these problems can

There's a great deal of literature on the subject of professional incorporation.

Back in the middle 1960's the articles were all saying not to incorporate

because the Internal Revenue Service was against it and there were potential problemssuch as unreasonable compensation and personal holding company status.

In

about 1969, however, the IRS decided they weren't going to be against it because
they lost six or seven cases in a row.
incorporation was the thing to do.
incorporation.

Then the articles began to say that perhaps

There was a great rush then for professional

I think some people incorporated who should not have.

Now I'm seeing articles in publications such as Medical Economics and even
our professional law journals to the effect that as a result of the changes in the
Keogh Plan by the Pension Reform Act of 1974 maybe incorporation is not such a
good thing anymore.

However, I don't think that you can leave your financial

future up to the article writers who attempt to generalize about a problem which
really involves analysis of specific facts and circumstances.

I'd like to try in

the time that I have to discuss some of those facts and circumstances which would
be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to incorporate your practice.

Then I'd like to discuss some of the requirements for the proper operation
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of a professional corporation so that you can avoid some of the pitfalls which
you may experience if you're not careful.
First of all, it would certainly be foolish for
practice and thereby cause additional problems.

anyo~e

to incorporate their

It should be established and

operated so as to run more or less automatically.

It will take some initial

adjustments to get the corporation established, but you should be able to get
into the routine of practicing your profession in the corporate form quickly.
The primary objective of a professioEal corporation is to obtain the same
tax shelter benefits that the executives of large corporations get--retirement
plans or deferred comRensation--whichreally are not' available to professionals in
a similar degree unless they incorporate.
a form of a savings program.

A qualified retirement Blan is really

It's a system whereby you save part of the money

you earn from your practice each year.

The benefit of a qualified plan is that

you can make the savings before paying taxes on the money.
on your tax bill.

You get a deferral

There are in many cases great advantages to being able to

defer the payment of the tax because you are able to contribute money to a qualified pension or profit-sharingplan, take a tax deduction for it, and use the
government's money to build up a fund over 15, 20, or 30 ¥ears.

At the end,

you'll have a great deal more than you would have if you had put your money in
savings or investment after paying tax on it.

Certainly, the kind of savings

program we're talking about here should be approached as a
ment, however.

conserva~ve
)

This is not going to be like an oil well in Texas.

invest-

This should

be viewed as something that you're going to have when you get to be 65, 70, or 80
years old.
One of the basic considerations in deciding whether to incorporate is
whether you will be able to save any money after incorporation.

The establish-

ment of a qualified corporate retirement plan is not going to enable you to have
more money to spend.

Unless you have been saving some part of your earnings, you

will have to reduce spendable income with incorporation.

On the other hand, if

you're in the 50 percent tax bracket, which for joint taxpayers starts at about
$44,000 of taxable income, and you incorporate, anything that you put into a
qualified retirement plan--or anything that you put into a Keogh plan if you
don't incorporate--is money that you would otherwise have had to pay 50 percent
of to the government.

So even though you have to reduce your spending somewhat

to build up a savings program, you only have to reduce it by one half of what
you're able to save.
The. decision to incorporate would also involve analysis by each of you of
your personal living habits.

How much money do you have available to set aside?

Can you change your habits and be able to save money?
change her or his habits and be able to save money?

Can your wife or husband
How much money are you going

to have to spend in the next few years for the college education of children?
you are 45 or 50 years old and you have six kids in college, then incorporation
is probably not for you at this time.

If you have elderly parents whom you're
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If

obligated to support, then again a professional corporation possibly should be postponed, depending on your other financial circumstances.
We have a general rule of thumb that a professional should not incorporate
unless the net income from his practice is at least $50,000 or maybe even $60,000
to $70,000.

You know that you can contribute

15 percent of your taxable income

or self-employment earnings to a Keogh Plan with a maximum contribution of $7500.
At $50,000 the 15 percent mark is $7500, and that's how I get tO,the breaking
point.
It is possible in a professional corpo~ation to gain additional tax deductions that are not available to the unincorporated.

Those tax deductions, aside

from the qualified retirement plans, include disability insurance and ciedical and
dental care expenses, medical care expenses to an individual, but only if they
exceed 3 percent of his adjusted gross income.

In most cases the medical expenses

are less than that, but they are still very real.

If you have a corporation, you

can deduct medical expenses from dollar one, in effect, and not be affected by the
3 percent limitations.
There's a certain type of life insurance which your corporation
the premiums for which it can deduct.

can buy,

This special insurance is group-term life

insurance under section 79 of the Internal Revenue Code, for which

a~

individual

would normally get no tax deduction.
There is some discussion of the idea that if you're not able to save much
money now, then incorporate.

Go to all the trouble to get the lawyer, the

insurance man, and the bank trust officer involved and get yourself obligated to
a larger number of people.

Then when you get all this paper structure set up,

you will then be forced to save money that you otherwise wouldn't save.
always been skeptical of that approach.

I have

I know a lot of life insurance has been

sold on that basis, but I would think that a professional should be able to control and not need the prodding of the forced savings concept.
There are still some advantages to a corporate retirement plan over a
plan which requires no incorporation.

The limitation on contributions to

a Keogh plan has been raised from 10 percent of earnings or $2500 to 15 percent
of earnings or $7500.

However, if you're able to save more than $7500 in a year,

then incorporation should be looked

int~because

with qualified defined benefit

corporate plans/you can put aside 25 percent of your earnings or $26,825, whichis less.
Many of the articles which I mentioned had condemned corporate plans focused
taxes.

If you have the Keogh plan, you have a much smaller plan; therfore,
the money out in a lump sum, your taxes will be less than with a

,~r\~'~A~ate

plan.

In these articles, it always comes out that in the corporate

you wind up with more money in hand, but not as much as the initial sum that
u build up would indicate.

However, those articles and that approach make many

as to when the money is going to be taken out, how it's going to be
down, and how that money that's not put into the corporate retirement plan
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is going to be kept after taxes and invested in some other form of tax-exempt
investment such as municipal bonds.

I'm not at all sure that it's good to be

forced to invest in tax-exempt municipal bonds, especially with the experience
in New York.
There are still some differences in the eligibility requirements between
the Keogh and the corporate plans.

In Keogh you must include all employees who

have 3 years of service with your partnership or sole proprietorship.

If you

have a corporate plan, you can exclude employees until they reach age 25.

A

person who's reached age 25 must come in afteL at least 1 year of service, however.
The treatment of Social Security is also different in the two plans.
impractical to integrate a Keogh plan with Social Security.

It's

You could do so, but

two-thirds of the contributions of the plan must be allocated among the lower
paid employees.

A sole practitioner or partnership certainly would not want to

establish a plan in which two-thirds of the contributions of the plan are allocated
to lower paid employees.

Integration of Social Security into the corporate plan,

on the other hand, means that you contribute from 5 to 7 percent less on the
compensation of lower paid employees as you do for yourself.

You could put a full

25 percent away for yourself and maybe only 18 or 19 percent for lower paid
employees.

It reduces your costs.

The federal estate tax exclusion for distributions from a qualified retirement plan established by a corporation is still available, but there is no such
exclusion for distribution from a Keogh plan.
inheritance tax.

*

This also applies to the Kentucky

There is no justification that I can see for this difference.

It can mean a significant savings, because while the estate tax rate is only at
3 percent above $60,000, it can go all the way up to 77 percent on $10,000,000.
On an average estate for professionals, which might be between $100,000 and
$250,000, the federal estate tax rate is 30 percent.
There are, of course, no loans permitted from the Keogh plan, but with a
corporate profit-sharing plan it is possible for a participant to borrow money from
it in cases of unusual need or emergency.
an unusual need

There's a lot of question as to what

or emergency is, but we have taken the position that unusual

medical expenses would be a justification for borrowing money from the plan.
If education expenses come along for children in college, and there's no other
way to get the money, it could be borrowed from your corporate profit-sharing plan.
The retirement plans and the entire corporate arrangement should be as
flexible as possible since we don't know what the future holds for us.
possible with the Keogh plan.

That's not

No distributions can be made from the Keogh plan

*This distribution was eliminated by section 2009(cl of the Tax Reform Act of
1976. Effective January 1, 1977, amounts receivable from a corporate or Keogh
plan and paid in a manner other than lump-sum will be excluded from the decedentparticipant'sestate. An annuity or installments over a period of at least 36
months are methods of distribution qualifying for the exclusion.
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without paying a penalty tax until 6 months before the professional reaches age
60.

On the other hand, distributions must begin 6 months before the professional

reaches age 71.

Those required distribution times do not apply in a qualified

corporate plan.
A Keogh plan is a<lse less flexible in that if it covers an owner-employee-that's an employee who owns at least 10 percent of the stock or a 10 percent
interest in the partnership or is sole proprietor--then even a profit-sharing plan
must provide a definite contribution formula, IRC §40l(d) (2) (B).
you must agree to contribute a fixed amount each year.
-,

corporate profit-sharing plan.

In other words,

That's not true with a

If you have a bad year, or if you've taken 6

months off to go to Europe and you don't have money to put into the corporate
profit-sharing plan, you can skip the contribution for that year without affecting
the status of your plan at all.
are completely flexible.

Contributions to corporate profit-sharing plans

You can put nothing in each year or you can contribute

up to 15 percent of your compensation in each year.

That flexibility always seems

to be one of the advantages of a professional corporate plan.
There also remains an unusual difference in the voluntary contributions
that can be made to a corporate plan as compared to a Keogh plan.

If you should

be fortunate enough, after you have put money into the retirement plans to the
full extent, to still have money around to invest, you can make voluntary contributions to both a Keogh and a corporate plan.

There are no

current deductions

on those contributions, but the earnings on those contributions will be tax-free
until you take them out at the end.

However, voluntary contributions to a Keogh

plan are limited to $2500 per year.

The limitation on voluntary contributions to

a corporate plan is an amount equal to 10 percent of compensation received during
all years of participation.

But keep in the back of your mind that the voluntary

contributions you make to a corporate plan, after the Tax Reform Act, will count
as annual additions to the plan to the extent that they exceed 6 percent of your
compensation for the year.

But that still can very often be more than $2500 dol-

lars.
There are other fringe benefit plans which a professional corporation can
adopt other than the qualified retirement plan.

You're not going to get a tremen-

dous amount of tax savings from those other plans, like the medical expense plan
or the deductions for disability insurance or the group term life insurance plan.
If a sole proprietor incorporated and the tax savings from all these plans put
together was $500 or $1000, that would be unusually good.

The big tax saving

comes from the qualified retirement plan.
There are some non-tax considerations to incorporation of your practice.
One is that there are some limitations on liability.

Under most state laws and

the common law, you are liable for the acts of your partner to the full extent
of your personal assets if you are not incorporated.
that joint liability ends.

If you have a corporation,

If a shareholder of a professional corporation commits

malpractice, of course, he's liable to the full extent of his assets under the
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state laws, but the other shareholders in the corporation are not liable.

The

corporation itself would have liability, but in most cases we try to keep the
assets of the corporation small so that if the liability should ever happen to
attach, not much would be lost.
There are some organizational advantages to incorporation.

It can aid

efficiency to get defined lines of authority--to have a board of directors, a
president, a treasurer.

There are some advantages to operating in the corporate

form just because it gives a certainty of form of operation.
Another advantage which I'm not so sure about is that young doctors may
feel very impressed when they find that the persons who may hire them have
incorporated their practice and have all of ±hese retirement plans and fringe
benefit programs established.

It makes you look a 19t more like you have the

latest in the practice of medicine or law.
There are some aspects that you've probably heard about that I don't feel
are beneficial to the corporation.
by the corporation.

One of those is the ownership of an automobile

It can be actually a detriment.

If there's more than one

doctor, and one drives a Volkswagen and the other drives a Mercedes Benz, you may
have a cause for friction right there if the corporation owns both those autos.
Additionally, the ownership of automobiles by a professional corporation can
cause a tax problem.

If the Internal Revenue Service audits the corporation and

decides that the automobile is not entirely for use in the business, it will treat
the use of the automobile by the doctor as a dividend and deny a dec3.uction to the
corporation.

The result is that the corporation pays tax on the disallowed

deduction at the corporate tax rate, which is 20 percent, and then the doctor pays
a tax on the use of the automobile at his normal, personal mdividual tax rate as
a dividend.

If the doctor owned the auto and claimed the deduction on his

individual return, there would not be the double tax risk.
There's another advantage which I want to talk about.
doctor

or lawyer will own his own office building.

In many cases a

One way to avoid paying taxes

on it is to transfer the rents from your office building to your children in trust.
The courts have uniformly held that this is a sham transaction, and that the rentals
are not proper business deductions.

However, if you have a corporation which is

operated properly, that gives you a legitimate business reason to pay rent, because
your corporation must pay rent since it is a separate legal entity from the doctor
or lawyer.

That rent should be and will be deductible by the corporation when the

payments go from the corporation to the trust.

The income in the trust can be

accumulated for the benefit of the children to pay for their education.

The rent

payments as they are earned by the trust will be subject to tax from either the
trust or the child, if the distribution is made from the trust for his benefit.
There are some problems to watch for in this situation.

If the trust pays

any of the support obligations of the parent, then the parent will have to pay
income tax on such amounts that go into the trust.

The way to alleviate that

problem is simply to have the trustee accumulate the money in the trust for the
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benefit of the children to pay for their education.

The rent payments as they are

earned by the trust will be subject to tax from either the trust or the child, if
the distribution is made from the trust for his benefit.
There are some problems to watch for in this situation~

If the trust pays

any of the support obligations of the parent, then the parent will have to pay
income tax on such amounts that go into the trust.

The way to alleviate that

problem is simply to have the trustee accumulate the money in the trust for the
benefit of the children and not pay it out to them until they reach age 18, when
the legal support obligation ceases.

This

jus~

happens to be, at about the time

that they're going into college, when the big expenses ,come.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION:

Did you say that with the Keogh plan, you must make a contribution every

year once you've established the plan?
MR. RICH:
more.

Yes, if you're a sole proprietor or if you're a 10 percent partner or

Furthermore, you can't vary the amount of percentage that you pay.

QUESTION:

In a corporation, how do you go about determining salaries?

partnership in our law firm, but we have wide ranges of income.

We have a

It appears to

me that the form of written contracts for the distribut'ion of income varies in proportion
to the amount that was earned.

If one partner, because of his'productivity or

efficiency, makes more money and puts more accounts receivable on the,pooks of the
corporation, those differences could be reflected in the compensation formula that
a corporation adopts, just as it can be done with a partnership.
It is, of course, a question with a corporation as to whether compensation
paid by it is deductible.
feel that it should.

Should the professional corporation pay dividends?

The dividends should be based on the capital investment that

the former partners--now shareholders--have made in the corporation.
two

cas~s

We

dealing with this subject:

There are

McCandless Tile Service, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct.

Cl.,1970), and Barton-Gillet Co., 29 TCM 679 (1970), which were both bad Gases for
the taxpayers and good cases for the Internal Revenue Service.

We advise most of

our professional corporations to payout some dividends because the brunt of the
argument is that there should be some return on invested capital to the shareholders.
Of course, you can cite many cases of corporations that don't pay dividends-American Airlines doesn't pay dividends and they have a lot of capital--but in your
planning you should attempt to head off the problem by paying a dividend to help
counter the unreasonable compensation argument.
We have many cases--and none have been successfully challenged--where compensation is based on productivity.
wage-price freeze.

It was a wonderful thing to have during the

Many advisors at that time said that you couldn't raise

salaries because of the wage-freeze portion of the Economic Stabilization Act,
but with a formula for compensation you weren't subject to that.

So that's some

more flexibility that you might consider with regard to professional corporations.
QUESTION:

If

all partners receive completely equal compensation after a term of

indenture, could th~ corporation be worked so that the wage-price freeze would
not adversely affect that situation?
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MR. RICH:

Yes.

Again, I would suggest that a clause in the compensation section

of your employment contract--and it's very important to have an employment contract--state that

the

intention is to. distribute to professional
employee Doctor
,

X an amount in total compensation that's equal to the billing that he has generated.

We had no particular problems with sustaining increases in compensation

which were caused by an increase in productivity and efficiency, so long as the
corporation had not raised its fees for professional services.
To return to the body of the lecture, you should be aware that there are a
lot of beginning expenses, including attorney;'s fees, filing fees, additional fees
to your accountant, fees for expenses in changing yoqr signs, billhead, phone
listings, and things of that sort.

We would judge that for a one-man corporation,

those expenses might be as much as $2,000 or $3,000.
shot charge just to get the corporation set up.
expenses which you'll also want to consider.

Basically that's a one-

There are some annual recurring

There will be extra expenses because

of legal and accounting fees, and if you have a paid trustee, you'll have trustee's
fees.

Those totals shouldn't amount to more than $200 or $300.

defined benefit plan, you'll have to hire an actuary.

If you have a

They charge anywhere from

$500 to $1,000 a year for making the computation necessary to calculate the
contributions of the plan.
One of the big costs of incorporating arises from the
employees in the plan.
that.

need"t~

include other

If you have a Keogh plan, of course, you're already doing

By having a corporate plan you can lessen the cost of including the other

employees by taking advantage of integration with Social Security and by providing
in the plan for deferred vesting, which I didn't mention, but which you can't
have in the Keogh plan.
There are additional costs for Social Security coverage.

You'll have to

cover yourself if you're in a corporation, and so, of course, you'll have to pay
Social Security tax on yourself and an employee.

However, the difference is not

very great between the self-employed person rate, which is 7.9 percent, and the
joint rate for the corporation and the employee.

Since the employer's portion of

the Social Security tax is also a tax deduction, the effective rates which you
should compare are 7.9 percent for the self-employed rate compared with 8.7 or
8.8 if you have a corporation and pay the tax both on yourself and on the corporation.
In Indiana there is a gross income tax which increases the costs of operating
as a corporation.

There's no way to avoid that.

In most cases, we attempt to

have our corporate client payout most of its earnings in some tax-deductible form,
either in the form of compensation to the professionals or contributions to
qualified plans or, if necessary, a bonus to the professionals.
small dividend each year.

Then there is a

But in Indiana with its gross income tax there is a

cost of a little over 1 percent.
There are some formalities of corporate operation.

There are only two cases

which the Internal Revenue Service has won in challenging corporate status.
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Of

course the IRS picks good cases to litigate.

One was the Roubik

365 (1969), which was decided in the Tax Court.

case, 53 T.C.

That was the case where four

radiologists incorporated and then proceeded in all respects, to act as though
they had no corporation.

The individuals in the corporation received payments

from hOGpital personally and then endorsed the checks over to the corporation.
Theydidn't hold themselves out to the public as a corporation.

The hospitals

weren't even informed that these four radiologists had incorporated.
at four different hospitals, and there was very
them.

There was really no unity of operation.-,

participate

They worked

little interchange of work among
One of the doctors continued to

as a partner in another professional venture.

He received money

outside the corporation framework from that work, but that was professional
practice income.

Each doctor had a contract in his individual name with the

hospital at which he performed services.

If you're going to have a professional

corporation, your contracts and formal legal documents should be in the corporate
name.
Each of the individual doctors supervised his own personnel.
any corporate management.

There wasn't

They sent bills out in their individual names.

was just a horrendous case, a case that the government had to win.
you the minimum things you should do to act like a corporation.
careful, the status of your corporation is in jeopardy.

It

The case tells

If you aren't

You reallydGn't lose

a great deal, but you don't gain the benefits of incorporation either.
There are some professional management consultants around who will advise
you that in order to eliminate the cost of including other employees in a qualified
corporate plan, you should have all of your employees put on the management consultant firm's payroll.

That's flying right in the face of the ruling in Roubik.

That corporation didn't own any equipment;

it didn't hire anyone except the

doctors.
If you're going to have a legitimate professional corporation, it must
perform some business function.

You should use the corporate name in your

advertising and your phone listing.

You should list it on your stationery; it

should be on your bills, your contracts, your insurance policies, and your checks.
If you're going to make a good case for establishing the separate existence of
your corporation, you shouldn't be ashamed to use your corporate name.
The other case that was lost by a professional corporation had the same
sort of ridiculous facts.

Epperson v. U.S., 74-1 USTC 4f9284.

Some of the other formal requirements, such as articles of incorporation,
by-laws and officers, are fairly standard things.

One danger for lawyers, and

you should be careful with this, is treating a professional corporation just the
same as any other corporation.

You shouldn't. They're different.

different because they're a strictly personal service corporation.

They're
There is a set

of different principles that apply, and you should be careful to recognize those.
As I told you, the employment contract is a key document.

There should be

a clause in the employment contract to the effect that the doctor-employee is
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........------------------------~
devoting his exclusive services and loyalty to the corporation.

In a one-man

corporation, it is a very self-serving document, but it still should be there.
It's important that these trappings be present, but they shoulqn't be burdensome
to you.

They should become automatic.
You might also ada to your employment contract provisions tnat tne corporation

expects the employees to have an automobile available for use, to subscribe to
professional publications, and to attend meetings like this one in order to continue their professional education.

By having that in the employment contract as

a requirement of employment, it gives the doctor whose tax return is audited after
he takes deductions for his trip to Bermuda for a confer,ence, or to Lexington,
Kentucky for a conference, or to Cincinnati, Ohio for a conference, something to
point to

in saying that the expenses were required by his employer, the profes-

sional service corporation.
It's fallacious

to

assume that having the corporation automatically legi ti-

mizes deductions for trips and conventions which are not really exclusively for
business.

If you're going to go on such trips and take such deductions, it's

better that you do it on your personal return, not on the corporation's return,
because of the double-tax problem I mentioned earlier in connection w:Lth automobiles.
I won't go into some of the technical tax questions that I allude to in
my outline about how to transfer your assets from your individual pracj:ice to the
corporation.

One thing to keep in mind in so doing is that it should be a tax-

free transfer.

You should transfer accounts receivable to the corporation; it

pays the taxes on them as it collects them.
You should not transfer liabilities in excess of the value of the assets
that you transfer.

That would trigger a tax on you personally.

In other words,

if in your practice you borrow money, and you incorporate and transfer assets
worth $1,000

plus loan obligations worth $2,000, then you individually as a

result of that transfer have received, as far as the tax people are concerned,
$1,000 worth of boot.
difference.

That means that you have to pay tax on that $1,000 net

So make sure in your transfer to the professional corporation that

the assets always exceed the liabilities.

If necessary, keep the liabilities in

your own name and pay them off personally rather than transfer them to the corporation.
I mentioned the dividend ques.tion.
the basis of a formula.

I told you that you could payout on

It's very important that you consider this and that you

have a basis for the formula.

However, I'm not as worried about the unreasonable

compensation problem as other people are.

We've had no bad experience with put-

ting the compensation formula in employment contracts.

I think it should be done.

Now let's talk about qualified retirement plans, pension plans, and profitsharing plans.

If you're going to have just one plan, we recommend that you have

a profit-sharing plan because it's the most most flexible.

You don't have to

contribute anything to it if you don't want to; you can put in up to 15 percent
of the compensation paid to participants.
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If you can save more than 15 percent, then you should consider using a
money purchase pension plan too.

That's just like a profit-sharing plan in that

it doesn't guarantee any fixed benefit.
an additional 10 percent.
There may be advantages
pension plan.

to

However, it enables you to contribute

very high income physicians in a defined benefit

A defined benefit plan is a kind of plan that provides a guaranteed

monthly or annual income after you reach retirement age.

You can put more money

into a plan like that than you can with the two plans I've mentioned because it's a
fixed end-benefit plan.

The maximum

adjustment is now $80,475 a year.

benefit~der

the new law, with the inflation

To find out how much you have to contribute in
I

order to get that end benefit, you go to an actuary.

He makes some calculations and

assumptions and tells you how much you must put in each year.

The amount that you put

into such a plan is currently deductible to you or your professional corporation.
I've done some rough calculations on this.
you have 25 years until you're 65.
an end benefit of $80,000.

If you're age 40, that means

You could put $13,988

a year into it to fund

That assumes a 5 percent growth rate, a 5 percent

interest rate, and that you pay in the same amount each year.
annual premium.
year.

It's called a level

If you're age 50, you would contribute, and deduct, $30,000 a

But then you're talking about well over $100,000 in compensation to fund

such a plan.
You might be satisfied with a $26,825 limitation on annual contributions to
your account in defined contribution plans.

If you find that uncomfortable to

live with,take a higher tax deduction than the $26,825 limit, you can do so by
adding a defined benefit plan.
That's because there's a special 140 percent rule for computing the limitations on benefits when defined benefit and defined contribution plans are combined.
For example, assume you have a defined contribution plan like profit-sharing, and
fund that to the maximum percent, putting $26,825 into it.
income of $178,000.

That would require

But after you put the 15 percent into that plan, you're

entitled to have a separate defined-benefit plan, which will provide a maximum
benefit of 40 percent of the benefit otherwise allowed by the law for defined
benefit plans.

The maximum plan is $80,000 and 40 percent of that is $32,000.

fund that, if you're age 55, costs $21,000 a year.

To

So instead of being limited

to the $26,000 limit that the new pension law provides, a doctor in that situation
can put aside $47,000

~ubject

not for the average earner.

to the overall 25 percent deduction limiti.

This is

This is certainly for the physician or lawyer with

earnings of more than $150,000 per year.
I think you should look into integrating any retirement plan you have as
this can cut down the cost of including other employees.
you can only integrate one.
vesting in all plans.

Keep that in mind.

If you have two plans,

You should also consider deferred

The basic rule for small professional corporations

is

that you must have 100 percent vesting after 10 years of participation in the
plan or 10 years of service with the corporation.

The Internal Revenue Service

is currently taking the position that an employee must have a vested interest of
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40 percent in your plan after four years of service.
ject to challenge.

That interpretation is sub-

If you do have deferred vesting in your plan, it encourages

an employee to stay longer, which is what you want.

It also has the benefit that

if they don't stay as long as you want them to, the benefit of their forfeitures
will partly go to you.

In a profit-sharing plan, the forfeitures are reallocated

among the accounts of the existing participants on the basis of the relative
sizes of their accounts, which means you would get most of them into your account.
If it's a pension plan, the forfeiture is used to reduce the next year's contributions to the plan.
One thing I wanted to mention is insurance in a qualified plan.

You will

be beseiged, if you haven't already been if you've incorporated, by insurance men
who encourage you to invest part of your plan assets in insurance.

They will

assure you that the tax laws permit 50 percent of your plan assets to be invested
in insurance.
ment in a plan.

I personally have doubts as to whether insurance is a good investIf you need the death benefit protection, then possibly you

should consider it.

But just as a pure investment, insurance can usually be beat

with some other form of investment.

Even a savings and loan investment is better.

So you should look very carefully at it.
I'm not sure whether you know this or not, but if you 'do invest in life
insurance in a qualified retirement plan, a portion of what goes intp the plan
is taxed to the individual on whose life the insurance is purchased.

By buying

insurance in a qualified plan, it actually detracts from the tax savings that
would otherwise be available.
If you have a Keogh plan, the best advice as to what to do with it if
you incorporate is to freeze it.

It is possible to have it transferred, but in

my opinion is more trouble than it's worth.

The only advantage you gain is

having all your eggs in one basket, with the same trustee investing both funds.
The Keogh rules and restrictions continue to apply to the Keogh funds in any
case.
QUESTION:

How do you go about getting your plan approved by the Internal Revenue

Service?
MR. RICH:

I'm glad you mentioned that.

I've run into some cases where people

have not submitted plans to the Internal Revenue Service for qualification determination.

That should be a standard step.

You do that after you adopt your plan.

It will be submittedto Louisville if you're in Kentucky.
the Indianapolis office.
office.

In Indiana it goes to

In Ohio it goes to the Cincinnati office or the Cleveland

You send along forms which give summary descriptions of the plan, and then

the Internal Revenue Service works with you in changing your plan,
to make it conform to their latest requirements.
for professional corporations.

if necessary,

They have special requirements

Just because you have a plan that satisfies the

guidelines of the law doesn't mean that it will be approved.

For instance, if

it's a professional corporation, the IRS doesn't accept a very long vesting term.
It doesn't like a 10-year vesting period.
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It prefers percentage vesting as each

year passes.

For a vesting schedule to be approved, it must not discriminate in

favor of higher-paid employees.

Usually this is just a formal matter.

You submit

the plan to the IRS and they readily approve it.
If you want to know more about this subject, is th~re a place that you

QUESTION:

can take short course on pension law or professional service corporations or whatever?
MR. RICH:

Yes.

It seems like or there have been, in the past at least, a lot of

conferences like this where the whole program is devoted to professional service
corporations.
MR. HICKEY:

~ohn.

Maybe you could have one here,

We had a day-and-a-half program on the Pension Reform Act when it
I

first carne out.

There are quite a few by the American Bar Association, the

American Law Institute, and other national groups on this currently.

I don't

know of any local ones that are immediately available.
MR. RICH:

But there are people around who specialize in professional corporations.

Maybe you could just bend their ear for a while.
MR. HICKEY:

I think Professor Whiteside has a comment on something you just said.

MR. WHITESIDE:

Will a plan go through the IRS for approval as easily where a

practitioner makes himself the trustee of hjs own plan?
MR. RICH:

There should be no problem to obtain qualification determination from

IRS if the professional is his own trustee.

There are some legal ques:!:ions.

If

the doctor is trustee and he's also on the advisory committee and he's also the
only beneficiary, then we have the doctrine of merger of
could apply.

tr~st

The IRS has raised that question to our firm.

estates which

We wrote a legal

memorandum in reply, telling them why the doctrine of merger doesn't apply.

It

is a technical legal question, and if for some reason there are not other beneficiaries beside the doctor, he should have his wife or a bank as trustee along
with him.
himself.

In most cases during the early years, a doctor could serve as trustee
But when the funds get to be in amounts which you need professional

advice on how to invest and you don't have time to do it yourself, you might as
well go to a professional trustee like a bank.
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ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE PROFESSIONAL 1
Edward A. Rothschild, J.D.
Washer, Kaplan, Rothschild,
Aberson, Miller & Dodd
Louisville, Kentucky
I'm going to talk to you about a subject in which you do not have an election
like you do in choosing a professional service corporation.

I'm going to talk to

you about a subject which is as sure to happen to you as you are sitting in this
room, because I'm going to talk to you about
this into two parts.

dea~h

and taxes.

I'm going to break

First, we shall discuss what your estate consists of and what
I

the death taxes based on your estate consist

of.

planning and economic planning for your family.

Second, we shall discuss tax
In this lecture, I'm also going

to talk about some major misconceptions that some doctors and lawyers have when
it comes to estate planning.

I am going to discuss estate planning for profes-

sionals like you, but much of what I'm going to say applies to other types of
professionals as well as businessmen.
One basic point about estate planning is that it is very similar to fingerprints in that there are no two alike.

What you own is probably not going to be

similar to what the man sitting next to you owns.

Your individual family situation

is going to be different from the family situation of your neighbor.
Let's first talk about what your estate consists of.
your taxable estate for death tax purposes?

What's included in

The first item I usually think of in

this area--and one of the most elective items--is life insurance.
should normally be one of the major assets in your estate.

Why?

Life insurance
Because over the

years of our practice, in trying to increase the standard of living for ourselves
and our family, it's important for us to take stock of what will happen to this
standard of living upon our death.

Life insurance gives immediate large benefits

in the event we die.
Let me talk to you about a problem that I see in many estates.

In 24 of 25

estate plans that I get involved in, I find it necessary to change the beneficiary
of the life insurance policy.

Think about your life insurance and about who the

beneficiary is in your life insurance policy.

If you"-re fairly typical of most

people who take out life insurance, your wife is probably the primary beneficiary
and your children are the secondary beneficiaries or maybe you don't even have a
secondary beneficiary.

Well, let me tell you about one important salient fact.

Life insurance does not pass by willi it passes by contract.
any difference what you state in that will.

It doesn't make

You can have a great marital deduc-

tion trust and a great residuary trust protecting your children until they become
25 or 30, but if you don't change the beneficiary of the life insurance policies,
those funds are going to be taxable and they're going to be distributed in accorIThis lecture was given before the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and does
not cover the changes reflected in that Act.
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dance with that contract.

So as a general practice, I effect the changes of

beneficiaries to tie in with what the client wants in his will.
Now let's talk about taxability of life insurance, because this involves

,

another great misconception.

You have to take into consideration the two basic

death tax laws--the federal estate and state inheritance tax laws.

Life insurance

proceeds paid at death are fully taxable for federal estate tax purposes if the
decedent owned the policy at his death.

Ownership rights of a life insurance

policy cover a number of rights, such as the right to change beneficiary, the
right to borrow on the policy, and the right to pledge the policy as security.
In Kentucky, life insurance left to a named benefic,iary, to a testamentary trust,
or to an inter vivos trust is nontaxable even though the decedent kept the ownership rights.

But if the estate is the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, it's

fully taxable in Kentucky for Kentucky inheritance tax purposes.
I'm not going to talk any more about qualified plans, because that was well
covered by the previous speaker, but I do want to emphasize one thing about the
qualified plan beneficiary.

If you are incorporated and have a qualified plan,

and if it's left to a named beneficiary, there are no federal estate taxes on it. 2
However, if it's left to your estate, it is fully taxable for federal estate tax
purposes.
Now let me talk to you about another misconception; that's .. how title to real
estate should be held.

Real estate and personal property in joint survivorship

are treated differently for federal estate tax purposes than for Kentucky inheritance tax purposes.

For federal estate tax purposes, if you have a piece of

property in joint survivorship with your wife or anyone else, the full value of
that real estate will be taxed upon your death in your estate, unless the other
party can prove that he or she made an economic contribution to that property.
That fact sometimes is very difficult to prove.

It's very difficult to explain

to a widow that she does not have any legal interest that we can keep out of her
husband's estate because she didn't make any financial contribution to it, when
she might have raised the kids

and done all the housework.

Therefore, I quite

often find that joint survivorship is one of the worst ways for property to be
held.

I normally make an exception to this rule when it comes to the home

because joint survivorship of a home allows the wife to get the residence immediately upon your death.

Remember that joint survivorship property does not pass

by will.
Let me tell

yo:u about a case I had about 5 years ago to illustrate the

dangers of joint survivorship property.
estate planning.

I had a client who came in for some

The first two things I discuss with all my clients are about

2Since my talk, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 now states that a lump sum distribution
from a qualified plan is taxable for federal estate tax purposes regardless of
who is the beneficiary.
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their family situation and what their estate consists of and how property is held.
This man had been married previously and had three children, his wife had been
married previously and also had three children, and they had one
, child together.
It was my client's desire to provide first for his wife's financial security with
his total estate to be divided equally among the seven children later.
I got into the second phase of our conference.
$1,600,000.

This gentleman had assets of

All but $100,000 was in real estate.

how was the title to the real estate held.
was in joint

survivorship with his wife.

My next question to him was

He answered that all h1s real estate
I toJ,Jj him I could write a will with

a marital deduction and set it up in a trust that would
the property to his seven children.

Then

I

eventually pass half of

But then I said that nothing would pass by

his will because joint survivorship means it's immediately going to pass to your
wife when you die.

I explained that if she dies one minute after you do and

doesn't have a will, the three children by your prior marriage--under Kentucky
law--are going to get nothing because her property will go by descent and distribution to the ahildren by her previous marriage and to your one child.
presented the following additional contingencies.

Then I

Let's say that a few years

later your widow gets married and decides the best way for all the real estate
to be held is in joint survivorship with her new husband.

Then 'she dies.

Her

second husband might end up with $1,500,000 worth of property less taxe@., and
all seven children could be left out in the cold.
the conversation, he's beginning to squirm.

Believe me, at this point in

As another example, if your wife

should decide later that she wants to leave the real estate differently from how
you stated you wanted it in your will, all of the real estate will be left as
she desires.
Then I said, let's say that she leaves all of this property to the seven
children in equal shares, with a similar trust as you will establish in your will
and thus she carries out your wishes on all of the property that she's inherited
from you.

Your seven children are going to receive approximately $225,000 less

and the taxing authorities are going to receive that much more because you overfunded the marital deducti:on.

In all probability, all the property you leave at

your death is going to be taxed again

at your wife's death.

Now in joint

survivorship real property between husband and wife, there is an escape valve for
gift tax purposes.

If the spouse contributed solely to the purchase of the

property, you can transfer that portion back into the spouse's sole name without
any gift tax consequences.

Serious consideration should be given when you buy

property to determine how the title to the property is to be held, and normally
joint survivorship is not the best method to take title.
Next, I would like to discuss with you professional partnerships and professional corporations.

What provision have you made for getting some funds out

of this corporation as compensation, for example, for past services?
do you have on that stock or on that partnership interest?

What value

Who's in the position

to best determine what the value of your stock in the corporation or your partner-
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ship interest is?

It's you!

When you're healthy and your partners are healthy

1

i

or your fellow stockholders are healthy, you can work out a reasonable agreement
at arms length to protect the value of your interest as far as your estate is concerned.

I
If you

own coin collections, stamp collections or other similar type

property of value, take special care of them.

If you are the executor or the

attorney for an estate that has this type of property,you should put them in a
safety deposit box immediately because they're like cash.

These type properties

are hard to evaluate and usually require the-use of experts.

Sometimes it is

necessary, where the value of the collection is high" to get experts from New York,
Chicago,or Los Angeles who will come in and appraise and sometimes buy them.
Everything you own is included in your estate.

I've found that in 96 of

100 cases, when my client sits down and takes a financial inventory of his estate,
including face value of life insurance and fair market value of his real estate,
he is surprised at the total value of his estate.

If you haven't taken such an

inventory, you should; it's later than you think.

Anyone with an estate greater

than $60,000 has an estate tax problem.

Federal estate taxes affect everyone in

this room.
with the federal death tax you start off with the gross estate, which is
the fair market value of everything you own.

If you have real

think of it in terms of what you paid for it.

esta~e,

don't

Think of it in terms of what it's

worth now because the taxing authorities will, and it can make a tremendous
difference.

You subtract from that the funeral expenses, debts, administrative

expenses, mortgages, and that leaves you with an adjusted gross estate.
leave one-half of the adjusted gross estate to your spouse tax-free.
bequests or devises are also completely deductible.

You can

Charitable

These can be made in specific

bequests to your church or other charity, or you can do it in such a way that the
charitable institution gets the remainder interest of a trust.

But if you do it

the latter way, remember that there are only three ways under the law to do it.
You must either have a uni-trust, annuity trust, or pooled income trust.

If there

is an individual that you want to have the benefits of a trust for his or her lifetime and then leave the balance to a charity, you should work it out in accordance
with one of the three above type trusts or you're not going to get the estate tax
deduction for the remainder interest.
Every estate has a $60,000 exemption.

After that's taken off, you've

arrived at the net taxable part of your estate.
low.

The rates on this start off very

On $100,000, you take out $4,800; on $200,000, you take out over $31,000;

on $500,000 you take out over $100,000 and on $1,000,000 you take out almost
$300,000.
There are a couple of instances where, if you have a closely-held corporation or real hardship situation, it can be paid over a period of years, but the
interest is 7 percent.

Two years ago when it was 4 percent, we were using this

installment pay method whenever available.
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There are federal tax credits
You automatically get credit

to remember.
to a

certain percentage which is contained on

suates, with the excep-

tion of Florida, the state death taxes

the

credit you get for the federal death tax.··
proceeds

It is important to analyze whether
from another estate within the last 10 years'_

against the

tax. for part of the estate previously taxed.

were paid

might get you a credit for that gift

is brought back

into the estate.
The Kentucky inheritance tax is
Most state inheritance taxes are based on

the relation-

ship of the beneficiary to the decedent.

changed

by who gets it, with the exception of the marital

tax free by

the spouse.

t class; it

In Kentucky, a wife and minor children

means that they get larger exemptions and the tax rates are
now either spouse gets a $20,000 credit.

dif~E3.~ent.

In Kentucky

Up until this change in the law, by the

1976 Legislature, a wife got $10,000 credit, a husband $5,000.

Life insurance is

treated differently in Kentucky and so is jointly owned property.

Only one-half

of jointly owned property is taxed in Kentucky, regardless of who contributed to
the property.

So you see, when you get into small estates, sometimes it's better

the have joint survivorship property, but only with estates of less than $100,000.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION:

In the situation where a bank account is in a joint name between mother

and daughter but the daughter didn't make any contribution to it, can the estate
recover that money when the daughter takes it out of the bank?
MR. ROTHSCHILD: After the mother's death, the property automatically passes to the
daughter.
owner.

It doesn't pass through the executor; it passes outright to the joint

It would all be taxable in the mother's estate for federal estate tax

purposes on the basis of your example, however.
QUESTION:

Do you mean personal property and real property all pass at the same

time?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

If it's in joint survivorship or if the bank account is on an

"or" basis, yes sir.

In

Kentucky that's the law.

I presume from what you said that it makes no difference about the
wording on a bank account--if there are two names, that indicates survivorship.
If it's named in "or."

In other words, just because someone has

a right to withdraw funds from the bank account under power of attorney does
not necessarily make it joint survivorship property.
In the example where the man had $1,500,000 in real estate, if he and
present wife made a joint will that it go to the seven children, would that
be a contract which the wife could not break after his death?
ROTHSCHILD:

From his tax standpoint, that would be a disaster.
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QUESTION: But from a legal consequence, would not the joint will be an unbreakable will?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

If it was a joint will, it does become a contract.
,

However, if

the property passed by deed, I don't think the contract would be applicable.
will would only apply to those assets that pass by that contract.

The

If they agreed

that all joint survivorship property had to be included in this contract--if they
clarified it to that
QUESTION:

extent~~then

you might have a valid contract.

What would be the effect of a subsequent marriage on dower interest,

assuming this contract exists?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

That's a good question.

I'm not sure what the situation would be

if the second husband came in and claimed his dower,or curtesy

right~.

What I

emphasize to my clients in that kind of a situation is that it usually is not
feasible to write a joint will.

I stay away from them like the plague.

The ones

I've seen are disasterous.
QUESTION:

Assume that it's not a $1,500,000 estate but rather a $50,000 estate.

The husband wants to give the property entirely to the wife, and the only contribution she had really made has been raising the kids and maybe having a job at one
time.

Would there be any gift tax consequences on that transfer?

MR. ROTHSCHILD:
QUESTION:

Do you mean at death?

Well, at any time, would there be a gift tax consequence!

MR. ROTHSCHILD:

Certainly in his lifetime, if he transferred real estate, he's

made a gift.
QUESTION:

Because she hasn't made a contribution?

MR. ROTHSCHILD:
QUESTION:

Yes, sir.

In other words, her raising the family and things like that would not

be a contribution to the purchase price under gift tax law?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

No way.

But under gift tax law they'd have some split gifts.

You have a marital deduction in gift taxes as well as in estate

taxes, but from

the standpoint of a taxable gift, it would be considered as a gift for gift tax
purposes.

There's one exception to that.

That is if at the time real property

is first put in joint survivorship between husband and wife, if the parties agree
that at that point they're going to treat it as if it's sold for $100,000 and he
gives her $50,000, she'll receive no taxable gift.

That's one option that you

have when you put something in joint survivorship in real estate between spouses.
QUESTION:

I've heard that Kentucky was the worst place in the country to die and

leave anything.

I

wonder if you have an opinion on that from your experience.

A

related question is whether circumstances are so different in every state that if
you construct a proper package for an individual in Kentucky, and he moves away,
does he have to go through the whole thing allover again?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

There is no comparison, as an example, between the death taxes in

California and those in Kentucky.

California does not recognize the deduction of

federal estate taxes on the California inheritance tax return.
estate in which the federal death taxes were $200,000.
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I have a California

On the California inheri-

tance tax return we could not deduct it, and the California inheritance tax was
almost $100,000.

Their rates are higher and they don't give you the exemptions

that you get in Kentucky.
QUESTION:

What about the question of moving from one state to the next?

Are

they so different that you almost have to totally revise the program?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

Not necessarily, but you should review it in any case.

In

Kentucky, life .insurance left to named beneficiaries is not taxable, but this
isn't true in a lot of states.
law.

Joint survivorship property?

Check the state

Kentucky doesn't care who contributed to _.,the property. . Joint survivorship

property will be taxed at a 50 percent rate in Kentucky, unless given within 3
years of death.
I'm going to talk to you now about what I consider to be one of the most
important tax shelters that exists and it's probably one of the cheapest.
is the proper preparation of a will.

That

When you discuss a man's will with him,

there are two things you should kn0w before you even, start discussing how he wants
his property to be left.
properties does he own?

First, what is his family situation and second, what
Often, you have to ask some personal and sometimes

unpleasant questions in order to get to the facts.
with the basics.
healthy?
either~

Is your wife healthy?

For instance, you start off

How old are your children?

Are they

I wrote 16 or 18 wills last year where the clients had childl;'en with

a major mental or physical defect.

When you start talking about that type

of problem, you have to give serious consideration to setting up a trust under
the will for the lifetime of the disabled child.
What properties become a part of the estate?

First, you discuss life

insurance beneficiary designations and how title to real estate is held.

Then

you're ready to start the progressive steps down through the will.
I normally have a separate specific bequest of furniture and personal
effects primarily for more flexible income tax savings.
you have a new income tax payer--the estate.

As you know, at death

Treat it with respect, because

when you are writing a will, you should not only be planning the man's present
estate, but also his estate post death planning as well.

Specific bequests will

not be considered a distribution of taxable income for fiduciary income tax
purposes.

Furniture and fixture clauses can sometimes cause problems among heirs.

Everyone wants Aunt Susie's breakfront in the dining room.

But these are things

you have to discuss with your client to determine how she wants to leave certain
items of personal property.
If you're married and your estate is worth $120,000 or more, you should
give serious consideration to the maximum marital deduction.
deduction can actually be left in 3 ways.

The maximum marital

You can leave it outright, or you can

leave it in two types of trust -- an estate trust, which means simply at the wife's
death, the property passes to her estate-- or a power of appointment trust.

It

has to be left under certain specific conditions or it won't qualify for the
marital deduction.

In the power of appointment trust, the wife has to get the
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income at least annually.

If she doesn't or if anyone else controls that income,

the trust won't qualify for the marital deduction.

At death, the spouse has to

have the right to elect in his or her will where that prorerty goes.

If the

spouse is a good financial manager, it might not be necessary to set up a marital
deduction trust, but the marital deduction can be left outright.

Joint survivor-

ship property and life insurance left to the spouse will be subtracted from the
marital deduction amount left from the probate estate.

If you set up a power of

appointment trust and have $200,000 qualifying for the marital deduction with a
$50,000 home in joint survivorship and $501000 worth of life insurance with the
wife as the beneficiary, the only amount you should ,have in that trust is
$100,000.
The balance of your estate does not have to be left in trust.

It can be

left to your children, grandchildren, parents or to whomever the testator chooses
to leave his estate.

However, in the vast majority of cases, he has to set up a

primary concern is the protection of his wife for her lifetime.

If the testator

wishes his wife to have the benefits of his entire estate, he has to set up a
trust for the balance of his estate.

It is necessary to be careful with your

drafting of the trust, because it isn't drafted properly, the residuary trust
might be taxed to her estate at her death.
I don't recall having prepared a trust where I didn't make".a provision
for invasion rights of principal.

If your wife gets sick and needs money and

doesn't have a right to invade that principal, you can be sitting there with a
trust that cannot be used to pay her medical bills.

Therefore, I normally insert

a clause saying that principal can be invaded for the "health and maintenance"
of the wife.

If you use such words as "general welfare" or "comfort", you can

cause that part to be taxed again

in her estate.

So watch your wording.

One of the vital areas of a will is a second trust for children, maybe
grandchildren.

Remember one basic point:

now the legal age is 18.

in Kentucky and in many other states

If you don't leave a trust, but just leave it outright

to the children and they're under 18, then at age 18 they're going to come to the
administrator and ask for their money.

Most clients feel that a child is not old

enough at 18 to handle large sums of money.

Normally, most clients decide to

terminate the trust for their children somewhere between the age of 25 and 30.
preparing this type trust, it should be flexible so that the children or the
grandchildren can use the principal as well as the income for their health,
maintenance, and education.
do with taxes.

This is more human planning and has very little to

These are the practicalities that you want to consider when you

discuss a will for your client.
You should have an executor in a will and this should not be left to
chance.

If you name an individual who doesn't know anything about estate admin-

istration, then you'd better have a good lawyer who does, because when you're
dealing with an individual executor or executrix, a lawyer has to do everything
but keep the checkbook.

The alternative is to use a bank's trust department
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In

which, if large enough, has the expertise in the various areas that have to be
dealt with in handling the estate.
A trust can last for a long time.

If you make a will ,with the income to go

to your wife for her lifetime and your wife is 35 years old, you could be talking
about a trust that could last for 50 years if your wife dies at 85.

If you have

children and you want the trust to terminate when they're 25 and the youngest is
3, you're talking about a trust with a minimum of about 22 years.
this type, it is probably best to use a corporate trustee.

You don't necessarily

have to give a corporate trustee carte blanche on everything.
advisory committee consisting of your loved ones.

In trusts of

You can set up an

If ,they can't get along with

the trust officer, they could be given the right to change to another corparate trustee.

The testator cauld appoint a cansultant to the trustee relative to

changes in investments.
In the remaining time that I have, I'm going to. talk to you abaut planning
you can do. prior to. death.

I don't give investment advice; I dan't think this is

a lawyer's function, but I do. discuss certain types af tax-favared investments.
One papular type af investment is what we call flower bands, or tombstane bands.
These are certain United States Treasury bonds that qualify far payment af federal
estate taxes if awned by the testatar at his death.

They seli at sizable dis-

counts--presently they are selling for $790 or $800 per $1,000 face'amaunt of the
band.

If you use them to pay federal death taxes, they can be delivered to. the

Federal Reserve at face value.
I did some estate planning for a client 3 or 4 years before he died, and
he baught $280,000 in United States Treasury bonds (flawer bands).
selling at that time at $700 per band.

They were

When he died, we took $200,000 face value

of these bonds and delivered them to. the Federal Reserve in payment af his
federal estate taxes.
band.

At the date of his death, the bonds were warth $800 per

The estate made a $40,000 profit, minus the death taxes an the appreciatian,

so. that developed into. a windfall prafit far the estate af $28,000.

My ,client

cauld have baught these bands a day before he died and they could have still been
used for payment af his federal estate taxes.
In Kentucky, a power af attarney can be used even in the event af disability.
Under Kentucky law the individual who. has the power af attorney can buy flawer
bands far his principal even though the principal is nat capable to. make such a
decisian.

The power af attarney can also. start upan the disability of the principal.

There is a recent New Yark case where the IRS disallawed the use af a power af
attorney to purchase flawer bands.

The Court successfully claimed that the power

af attarney at the time it was exercised: ,was nat valid because the individual was
disabled.

We don't have that prablem in Kentucky if the power af attarney

pravides the power remains valid upon the disability of the principal.

There are

anly abaut eight ar nine states that have this braad pravisian in their law.
In Series E U.S. Savings Bonds where the interest accumulates and is nat
taxable far incame tax purpases until the bands are sold, it daesn't make any
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difference whether the bonds are sold before or after the owner's death--the
interest will be taxable for income tax purposes.

However, the executor has a

number of choices in how and who should pay the income tax on the accumulated
bond income.

The executor can accrue the bond interest and put it on the last

income tax return of the decedent or he can continue to hold them and then make
a distribution to the beneficiary and let the beneficiary sell them and pay the
income tax on the income of sale; or the executor can accrue them in the executor's
estate and sell part of them and hold part of them until a later'date and thus
spread the income over more than I year.
I had a case where the decedent died in February and her son (the only
heir of her estate) was in the 60 percent income tax bracket.
to generate a considerable amount of taxable income.

The estate was going

We decided to accrue the

interest in her last income tax return because she had very little income in that
I month before her death.

We saved about $5,000 just on that one transaction.

If the son had received the bonds and then sold them and took the interest income
on top of his other income, it would have resulted in a payment of 60 percent of
the interest income in taxes.
Many of you probably have municipal bonds.

Municipal

~onds

are fully

taxable for federal estate tax purposes and in most states for inheritance tax
purposes.

If you have $10,000 worth of municipal bonds, whatever the~ market

value is worth, at the date of your death they will be taxed in your estate for
federal estate tax purposes at that figure, even though they are free bonds for
income tax purposes.
As you know, in a corporate qualified plan, all of the proceeds representing
the corporation's contribution to the plan are not taxable at your death if they are
left to a named individual, to an inter vivos trust, or in a testamentary trust.
If it's left to a testamentary trust, be sure that you make a provision that the
proceeds from the qualified plan cannot be used for payment of death taxes or
administrative costs of the estate, because if it can be used for that purpose,
it might also be taxable in your estate for federal· estate tax purposes.
If you have a situation where the husband has a sizable estate and the
wife has a very small estate, sometimes it's wise to put in your will that in the
event of the simultaneous death of the husband and the wife, it will be assumed
that the wife has survived the husband.

The same wording should be used in both

wills, assuming the husband has the larger estate, in the event they die
simultaneously and it cannot be determined which spouse died first.
QUESTION AND ANSWERS:
QUESTION:

How are common stocks, owned by the deceased but held by a reliable

brok:.era.ge

firm, treated for death tax purposes?

MR. ROTHSCHILD:

They would be evaluated in your estate at the fair market value

as of the date of death.

Actually, you can evaluate the estate at the date of

death or 6 months thereafter.

If the value of those stocks, for instance, should
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go down in that 6 months period, you might want to take the
and perhaps save some death taxes.
QUESTION:

Is there any advantage to having a co-executor

instance, your wife and a bank?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

You can.

It provides a little check and balance on the bank.

It doesn't make any difference as far as the fee is concerned because the bank will
take the full fee.
QUES'I'ION:

Is a trust to the wife for lifetime included in the decedent's estate

for estate tax purposes?

What's the tax

treat~ent

on that?

You have listed in

your outline short term trusts and irrevocable trusts and
I was wondering about
,
the tax treatment of the different types of trusts, too.

Could you comment on

that?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

What I was talking about in the outline were living trusts.

These are not trusts connected with your will.
set up in estate planning for your family.
different types of trusts.

These are inter vivos trusts you

Basically, this group covers three

A revocable trust, which you can revoke at any time

you want to, has no estate tax significance, no income tax significance, and no
gift tax significance.

Then there is a short term trust.

This is used where

the individual is in a high income bracket but doesn't have aiarge estate.
However, he does have enough property to put some aside in a trust
of no less than 10 years.

fQr~

a period

The income from the short term trust principal is

distributed to the income beneficiary, such as the grantor's children or to a
parent of the grantor and then at the end of the 10 years, the property reverts
back to the grantor.

It's primarily an income tax advantage, but it also can

have some estate tax disadvantage, because if the grantor dies before the
short term trust terminates, a portion of the trust would not be taxable in
the grantor's estate, based on the amount of the acturial part of the income
which the grantor would not be entitled to receive until the end of the 10
year period.

There could be a gift tax on the trust proceeds; about 40 per

cent of what you put into it would have to be included as a gift at the
time that you set up the short term trust.
The irrevocable trust is the best overall tax saving tool of all because
that trust not only has the tax advantage of keeping its income from being taxed
to the grantor, but it also eliminates federal estate tax if it's properly drawn.
If your estate is large enough that you feel you can do without the property
given away, this trust is often a very attractive tool.

Property given to a

revocable trust is a gift and might result in gift tax to be paid by the grantor.
However, each of the parents has a $30,000 lifetime exemption, and the children
have a $3,000 a year exclusion.
QUESTION:

How about these testamentary trusts?

MR. ROTHSCHILD:

With a testamentary trust, the object is to keep property out of

the wife's estate as of the. date of her death.
QUESTION:

It goes on down to the children.

This is not exactly a tax question, but as a physician, I'm constantly
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hearing about people for whom a will has been provided, but there's absolutely
nothing for them to operate on for the first year or two
to the money.

b~cause

they can't get

Is there some mechanism by which some insurance money can go

directly to the family for immediate use, or do they always have to wait for all
this probate business?
MR. ROTHSCHILD:

Of course, you know that insurance, if your contract calls for

it, is not going to go through probate.

If the wife is the outright beneficiary,

she should be able to get the proceeds withln 30 days after your death.

If I

have a marital deduction where the wife gets the marital property outright and
the balance goes in trust for the wife for her liftime and then in

trusts~for

the children, I'll normally recommend one-half of the proceeds be left outright
to the wife and the other half of life insurance proceeds be left in trust.
If all the property gets tied up in probate, a widow has an allowance in
Kentucky.

That's one of the reasons that it's important for you to develop

liquidity in what you have--so that it doesn't get all tied up in property that
you can't convert to cash for that allowance.

Thus, it also becomes advisable

for you to consider life insurance so that you do have immediate cash available.
QUESTION:

I have a question relating to a recent Kentucky Supreme Court

decision about the valuation of several acres of farm land.

It is,,-being used

for agricultural purposes, but suppose that it actually has a higher value in
terms of the possiblity that it is subdivided.
figure~or

Do you value it at the higher

estate tax purposes?

MR. ROTHSCHILD:

I don't like to, but I do.

That particular case was about

property taxes.

I'm talking about estate taxes..

They're not treated the same

way.
QUESTION:

Do you still have to follow that higher figure?

MR. ROTHSCHILD:

Yes, until Congress comes up with some kind of relief, which I'm

hopeful that they'll do, we are faced with that problem in Kentucky and allover
the country.

It's a serious problem because valuations have shot up rather rapidly.
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